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Resumo 
 
 
Do ponto de vista da política económica, existe a 
possibilidade de utilizar a receita dos impostos ambientais 
para baixar os impostos sobre o trabalho, promovendo assim 
o emprego. Esta oportunidade surge na literatura como forma 
dos países industrializados responderem a um duplo desafio: 
um crescente nível de poluição e um decrescente nível de 
emprego. Alguns países tomaram já decisões no sentido de 
alcançar o “duplo dividendo”: melhorias ambientais e 
diminuição do desemprego. Os resultados teóricos, na sua 
maioria cépticos em relação à verificação do segundo 
dividendo, são substancialmente contrariados por uma série 
de estudos que utilizam modelos de equilíbrio geral. Pretende-
se com este trabalho fazer uma simulação para a economia 
portuguesa de uma reforma fiscal ambiental com as 
características referidas e a verificação da existência do 
“duplo dividendo”, através de um modelo computacional de 
equilíbrio geral. 
Para além disso, é feita uma análise dos impactos do 
Mercado Europeu de Licenças de Emissão, ao nível sectorial 
e regional, em Portugal, utilizando dados microeconómicos, 
com o objectivo de estudar as consequências ao nível das 
trasacções entre sectores e efeitos distributivos entre regiões. 
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Abstract 
 
A discussion has arisen amongst economic policy-makers, 
about using the revenue of environmental taxes to lower labor 
taxes, thus improving employment. This possibility appears in 
literature as an answer to a double challenge facing 
industrialized countries: the increasing level of pollution and 
decreasing level of job creation. Some countries have already 
taken decisions in the direction of the “double dividend”: 
environmental improvements and reduction of unemployment. 
The theoretical results, mostly skeptical to this second 
dividend, are substantially opposed by empirical studies that 
use general equilibrium models.  The goals of this work are to 
make a simulation for the Portuguese economy of a Green 
Tax Reform with the referred characteristics and to verify the 
“double dividend” hypothesis, through a computational general 
equilibrium model. 
An analysis of the impacts of the European Carbon Market is 
also made, both at the sectoral and regional level, in Portugal, 
using micro data, with the objective of studying the 
consequences on the transactions between sectors and the 
distributive effects between regions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Motivation: Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol and Environmental 
Policies 
 
In the last years the expressions “Climate Change” and “Global Warming” 
appear daily in the news and are used by environmentalists, academics and 
politicians as very imperative issues. It is important to clarify them, 
because they are often used to express the same idea1. 
 
Climate change may refer to any important change in climate (temperature, 
precipitation, or wind) that subsists for a long period of time (decades 
or longer). These changes may result from natural factors (such as 
changes in the sun's intensity or slow changes in the Earth's orbit 
around the sun), natural processes (e.g. changes in ocean circulation) 
and human activities that change the atmosphere's composition (e.g. 
through burning fossil fuels) and the land surface (e.g. deforestation, 
reforestation, urbanization, desertification, etc.). 
 
Global warming is an average increase in the temperature of the 
atmosphere near the Earth's surface and in the troposphere, which can 
contribute to changes in global climate patterns. Global warming can 
occur from a variety of causes, both natural and human induced. In common 
usage, global warming often refers to the warming that can occur as a 
result of increased emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) from human 
activities. 
Most meteorologists and climate scientists consider that human action has 
a very important effect on these phenomena. The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) says that great part of the heating 
observed during the last 50 years is due to a greenhouse effect2, caused 
by the increase of the concentrations of GHG originated by a more 
                                                          
1
 See http://epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html for some definitions. 
2
 “Greenhouse gases effectively absorb thermal infrared radiation, emitted by the 
Earth’s surface, by the atmosphere itself due to the same gases, and by clouds. 
Atmospheric radiation is emitted to all sides, including downward to the Earth’s 
surface. Thus, greenhouse gases trap heat within the surface-troposphere system. This 
is called the greenhouse effect.” In IPCC (2007). 
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intensive use of underground and ground water in agriculture, by a 
stronger energy consumption and by the increase in manmade pollution. 
Total annual emissions of GHG have been rising steadily. Over the last 
three decades, GHG emissions increased by an average of 1,6% per year, 
with carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the use of fossil fuels growing 
at a rate of 1,9% per year (IPCC, 2007). The effects of this pollution 
can lead to unsustainable development with important consequences for 
humans and for natural resources (namely through global warming, as 
referred above). 
 
The world conscience that we have environmental common problems, problems 
that countries must try to solve together, was revealed explicitly for 
the first time in 1979, with the First World Climate Conference. Then, 
the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere followed in Canada 
1988, where IPCC recognized for the first time the existence of a climate 
change problem. 
 
After that appeared the IPCC's First Assessment Report, in Sweden 1990, 
and the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change, in 
ECO-92 in Brazil, which started to be effective in March 1994. During 
this last conference it was shown that, in developed countries, some 
measures were being taken to control environmental damages, but in 
developing countries the economic growth has monopolized all priorities, 
while the environment has been degraded. 
 
To invert this situation, the UN convention had the objective of 
stabilizing the concentrations of GHG at a level that would prevent 
anthropogenic dangerous interferences in the climatic system and reduce 
the existing social and economic inequalities between developed 
countries, developing countries and even underdeveloped countries. For 
that purpose, it establishes common but differentiated responsibilities, 
distinguishing between developed and developing countries. Developed 
countries were pointed as being, historically, the main contributors to 
the GHG emissions and global warming.  
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In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was signed (but started to be effective only 
in 20053), proposing a calendar to GHG reduction.  The detailed rules for 
the implementation of the Protocol were adopted at 7th Conference of the 
Parties (COP 7) in Marrakesh in 2001, and are called the “Marrakesh 
Accords.” 
 
OECD members (or developed) countries and ex-Soviet bloc integrating 
countries, denominated “countries in transition to a market economy”, 
compose the Annex B of the Protocol. These countries committed 
voluntarily and formally to reduce their GHG emissions4 to at least 5,2% 
below the 1990 levels , in the period 2008-2012, as well as to help, 
financial and technically, the developing countries to adopt “clean” 
technologies in power and industrial sectors. Particularly, the European 
Union (EU) parties agreed to reduce its emissions by 8% in the period 
2008-2012 in comparison with 1990 levels. 
 
Also, all the countries are committed to formulate and to manage national 
plans on reducing climate change, as well as to make and present to the 
Convention updated periodic inventories of their sources of emissions and 
their carbon drains. 
 
The Protocol rules were not symmetrical. In order for the EU to reach its 
goals of reduction, it was made an agreement in 1998 to divide the 
responsibility of reduction of GHG in an unequal way among the Member 
States. This method took care of diverse variables like historical income 
per capita, GHG emissions, the chances for reducing these, the level of 
economic development, the energy mix, the industrial structure, etc. It 
is known as “the burden sharing agreement”.  
 
                                                          
3 This delay in its effectiveness was due to the requirement of its ratification by 
industrialized countries responsible for at least, 55% of CO2 emissions, fact that only 
happened in 2005, with the ratification of Russia, responsible for 17% (EU for 36%). On the 
other side, the United States and Australia governments denied to sign the Protocol, 
invoking competitiveness and economic reasons. 
4 Kyoto Protocol covers the following GHG: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), per fluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride 
(SF6). 
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The distribution of the responsibilities varies a lot, as we can see in 
table 15: Luxembourg must reduce its emissions by 28%, whereas Portugal 
can increase its emissions by 27%. 
 
Table 1 - Burden-sharing target of the EU – Target 2008-2012 
EU 15 - Countries Emissions allowed above 1990 level (%) 
Austria -13 
Belgium -7,5 
Denmark -21 
Finland 0 
France 0 
Germany -21 
Greece 25 
Ireland 13 
Italy -6,5 
Luxembourg -28 
Netherlands -6 
Portugal 27 
Spain 15 
Sweden 4 
UK -12,5 
EU 15 Kyoto target -8 
Source: Climate Action Network Europe in http://www.climnet.org/resources/euburden.htm. Per 
decision of EU Environment Council 16th June 1998. Reaffirmed by joint ratification of the 
Kyoto protocol on May 31st 2002. 
 
The Protocol also previews some flexible mechanisms like Joint 
Implementation, Mechanism of Clean Development and Emission Trade System.  
 
The first one gives to any country with an emission reduction commitment 
(Annex B Party), the possibility of obtaining emission reduction units 
through investing in emission reduction projects in another Annex B 
Party. Joint implementation offers Parties a flexible and cost-efficient 
                                                          
5 For a discussion about the way “Burden Sharing” should be allocated see Verdestal & 
Svendsen (2004) or Posner & Sunstein (2008). 
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means of fulfilling a part of their Kyoto commitments, while the host 
Party benefits from foreign investment and technology transfer.  
The Mechanism of Clean Development allows that an Annex B Party executes 
a project of reduction of emissions in developing countries, like Latin 
American countries. With such projects they can gain sealable emission 
reduction credits, each one equivalent to a ton of CO2 that can be 
counted for its Kyoto goal. It’s a flexible instrument to reduce the 
emissions, stimulating sustainable development and the reduction of 
emissions. 
Annex B Parties can also use the Emission Trade System as an instrument 
to fulfil its Kyoto target. This scheme allows countries to sell 
credits, if their emissions are bellow the target, or buy credits if 
they are over their targets. 
So, by this Protocol, each country is free to choose the best way to 
reduce its GHG emissions. But beyond the Kyoto mechanisms, which other 
instruments can support countries in reaching these goals for GHG 
emissions? We can refer to taxes, permit markets and command and control 
instruments. 
 
Environmental problems are, mostly, a consequence of polluting agents not 
having to support the costs of its actions. According to Coase Theorem, 
if the agents involved in externalities are able to negotiate (without 
transaction costs), and there are property rights well defined by the 
State, an agreement where the externalities are internalized may be 
reached. 
 
Accordingly, if negotiation is possible, it can lead to the inclusion of 
emissions costs in the decisions of the polluting agent. If the 
negotiation is not practicable, then it can be possible for the 
government to reach a similar result through the imposition of a tax on 
the polluting agent, whose amount represents the value of the externality 
caused. This idea was presented by Arthur Pigou in 19206, being these 
taxes frequently cited as Pigou taxes. 
                                                          
6
 (Pigou, [1920] 1932) 
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These taxes correct price distortions in the market, incorporating the 
environmental costs of the emissions (and other costs) into the market 
prices – they correct prices and apply the “polluter pays principle”7.  
 
More recently it has been proposed the introduction of a system of 
emission-permits instead of pollution taxes. An emission-permit system is 
a pollution-control instrument based on requiring pollution sources to 
hold transferable permits. It is frequently called a “cap and trade” 
system.  
 
The regulator issues the desired number of permits (“cap”), that is, the 
limit for the emissions of the pollutant. The companies or other groups 
have to hold emission licenses that give them the right to emit the 
respective pollutants. The total sum of licenses cannot exceed the “cap”, 
limiting the emissions to this sum. Each source designs its own 
compliance strategy, including sale or purchase of allowances and 
pollution abatement. The companies who need to increase its emissions 
beyond the credits will have to buy licenses to the ones that pollute 
less. In such a way, the purchasers will pay a charge for polluting, 
while the sellers will be rewarded by having reduced the emissions beyond 
what was demanded.  
 
Price-driven instruments, like taxes and tradable quotas, allow 
flexibility in how, where and when emission reductions are made, giving 
chances and inducements to minimize the cost of mitigation (static 
efficiency). For instance, an emission tax gives to the producers, who 
know their technology better, the incentive to choose the cheaper method 
of pollution control: reducing the production; changing the technology; 
using a different fuel, as natural gas instead of coal; introducing 
methods of pollution control to remove the pollutants of the emissions; 
dislocating the production process to a less sensible localization, etc.  
 
Moreover, taxes and transferable quotas allow the producers with lesser 
costs of reducing pollution to make a bigger adjustment that the ones 
with higher costs. In such a way, the total cost of reduction of the 
pollution can be minimized. Additionally, these instruments have dynamic 
efficiency, as they give continuous incentives for the reduction of the 
pollution and for technological innovation (OECD, 1997). Thus the 
                                                          
7
 See European Environment Agency (1996) and Hodge (1995) for advantages of environmental 
taxes in pollution control. 
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incentives created by price-driven instruments ensure that the 
policymaker’s environmental goals are achieved at the lowest possible 
cost for the whole economy. 
 
Finally, considering that producers and consumers will not abandon the 
regulated activities, taxes and tradable quotas will increase public 
revenues (in the case of tradable quotas, this will only happen if they 
are auctioned quotas). These can be used directly to solve environmental 
problems or to subsidize producers and/or consumers to modify its 
environmental behaviour; they can still be applied in other government 
projects, allowing that other taxes, for instance, labour taxes, are 
reduced.  
 
 
1.2. Green Tax Reform and Double Dividend: definitions and European 
experience 
 
In the last years, industrialized countries maintained a high and 
increasing level of unemployment and, at the same time, they faced 
serious and persisting environmental problems. The perception of these 
two realities brought the politicians and academics to debate the idea 
that environmental taxes could be used to simultaneously improve the 
environmental quality and to diminish the rate of unemployment.  
 
In 1992, the European Commission presented proposals, with the main 
objective of introducing a tax on energy and carbon dioxide emissions to 
stabilize the CO2 emissions, until the year 2000, at their level of 1990.  
This measure was considered as a key element of world-wide policies 
destined to reduce emissions of GHG and to fight global warming.  A 
secondary objective consisted of assuring a general economy of energy:  
this was one of the reasons why the tax was designed to fall partly on 
CO2 emissions and partly on the energy content.  Finally, the proposal 
was considered an integrant part of a global policy of fiscal reform. 
 
Since fiscal neutrality was intended, revenues could be used to reduce 
other taxes - namely to substitute labour taxation, thus producing some 
non-environmental benefits as well (employment, efficiency, etc), known 
in the literature as the double dividend of environmental taxes. However, 
this proposal was rejected by some countries. Anyway, many OCDE countries 
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have been implementing environmental taxes since the middle of the 80’s 
and Green Tax Reforms (GTR) were introduced in the following context: the 
distortive taxes on labour and capital have been reduced and 
environmental taxes were increased or introduced. Particularly, many 
governments have reduced the labour taxes (in particular non-wage labour 
cost) with the aim of reducing unemployment.  
 
This substitution of taxes lead to a “double dividend” as, in one hand, 
it improves the environment and, on the other hand, it diminishes the 
unemployment and/or increases the economic efficiency. The taxes on 
environment harmful activities don’t distort the economic decisions, but, 
on the opposite, they correct the existing distortions. Environmental 
taxes discourage activities that provoke economic public losses, and, as 
such, they do not impose any “deadweight loss”, but provide revenues and 
economic profits. These can be used to reduce other taxes that have a 
“deadweight loss”, namely the Social Security Contributions (SSC). So, it 
becomes easier to implement an environmental reform, as its aims go 
beyond the environmental protection. 
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the European Commission presented in 
April 2011 a proposal that resembles the GTR implemented in some European 
countries8. The European Commission pursues two main goals: (i) to 
contribute to growth and employment by shifting taxation from labour to 
consumption, (ii) to promote energy efficiency and consumption of more 
environmentally friendly products. Furthermore, the proposal aims to 
complement the existing EU ETS by applying a CO2 tax to sectors that are 
out of its present scope (transport, households, agriculture and small 
industries). If approved, this will result in a sort of hybrid regulation 
system for CO2 emissions, thus ameliorating some of the efficient 
concerns raised previously. 
 
The proposal includes splitting the minimum energy tax rate into two 
elements: on one hand a CO2 emission tax for each energy product equal to 
€20 per tonne of CO2; on the other hand, another tax based on its energy 
content, i.e. measured in Gigajoules (GJ). As a result of both elements 
the minimum tax rate would be fixed at €9.6/GJ for motor fuels, and 
€0.15/GJ for heating fuels. This will apply to all fuels used for 
transport and heating. 
                                                          
8 European Commission (2011). 
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The proposal considers also some sort of social aspects and transitional 
periods which are taken into account for improving political acceptance. 
As a result the Member States might exempt from taxation energy consumed 
by households for their heating and the transitional periods for the full 
alignment of taxation of the energy content might last until 2023. 
 
Alternative definitions have led to some confusion in the debate on the 
double dividend. European authors define the second dividend usually as 
an increase in employment (Ligthart & van der Ploeg, 1996). American 
authors define the second dividend in terms of a reduction in the 
distortive cost of the tax system (L. H. Goulder, 1995; Parry, 1995). 
 
There are mainly two different approaches to the double dividend 
hypothesis: the “environmental” approach and the “public finance” 
approach. 
 
The first one, supported by Tullock (1967), Terkla (1984), Lee and 
Misiolek (1986) and Pearce (1991), is based on the idea that the 
environmental taxes give extra benefits, because they are the best way to 
control pollution and because they increase efficiency, as long as 
revenues are used to diminish distorting taxes. This approach uses 
partial equilibrium models to explain its results, ignoring, in this way, 
that the interaction of environmental taxes with other taxes can amplify 
some efficiency losses9. Furthermore, it does an incomplete and ambiguous 
characterization of the two dividends. 
 
The “public finance” approach, developed mostly in the 90’s (see 
Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) for a survey), focus on the second dividend, 
that is, the efficiency gains or losses of the fiscal system after 
introducing environmental taxes. Using General Equilibrium Models (GEM), 
it allows a complete characterization of the two dividends to be made: 
the first one covers the variations of welfare related with the 
environment, as it reduces the externalities associated with pollution; 
the second one focus its attention on variations occurring in non 
environmental welfare. 
  
There are alternative definitions, as can be seen in Goulder (1995). This 
author distinguished three definitions of double dividend: (i) in the 
                                                          
9
 See for instance Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) 
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weak form: the use of revenues of environmental taxes to finance 
reductions in a distortive tax, originates cost savings “vis-à-vis” the 
case where the revenues returned to households under lump-sum transfers; 
(ii) in the intermediate form: it is possible to find at least a 
distortive tax that can be substituted by an environmental tax at null or 
negative costs; (iii) in the strong form: it’s possible to substitute any 
distortive tax at null or negative costs. 
 
Giménez & Rodríguez (2010) criticize the “public finance” approach, 
saying that it overestimates the efficiency costs of the GTR, linking the 
second dividend to the efficiency costs of the GTR and including the 
primary costs of the reform as part of the variations of non 
environmental welfare (primary costs are the costs of reducing 
inefficient levels of emissions and consumption, that according to 
authors, would not have to be seen as efficiency costs). So, they 
consider an alternative definition in which the first dividend has to do 
with net benefits in welfare after applying or increasing environmental 
taxes, when the revenues are returned to the families by lump-sum 
transfers. The second has to do with the resultant variations of welfare 
in reduction of distortive taxes instead of lump-sum transfers. This 
definition exceeds the Goulder definition of strong and weak double 
dividend, because it concentrates on its signal. It has a relevant policy 
implication as it establishes a criterion to apply only the environmental 
tax, or alternatively using its revenues to diminish a distortive tax. It 
avoids confusion between economic and efficiency costs and simplifies the 
computation of the two dividends. 
 
Based in the existing literature and some empirical evidence about double 
dividend, some EU Member States have separately looked for solutions for 
the CO2 emissions problem and some countries have shown a large effort in 
developing GTRs in the last years. It is complicated to make ex-post 
evaluations of these experiences and from there to derive clear rules to 
attain the double dividend. The environmental taxes seem to raise good 
results in economic and environmental grounds, but a small number of 
evaluations of its effectiveness have been made, because the 
environmental taxes are used in concurrence with other instruments of 
environmental policy. 
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Next we present a resumed version of some GTR experiences10. In some 
cases we also present simulations11 and results for these countries. 
 
Sweden  
In 1991, Sweden was one of the first countries in Europe to implement a 
GTR. The main objective was to reduce some distortive taxes on labour, 
personal income and employers’ SSC. To keep the tax revenue constant, 
some indirect taxes were increased, some new environmental taxes were 
introduced, as the tax on the carbon-energy (with some exemptions for 
energy-intensive industries), and some taxes were increased, like the tax 
on diesel, the tax on the electricity, and taxes on fertilizers, 
pesticides, aerial traffic, batteries, etc.12 
 
The Swedish Green Tax Commission analyzed the effect in employment of an 
increase of the tax on CO2, coupled with a reduction on labour taxes, 
using a GEM. The conclusions point to a loss of welfare, due to a 
reduction of the real income. This loss does not include the 
environmental gain. Between the companies, there were different winners 
and losers. The winners are in sectors such as telecommunications and 
medicines. The losers are companies of paper, transports and sectors of 
retail (European Environment Agency, 1996; Brännlund & Kriström, 1999). 
 
Denmark 
Denmark implemented an environmental reform in 1993. The main objective 
was to reduce the taxes in all income sources and gradually change the 
tax burden from labour and capital to pollution and the use of scarce 
natural resources (Danish Ministry of Finance, 1995). Taxes on fossil 
fuels, electricity and waste were increased. Since 1995, new 
environmental taxes on the use of energy by the industries (i.e. taxes on 
CO2 and SO2) were introduced. All the income from these taxes was 
recycled again for the industry, like subsidies for investments whose aim 
is energy saving and cuts in the SSC of the workforce. 
 
In 1998 an evaluation was made of the results attained with this policy 
and it concluded that this policy contributed to a reduction of the CO2 
                                                          
10
 See Gago, Labandeira and Rodríguez (2003), Hoerner and Bosquet (2001) or Gago & Labandeira 
(2011) for a detailed analysis of recent GTR experiences. 
11
 For more GTR simulations see for instance Majocchi (1996), Proost and van Regemorter 
(1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1997), Hayden (1999) or Labandeira, Labeaga, and Rodríguez 
(2004). 
12
 Source: Swedish government (2003) 
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emissions in about 4% in 2005 (OECD, 2000). The Inter-ministerial Dithmer 
Committee calculated the impact of the unilateral increase of the tax on 
CO2 in the industries and concluded that a positive impact in the 
employment existed, in the order of 1000 new jobs, at the same time that 
a reduction of 5% in CO2 emissions was obtained. The revenues of these 
taxes would be recycled for the reduction of SSC and also for subsidies 
to the investment (European Environment Agency, 1996). 
 
Netherland 
Between 1971 and 1996, the Dutch tax structure and environmental taxes 
evolved from a simple redistributive system to an “ecological” tax 
system. From 1996 a new tax on energy has been put into practice in small 
scale to the consumers (families, small commercial establishments, etc.). 
These revenues were recycled for the families through reductions on 
income tax and on workers SSC (OECD, 1997; European Environment Agency, 
1996).   
 
In 1994 it was estimated (Dutch Commission for Greening the Fiscal 
System, 1996) that the tax on CO2, existing since 1980, reduced the level 
of emissions in about 1%. Vermend and Van der Vaart (1998) and Komen and 
Peerlings (1999), used GEM to evaluate the effects of the environmental 
policies in this country. The first ones simulated an increase on energy 
tax, and a reduction of the price of labour insurance. The results showed 
a little deterioration in the industrial competitiveness and a reduction 
in private consumption, exportations and Gross domestic product,  due to 
an increase on prices and a reduction in tax revenues (given that the tax 
base was reduced, as there was a trend to save energy). This was 
reflected in a little fall on the employment rate. 
 
The second simulation had more positive results, distinguishing two kinds 
of energy tax: one for small users and another for all the industries. In 
both simulations the tax revenues are used to reduce labour taxes. In the 
case of the tax for small users, both welfare and employment increase, 
verifying the double dividend. The difference is that this simulation 
considers more than one production factor, what allows the environmental 
tax to alleviate the inefficient distribution of the tax weight between 
factors, as there is a redistribution of the factors most taxed to the 
factors less taxed. In the general tax, the conclusions are basically the 
same, with a small reduction in welfare. 
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Germany 
Germany adopted a law, in April of 1999, with the objective of making 
energy more expensive. Five steps of tax increases were taken on the main 
transport fuels (oil and diesel) and in other energy products; a tax on 
electricity was also introduced. Special tax conditions were given to 
some industries, agriculture, fishery and forestry, and factories 
employing disabled people. The GTR in Germany increased the total value 
of energy taxes from 34.1 billion Euros in 1998 to around 52.7 billion – 
an increase of 55 percent, from 1999 to 2003. The proportion of taxes 
levied on the factor ‘environment’ increased from 8.0 percent in 1998 to 
9.7 percent in 2003 (Green Budget Germany, 2006). The revenues were used 
to diminish the employee’s and employer’s SSC (OECD, 2000).  
 
Bach, et al. (2002) analyzed the impact of the GTR in Germany, using two 
models (macroeconometrical and a GEM). The macroeconomic results are also 
linked to a microeconomic model in the family sector, in order to study 
the effects on the distribution of income. They verify a small “double 
dividend” as CO2 emissions diminish and employment increases. The impact 
on economic growth is found to be minimal. The fear that the 
environmental fiscal reform might interfere with the goals of social and 
income-distribution policy is found to be largely unjustified. 
 
Norway 
Norway applies since 1992 a GTR project, with the existence of two taxes 
on carbon/energy: a general tax on fuels and a tax for small users 
covering gasoline and electricity. The first one covers all energy inputs 
and taxes fall 50% on the carbon content and 50% on the energy value. 
These taxes are relatively low, but reductions or exemptions are 
practically inexistent. Revenues are used to reduce the income tax, to 
stimulate investments that provide energy savings for the families and 
companies and to pay compensations to the companies (OECD, 2000). 
 
A study made for the Central Planning Bureau (1992), showed a clear 
effect on the competitiveness if the tax fell on the energy-intensive 
industries and also showed some differences between the macroeconomic 
effect of an unilateral application of the tax on Norway and of a common 
application of the tax on the OCDE countries, as the production and 
labour in the energy intensive industries could change location to other 
countries of the OCDE, for instance. For the period of 1991-1993, Larsen 
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and Nesbakken (1997) found a reduction of CO2 emissions in about 3-4%. In 
the particular case of paper industry, the oil consumption would have 
been 21% higher if the tax did not exist. For the sector of intermediate 
products and for government services the oil consumption would have been 
11 and 10% higher. 
 
Finland 
Finland adopted the GTR in 1989, cutting income tax and SSC, raising 
energy taxes and introducing new environmental taxes (OECD, 1997; 
European Environment Agency, 1996). In January of 1990  a CO2 tax based 
on the carbon content of fossil fuels was introduced. The tax rate 
evolved from €1,12/t CO2 in 1990 to €20/t CO2 in 2010 (Green Budget 
Europe, 2011). Some deviations existed: natural gas met a reduced rate, 
and peat was exempted in 2005-2010. In 1994-1996 a combined surtax base 
of carbon+energy content was applied (Green Budget Europe, 2011). 
 
In 1998, the Finnish government approved a new package of GTR, with 
reduction of SSC, on one side, and, on the other, the incorporation of a 
Landfill Tax and a change in energy taxation (namely an increase on 
electricity tax of about 25%). The tax on CO2 emissions also had a 
similar increase and was imposed only on traffic fuels and heating fuels. 
Other approved measures were a high tax deduction for Aeolian and waste 
energy, the maintenance of the deductions for wood production and for 
electricity generated by its combustion and for heat and power engines 
(Gago, Labandeira and Rodríguez, 2003). 
 
In January 2011 a reform was introduced in such a way that liquid fuels 
and coal are taxed, not only according to their energy and CO2 content, 
but also with regard to their emissions into the local environment, which 
have adverse health effects. Furthermore, the CO2 component is 
now based on a lifecycle approach instead of combustion emissions only 
(Green Budget Europe, 2011). 
 
Two studies had been used to review the environmental policies in 
Finland: the KESSU IV model of the Ministry of Finance and the University 
of Oulu’s FMS model. Both models predicted that imposing a CO2 tax and 
recycling the revenues through reductions in personal income tax would 
negatively affect the Finnish economy on virtually all counts. These 
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impacts would be smaller if revenue recycling happened through cuts in 
employers’ SSC or in VAT (Finnish Ministry of the Environment, 1994). 
 
Italy 
In 1999 a new tax on CO2 emissions was introduced. The GTR was based on 
two components: (i) a gradual adjustment of the indirect taxes on mineral 
fuels, since 1999 to 2005, in accordance with its use and with their 
amount of carbon; (ii) the introduction of a tax on consumption of coal, 
fuels and natural bitumen, used in the incinerators, as foreseen in the 
directive of CE 88/609. The revenues of these taxes would be used the 
following way: 60,5% for reductions in workers SSC; 31,1% for 
compensation measures; and 8,4% for interventions to improve the 
efficiency in energy use (OECD, 2000). 
 
Ireland 
After the financial crisis that the Irish government faced in 2010, the 
GTR was singled as a way to raise considerable revenues to assist the 
country in its efforts to rebalance the budget. 
 
Professor Frank J. Convery from University College in Dublin published 
some comments on the potential of new environmental taxes in Ireland. He 
looked at the impacts of levies on water, aggregates and packaging, taxes 
on land value and reformed taxes on GHG. He pointed out that “given that 
Ireland has to raise taxes anyway, it makes sense to raise them in ways 
that simultaneously improve environmental quality, provide incentives for 
new low carbon enterprise, ensure managing resources efficiently, help 
meet EU obligations, apply the polluter pays principle, and that allow 
other taxes that damage economic performance to be reduced or at least 
limit the extent of the rise” (Convery, 2010). 
 
In order to increase state revenue, Ireland introduced the carbon tax at 
a rate of 15 Euros per ton in the 2010 Budget. The price of carbon will 
be doubled to 30 Euro per tonne until 2014, thereby contributing 330 
million Euros to the overall correction. On the other side, and to 
compensate the living standards of citizens, the corporation tax will 
remain untouched at 12,5% (Green Budget Europe, 2010b).  
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Estonia 
A phased GTR was approved in Estonia in 2005. The first phase, in 2006-
2008, and the second one in 2009-2013. The reform designed a gradual 
increase of taxes on emission, natural resources and fuels for 
transportation. Furthermore, it was introduced a tax on natural gas and 
electricity. The tax revenues were recycled through personal income tax 
reduction (Gago & Labandeira (2011)).   
 
Czech Republic 
Czech Republic also approved a phased GTR in 2007. The first phase, begun 
in 2008 and used the revenues from new energy taxes to reduce SSC.  In 
the second phase, planned for 2009-2010, a new tax on CO2 emissions was 
introduced. The third phase, programmed to begin after 2012, is pending 
of diverse parliamentary proceedings (Gago & Labandeira (2011)).  
 
 
Beyond particular cases of GTR, we present now some recent trends in this 
issue, for European countries, in particular the evolution of 
environmental taxes and labour taxes levels, taking as reference European 
Commission (2010) data and conclusions. 
 
This report shows that the share of environmental taxes in total tax 
revenue is decreasing for the EU-27 as a whole, reaching 6,1% in 2008 
(from 6.8% in 2000). At the same time, the share of taxes on labour also 
decreased slightly (from 50.1% in 2000 to 50.0% in 2008). However, this 
does not hold in all Member States and some of them (Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Estonia, Poland) have increased the share of environmental taxes while 
decreasing taxes on labour. 
 
Although these experiences have different designs, they all have common 
points: the introduced or increased environmental taxes were essentially 
taxes on energy or in CO2 emissions; they were all revenue neutral, that 
is, all revenues from environmental taxes were recycled back to the 
economy. However, we can see some discrepancies in the diversity of 
environmental taxes used and in the time frame of GTRs.  
 
EEA technical report (European Environment Agency, 2005) presents some 
lessons to learn from these GTR experiences, namely: (i) the need of a 
gradual phasing-in of the reforms; (ii) the extensive use of a public 
Introduction 
17 
 
information campaign to generate public support for the shift in taxation 
from goods to environmental evils; (iii) the use of environmental taxes 
to reduce the revenue taken from other taxes, such as those on income and 
labour; (iv) the extension of GTR from energy taxes to instruments that 
give an economic incentive and serve as a filter to undertake energy-
saving measures at least cost; (v) the integration of GTR into a much 
broader fiscal policy package for overhauling the fiscal system and not 
be perceived as an individual and autonomous fiscal program; (vi) the 
significance of green tax commissions for implementing GTR, particularly 
because of their value for improving understanding of concepts and 
processes; (vi) the use of rebates and exemptions only in a temporary way 
so that the transition to a more sustainable development is delayed 
rather than avoided. 
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Table 2 - Main characteristics of ETRs in European Countries 
 
 
Country Year Reduced or eliminated 
taxes 
Environmental taxes 
Sweden 1991 Tax on personal income, 
employers SSC 
Energy tax (CO2) 
Tax on SO2 emissions 
Electricity tax 
Tax on 
Fertilizers and pesticides, 
aerial traffic, batteries 
Denmark 1993 Tax on personal and 
corporate income, SSC, 
capital tax 
Adjustment on energy taxes 
Energy tax (CO2) 
Tax on SO2 emissions 
Electricity tax 
Waste tax 
Netherland 1996 Tax on personal and 
corporate income, SSC 
Energy tax (CO2) 
Tax on SO2 emissions 
Tax on 
Fertilizers and pesticides 
Germany 1999 SSC Electricity tax 
Rise on oil, diesel, heating 
and natural gas taxes 
Norway 1992 Income tax Energy tax (CO2) 
Tax on SO2 emissions 
Tax on 
Fertilizers and pesticides 
Finland 1989 
1998 
Personal Income tax 
SSC 
Energy tax (CO2) 
Landfill tax 
Electricity tax 
Italy 1999 SSC Adjustment on energy taxes 
Tax on coal and other fuels 
used in incinerators 
Estonia 2005 Income tax Tax on emissions 
Tax on natural resources 
Tax on fuels for 
transportation 
It was introduced a tax on 
natural gas and electricity 
Czech 
Republic 
2008 SSC Energy taxes 
New tax on CO2 emissions 
Source:(Gago, Labandeira, & Rodríguez, (2001) and own elaboration.  
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1.3. European Union Emission Trade System: definition and experience 
 
The European Commission has pledged to analyze, measure, and apply 
European policies to reduce the emissions of GHG. In parallel to 
environmental taxes applied in some European countries, the European 
Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) represents the main EU policy 
against climate change. The economic activities engaged in this market 
must have emission of CO2 quotas (or emission licences), without which 
they will not have license to operate. The holders of emission licenses 
can produce CO2 emissions in an amount equivalent to the received 
licenses. The installations are, in this way, stimulated to invest in the 
reduction of emissions and can sell the exceeding licenses in the ECM. 
The installations that pollute more than the owned licenses will have to 
buy additional licenses.  
 
The EU ETS was established to that effect by Directive 2003/87/CE and 
appeared in January of 2005. It is based on six fundamental principles: 
1) it is a “cap-and-trade” system (an overall cap is set, defining the 
maximum amount of emissions, and sources can buy or sell allowances on 
the open market at European level); 2) its initial focus is on CO2 from 
big industrial emitters; 3) implementation is taking place in two phases 
(2005-2007 and 2008-2012) with periodic reviews; 4) emission allowances 
are decided within national allocation plans; 5) it includes a strong 
compliance framework; 6) the market is EU-wide but taps emission 
reduction opportunities in the rest of the world through the use of the 
Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, and it also 
provides for links with compatible systems in third countries (European 
Commission, 2007b). 
 
The installations covered by the EU ETS initially received allowances for 
free from each EU Member States government, in what is known as 
“grandfathering”. However, since unused permits13 can be sold, 
installations are stimulated to invest in emissions reduction even when 
they are under the “cap” (the grandfathered allocated permits). Thus the 
EU ETS also provides dynamic efficiency. 
 
                                                          
13
 Carbon permits in the EU ETS are named European Union Allowances (EUA) and each covers 
one ton of carbon. Henceforth in the thesis we will use the word “permit” when referring to 
EUA. 
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Until now, each Member State was able to decide the sum of permits to 
attribute to the installations regulated by the Directive, following 
criteria provided by the European Commission. In the two initial phases, 
a limited number of sectors was included: energy activities (combustion, 
refineries, coke ovens); iron and steel (production and processing); 
mineral industries (cement, glass, ceramic products); and pulp and paper. 
It should be noted that the emissions of the installations covered by the 
market represent approximately 40% of the total CO2 EU emissions14 (51% 
in the Portuguese case for 200615).  
 
In January 2008, the European Commission proposed a number of changes to 
the scheme, namely: (1) a centralized allocation by a EU authority; (2) a 
greater share (up to 60 %) of auctioned permits16; (3) inclusion of other 
GHG, such as nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons (European Commission, 
2008); (4) an overall reduction in the proposed caps of GHG in order to 
reach a 21% decrease in 2020 compared to 2005 emissions17, and finally 
(5) a possible extension of the EU ETS to other industries (such as 
airlines, (European Commission, 2007). These changes are still being 
discussed, and if approved will only become effective from January 2013 
onwards, i.e. in the 3rd trading period of the EU ETS. 
 
In spite of the desirable theoretical properties of emissions permit 
schemes, it is well known that the nature of the EU ETS raises a few 
efficiency and fairness concerns (see for example Labandeira and 
Rodríguez (2010)). Cost-effectiveness of any environmental regulation 
requires a full coverage of emitters when non-subject sectors present 
lower abatement costs. Also, any unequal treatment of sectors generates 
distributional consequences. In defence of the EU ETS design, a market 
limited to main emitters is appealing due to a reduction of 
administrative and compliance costs. Furthermore, there is no evidence of 
market power, which would diminish trading efficiency (Convery & Redmond, 
2007).  
 
                                                          
14
 (European Commission, 2008) 
15
 See APA (Agência Portuguesa do Ambiente, 2008) for total CO2 emissions and NAP summary 
table for regulated CO2 emissions 
16
 Governments could auction up to 5% of allowances in phase I and up to 10% in phase II. In 
phase I, only four out of 25 Member States used auctions at all, and in only one case were 
auctions fully employed to the 5% limit (see Hepburn, Grubb, Neuhoff, Matthes, & Tse (2006) 
and Ellerman & Buchner (2007). 
17
 And 30% compared to 1990 emissions (see European Commission (2007a)). 
Introduction 
21 
 
It is true that a system of emissions trading may be unsuitable for the 
non-covered sectors. However, this does not wholly justify the 
differentiated treatment, because other economic instruments could be 
applicable to these diffuse sectors in order to internalize CO2 emission 
costs, like, for instance, environmental taxes.  
 
Bohringer et al (2006) observe the inefficiencies that can occur with EU-
ETS by separating the market between trading and nontrading sectors, 
because it does not allow an equalized abatement cost between all 
sectors. Furthermore, a hybrid policy that concerns EU ETS plus an 
environmental tax for the non covered sectors, in a GTR context, would be 
a good bet as, in this way, we make all CO2 emitters responsible and 
minimize the cost of the reform. About this, Gimenez and Rodriguez (2010) 
say that “the EU Emission Trading Scheme could (...) be complemented with 
other mechanisms such as ETR (environmental tax reform) through a hybrid 
regulation system, allowing for a wide coverage of polluters with 
reasonable administrative and compliance costs”. 
 
OECD (2002) presents potential motivations for the introduction of taxes 
in the presence of tradable permits. First, because it is possible to 
reduce compliance cost uncertainty. In an emissions allowance systems, 
there is uncertainty about the emission price, because it is determined 
by the market. So, it is possible to delimit the upper and lower bounds 
of the permit price, through environmental taxes and subsidies. Mixing 
the policies, it is possible to reduce the potential welfare losses from 
the regulatory authority either over-estimating or under-estimating 
marginal abatement costs. The environmental tax can function as a “safety 
valve”, when applied to the same companies that participate in the 
emission market. That is, if the permit price reaches the tax (upper 
bound), the companies will prefer to pay the tax, than purchase 
additional licenses.  For the opposite, if the permit price reaches the 
subsidy (lower bound) the companies will prefer to receive it than to 
sell additional permits. Thus diminishing uncertainty, authorities are 
able to convince risk-averse affected firms and households of the 
desirability of introducing a tradable permit regime. 
 
Second, it is possible to capture windfall rents from grandfathered 
permit allocation. When firms receive allocations for free, this 
represents a windfall rent, if the firm reduces emissions below the level 
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of allocated licenses. When applying an environmental tax to these firms, 
it is possible to recover some of these windfall rents. The tax is paid 
in all licenses sold or in stock. In the particular case of electricity 
sector, there are windfall profits in the production through combined 
cycle and thermoelectric devices, because these firms include the value 
of allocated licences in their effective production cost. In fact, these 
licenses are allocated for free, and only represent an opportunity cost. 
This way, these firms artificially raise their cost and therefore the 
electricity price they receive in the market. Here, the environmental tax 
could be used to diminish these windfall profits, representing a real and 
computable cost. 
 
Bygrave and Ellis (2003), point that a hybrid policy can operate in a 
complementary way or there can be a policy transition where one policy 
follows another. For instance, in UK and Denmark, companies are subject 
to both taxes and trading. Böhringer et al (2008) investigated the 
potential efficiency losses arising from the imposition of emission taxes 
on sectors that are covered by the EU ETS, and concluded that unilateral 
emission taxes on sectors subject to the EU ETS are environmentally 
ineffective and increase overall compliance cost of the EU ETS. 
 
Complementary policies can be targeted to work in parallel, targeting 
different entities. This is the case for Norway, where the emissions 
trading scheme works in parallel with the carbon tax: the trading scheme 
includes emissions sources that are exempt from the tax. Also in Ireland, 
a carbon tax for sectors not covered by the EU ETS was approved. The CO2 
tax is applied to transport fuels (Petrol, diesel and coal) and to non-
transport fuels (kerosene, marketed gas oil, fuel oil, LPG and natural 
gas). There are no exemptions except for ETS sectors (Green Budget 
Europe, 2010a). 
 
Germany also showed a good experience mixing a GTR with EUETS. 
Environmental taxes like taxes on sulphur, pesticides or water pollution, 
are effective instruments for dealing with special environmental 
problems, like acid rain or poor land use, and influence behavior of 
households and traffic. On the other side, industrial and energy sectors 
were excluded from GTR and included in EUETS (much more cost-effective 
and practicable in these sectors). Green Budget Germany (2006) shows some 
conclusions on combinations of taxes and tradable permit systems. It is 
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pointed in this report that there is a theoretical overlap between 
environmental taxes and emission trading, because non trading sectors are 
also indirectly affected in the form of higher energy prices. But, in 
practice, there is not a greater burden on industrial energy users: 
“First, industrial businesses in Germany, for example, are only liable to 
pay the Ecotax at a greatly reduced rate, while the energy sector is only 
liable to pay it in isolated cases, if at all. Second, the impact of one 
instrument can be cushioned by the impact of the other: businesses 
affected by both instruments can profit from the emissions reductions 
they achieve in response to ETR incentives, by selling the emissions 
allowances they generate as a result.” The main conclusion is that there 
is a great complementarity between the two instruments, and to give 
incentives for as many sectors as possible both instruments should be 
implemented, as few sectors are affected by both. 
 
Portugal, due to the Burden Sharing Agreement, must report, in the period 
of 2008-2012, a sum of emissions that cannot exceed 27% of the registered 
emissions in 1990. On one side, Portuguese installations are involved in 
ECM but, on the other side, Portuguese environmental taxes are still very 
incipient. Both environmental taxes and ECM are current and pressing 
policies that urge evaluate. All this motivated us to make and use a 
model to preview the economic effects of such policies in the Portuguese 
economy. In this study we do not evaluate the two policies 
simultaneously, although we intend to do it in a future work. 
 
 
1.4. Thesis Structure 
  
Environmental taxes in Portugal are a very incipient instrument, so it is 
important to forecast the economic and environmental effects of raising 
or introducing such taxes. As GTR was not introduced in Portugal we must 
use a model to forecast the economic effects of such reform. In respect 
to EU-ETS, as it is already functioning, we can analyze the present 
effects and what future consequences it will have in our economy. Such 
analysis can be made at national level, but it’s important also to do it 
at a regional and sector levels.  
 
By doing such analysis, this thesis reinforce and clarify theoretical 
concepts like environmental taxes efficiency, GTRs, emission trade 
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systems and, on the other side, gives information for policy making. This 
study represents a novelty, as there is few literature about these issues 
for the Portuguese economy18. Our study analyzes empirically, through a 
GEM, the environmental and economic effects of environmental policies. 
 
This doctoral thesis is divided in seven chapters, including this 
introduction. 
 
First we present a brief survey of recent computational GEM applied to 
environmental policies. To evaluate the economic impact of environmental 
and energy policies, namely on employment, a great variety of studies has 
appeared, from local sector policies concerning waste, water and 
atmospheric pollution, to global phenomena such as the greenhouse effect. 
But most of the models used for evaluating climate change policies are 
GEM, as they provide a consistent framework for studying price-dependent 
interactions between the energy system and the rest of the economy. In 
the second chapter we describe what a GEM is and emphasize its importance 
compared to other economic modelling methods. We also present an abstract 
of some important works that used GEM applied to energy and environmental 
policies, referring to some details in modelling, to extensions to basic 
models and to the integration of GEM with technological and with 
microeconomic models. We also refer to some simulated policies and its 
results. 
 
In chapter three the static GEM that we will use in our study is 
described. In empirical literature we can find diverse applications of 
static GEM that simulate environmental policies. Of these we emphasize 
the works of Böhringer, next to other authors, like Rodriguez, whom we 
will use as the basic references for the construction of our model.  
 
In chapter four, the Social and Environmental Accounting Matrix of 
Portuguese Economy for the year of 1999, that we constructed to calibrate 
the previous model, is presented. 
 
Chapter five contains a study about the effects of a GTR in Portugal 
using the described GEM. In chapter six, we present a study that analyses 
effects of EU-ETS in Portugal, in a sector and regional level. Finally in 
                                                          
18
 We only know the work of Pereira and Pereira (2011) that we will point in chapters two 
and three. 
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chapter seven, we present the main conclusions of this thesis as well as 
future perspectives of work. 
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2. Applied General Equilibrium Models for Energy and 
Environmental Studies – Some remarks 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The importance of energy in any economy, developed or underdeveloped, 
became clear after the first oil shock in 1973.  Those oil shocks 
questioned the belief that, at a world-wide level, abundant sources of 
energy existed and would not be an impediment or a brake to the economic 
growth. The world took conscience that energy is a critical element in 
contemporary economies. The industrialized countries started to look for 
a less oil-dependent growth, and since then, different studies have been 
made to formulate energy policies and to study their impact in the 
economies. 
 
Given that environmental policies are related with many aspects of the 
economy, such as price formation, product determination, income 
generation and distribution, consumption, government behaviour, and 
others, a systematic and coherent mechanism for such analysis is 
necessary.  
 
More recently, practitioners of economic and energy models were also 
concerned with the lack of interaction with natural resources (beyond 
energy resources), the environment and the climate. Complex models 
appeared concerning environmental issues, from waste, water and local 
atmospheric pollution, to regional and global phenomena such as acid 
rain, the ozone depletion and climate change. 
 
Climate changes seem to be provoked by energy-related activities such as 
fossil fuel consumption. The risk of climate change makes designing 
economic development strategies, with proper energy and environmental 
policies, increasingly important. 
 
Most of the models used for evaluating climate change policies are 
computational GEM. This chapter makes some comments about the literature 
on such GEM as applied to environmental and energy studies, and reports 
their special features.  
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The first GEM was built by Johansen (1960), but it was in the 90’s that 
this methodology begun to be broadly used (see for instance Conrad (1999) 
for a survey). 
 
GEM can be described as being “economy-wide”, in that they deal with all 
markets in the economy. Applied GEM assume equilibrium between supply and 
demand in all markets. The equations in these models also assume 
optimising behaviour: consumers maximise their utility, producers 
maximise their profits. In general, markets operate in perfect 
competition, with equilibrium prices balancing supply and demand. These 
models are usually calibrated rather than estimated econometrically. This 
means that substitution elasticities of production or utility functions 
are taken from other studies, while the parameters are adjusted to 
describe equilibrium at some benchmark point. Thus, broadly speaking, a 
GEM works by simulating the interaction of various economic agents across 
markets subject to behavioural and institutional constraints.  
 
GEM have the capability to capture the complexities of the economy, since 
economic variables are mutually interdependent. The microeconomic 
representation of direct effects, as well as indirect feedbacks and 
spillovers induced by exogenous policy changes, provides a consistent 
framework for studying price-dependent interactions between the energy 
system and the rest of the economy. But the advantages of this kind of 
models can be perceived more obviously when contrasted with other models. 
 
For instance, Technological Models analyze the technology of energy 
consumers and producers, aiming to determine the net present value of 
each technology of production that lead to lesser pollution and 
consumption of energy. This requires a detailed data base about energy 
demand and supply (see Grubb et al (1993) or Jaccard and Montgomery 
(1996) for a survey). Alternatively, these models may represent agents’ 
behaviour with the goal of determining the conditions for an optimal 
management of energy sectors (see Gusbin and Kouvaritakis (2000) or 
Capros and Mantzos (2000)).  
 
We can also find Economic Models, such us Microeconomic and 
Macroeconometric Models, of which we can refer as Partial Equilibrium 
Models. Like the Technological Models, partial equilibrium analysis 
represents an incomplete representation of the economy (usually one or a 
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limited number of sectors and/or institutions).19 A partial equilibrium 
approach is inappropriate to measure “feedback” effects from a particular 
policy change. It is based on many ceteris paribus assumptions and cannot 
fully capture all the interactions. By contrast, in a GEM, as the demand 
for and supply of each commodity depend on all relative prices, the 
interactions are clearly modelled (Bandara, 1991). 
 
Macroeconometric models, as their name says, are estimated 
econometrically and therefore rely profoundly on historical data. They 
usually pay little attention to microeconomic theory, except in broadly 
deciding which variables to include in the equations of the model. 
Typically they do not consider balanced markets in the short or medium 
run, allowing for fluctuations on employment, production capacity, etc. 
These models were criticized by Lucas (1976) in its role of simulating 
public policies, since they are based on historical data. Although they 
are also good in predicting short run effects, GEM can be more 
appropriate than econometric models to analyse very long-term impacts of 
changes in policy.20 But on the other side, GEM have less detail, more 
aggregation and consequently, are more susceptible of errors and 
uncertainty.  
 
This chapter does not intend to be a survey about GEM that simulate 
environmental or energy policies. Our objective is only to introduce this 
type of models to allow for a better understanding of the study that we 
are going to present in the next chapters. That study includes 
simulations of environmental policies through a GEM for the Portuguese 
economy (like environmental taxes and environmental tax reforms). 
 
So, this chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, we present dynamic and 
static models, as the main categories of GEM. Secondly, we comment the 
literature about environmental GEM and describe some details in the 
design of GEM applied to environmental and energy issues. Then, we 
present some extensions to basic models and some integrated models, and 
summarize simulated environmental policies and its results. And finally, 
we highlight the main conclusions. 
 
                                                          
19
 See for instance Alfsen et al (1995) or Labandeira and Labeaga (1999) for some 
applications of partial equilibrium models to environmental policies. 
20
 See for instance Barker and Köhler (1998) or Beaumais and Bréchet (1995) for some 
applications of macroeconometric models to environmental policies. 
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2.2 Computational General Equilibrium Models categories 
 
It is not easy to classify GEM models. Several criteria can be used to 
classify them. We will refer only to dynamic and nondynamic (or static) 
models21.  
 
GEM dynamic models allow the analysis of the evolution of the economy 
through time, showing the economic effects of a GTR in the short, medium 
and long run. The objective is to maximize a social welfare function, 
subject to dynamic equations of capital stocks and other stock variables. 
These models typically simulate a forward-looking behaviour of households 
and firms. The evolution of the economy is usually synthesized by the 
trajectory of five variables: private capital, public capital, human 
capital, foreign financing and public debt.   
 
As a result, these models constitute a very complete methodology that 
demands a high level of information and complexity. For this reason, the 
main characteristic of the dynamic models ”vis-à-vis” static models is 
that, usually, they consider a lesser degree of disaggregation (a 
representative consumer, few economic sectors) in order to reduce the 
complexity of the model22. 
 
In contrast, static models do not simulate the economic evolution between 
the initial and the final equilibrium, nor the costs of transition 
between both. They allow comparing the situation of an ex-ante balanced 
economy with another ex-post situation after the simulated reform (or 
shock). 
 
Static models allow for more disaggregation, namely in what concerns the 
consumer. The representative consumer is frequently replaced by different 
groups of consumers, each one having its own initial endowment and set of 
preferences. But it’s not a rule (we found dynamic models with more than 
a representative consumer, as for instance Farmer and Steininger (1999) 
                                                          
21
 Another frequent classification is on single country, multicountry or global models (see 
Maler and Vincent (2006)). Single country models, have more detailed sectors and households 
and are used for country specific policies while multicountry or global models have less 
details on sectors and are used to analyse multilateral policies and transboudary pollution 
problems.  
22
 See for instance Welsh (1996) or Proost and Regemorter (1996) for some aplications of 
dynamic GEM to environmental policies. 
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(with 55 different consumers). The disaggregation can be made, for 
instance, by the number of children (Aasness, Bye and Mysen, 1996), by 
gender, age, fertility, survival and migration rates (Fisher-Vanden, 
Shuklac, Edmondsa, Kima, & Pitcher, 1997), by employment status and income 
levels (Naqvi, 1998; Pench, 2001) and by labour productivity and 
probability of becoming unemployed (Proost and Van Regemorter, 1995). 
 
 
2.3 Environmental General Equilibrium Models – some remarks on the 
literature 
 
In this section, we review some literature about environmental policies, 
like environmental taxes, and particularly about the Double Dividend 
hypothesis, modelled through GEM. 
 
Galeotti, Carraro and Bosello (2001) comprises two kind of studies for 
the Double Dividend hypothesis: one focus on the distortions of the 
fiscal system before and after the green fiscal reform, looking to the 
individual welfare and giving little attention to the way the tax 
revenues are recycled and its consequences for the economy; the other 
focus on the impact that the recycled tax revenues have on macroeconomic 
variables (particularly in employment, product or growth). Its main 
motivation is the reduction of unemployment (therefore this objective is 
called Employment Double Dividend). A basic hypothesis is that the labour 
market is in imperfect competition. It is to this second kind of studies 
that we will pay more attention next, as it fits well in the work that we 
will present in the next chapter for the Portuguese economy (although our 
model have perfect competition in labour market). 
 
2.3.1. Details in modelization 
 
Here we summarize some details observed in GEM applied to environmental 
policies, which differ from GEM with other purposes. We analyze, in 
particular, the consumer and producer behaviour and some particular 
extensions to basic models. 
 
We already referred the way the consumer is included on the model. Now we 
are going to see how studies relate the consumer with the 
environmental/energy sector. Some include energy as an aggregate 
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consumption good in the utility function (Böhringer and Rutherford, 
1997), others make utility depend on environmental quality (Bruvoll and 
Ibenholt, 1998) and others use more complicated schemes. For instance, 
Muto, Morisugi and Ueda (2003) present the following scheme:  
- households are divided into two types, those who own a private 
automobile and those who don’t;  
- the first type of household chooses the traffic mode from the 
railway, bus, airplane and private automobile;  
- the non-owner household decides whether to purchase a private 
automobile or not;.  
- in this decision the household chooses the fuel type from gasoline, 
diesel and clean energy;.  
- if the household is not purchasing a new automobile, it decides to 
use one of the other traffic modes.  
 
The relation of the production side with the energy/environment sector is 
also made by several ways. One of them includes a sub model of emissions, 
which calculates the production of pollutants linked to the use of 
different types of energy, using specific emission coefficients (Aasness, 
et al., 1996; C. Böhringer & Rutherford, 1997; Bruvoll & Ibenholt, 1998; 
X. Labandeira & Rodriguez, 2010; Sahin, 2002). In GEM-E3 (Capros et al., 
1996) air pollution affects the number of days that active people are 
ill, so labour productivity in the production sectors is affected. 
 
In Dellink and Van Ierland (2004), polluters have a choice between paying 
for their pollution permits and increasing their expenditures on 
pollution abatement. The abatement sector is modelled as a separate 
producer that produces ‘abatement goods’, using both produced goods and 
primary production factors as inputs. Fisher-Vanden et al. (1997) treated 
explicitly natural resources, identifying two forms: depletable and 
renewable. This model was also designed to provide estimates of gaseous 
emissions from all human activities, including those associated with 
energy, agriculture, and industrial processes. Emissions are associated 
with specific human activities and, where appropriate, with specific 
technologies. 
 
Some models depart from basic models by taking some particular 
extensions. For instance, the way they include a labour market with 
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involuntary unemployment. This can be made by several ways: simulating 
unions and wage negotiation (Brunello, 1996; Carraro, Galleotti and 
Gallo, 1996); including costs of contract and job search (A. Lans 
Bovenberg & van der Ploeg, 1995) or fixing efficiency and real wages 
above the equilibrium wage (A. Lans Bovenberg & van der Ploeg, 1993, 
1998).   
 
Other models link pollution and consumption, and analyse the 
redistributive effects of environmental taxes (Smith, 1992; Harrison, 
1994). This redistributive issue can be seen in three ways: first, 
because of the regressive nature of environmental taxes, some empirical 
studies show that environmental harmful goods are largely consumed by low 
income persons; second, because the physical incidence of pollution is 
typically higher in low income groups; and finally, wealthier households 
attach a higher value to environmental quality. 
 
Other extensions can incorporate technological change, that is, how 
environmental policies can influence the creation of technology that is 
new and friendlier to the environment, and how environmental policies 
interact with innovation policies (L. Goulder & Schneider, 1999; Otto, 
Løsche, & Reilly, 2006; Popp, 2004).  
 
2.3.2. Integrated models 
 
Another variant of GEM is integrated models that link GEM with partial 
equilibrium models, like technological or microeconomic models. In this 
way, these approaches link the advantages of GEM with the advantages of 
partial equilibrium, particularly adding more detail to some economic 
agents or sectors. 
 
The incorporation with microeconomic models can be made by three ways. 
First, by integrating the full version of both models. This option has no 
loss of precision but makes the model extremely big and algebraically 
complex, becoming very difficult to apply the model to real data23.  
 
                                                          
23
 See for instance Adelman and Robinson (1976) 
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The second, and more simple, consists in integrating macro details into a 
microsimulation model, by complementing the micro model with a full-SAM 
based multiplier analysis, like in Lattarulo et al. (2002), or 
incorporating an input–output model, as, for instance, in Symons et al. 
(1994), Labandeira and Labeaga (1999) or Cameron and Ezzeddin (2000). On 
the other side, micro details can be added to a GEM, expanding the 
household sphere to include up to as many agents as those existing in 
family surveys (see for instance Jensen et al., 2002 or Davies, 2004).  
 
Finally (third), micro and GEM can be linked. That could be done in two 
ways. On one hand, through a sequence in which a static GEM quantifies 
the effects of policy-induced macroeconomic shocks, and then the 
microeconometric model takes as exogenous the relative changes in prices 
and other macro variables which result from the GEM (Bourguignon, 
Robilliard, & Robinson, 2003; Bussolo & Lay, 2005). On the other hand, 
through a bi-directional link between the two models, including some 
restrictions in the models to force a converging solution (see Savard, 
2003). For instance, “household behaviour in the GEM could be exogenous 
(fixed at the benchmark) with the following procedure for simulations: 
(i) changes in prices and factors from the GEM feed the micro model, 
which supplies the reaction by each household to macro effects, (ii) the 
preceding information is used as an input in the GEM, as new values for 
the households (previously exogenous), and (iii) the GEM is run again and 
the iterative process continues until convergence is achieved” (in X. 
Labandeira, Labeaga, & Rodríguez, 2009). 
 
A good example of an article that incorporates a GEM with a microeconomic 
model, to study the effects of energy taxes, is Labandeira et al. (2009). 
The authors study the efficiency and distributional effects from changes 
in Spanish commodity taxation, particularly regarding energy taxes. They 
use a general equilibrium model, specially designed to simulate energy 
policies, and a microeconomic household demand system, also with a 
detailed modelling of energy goods, through a sequential approach, but 
without bi-directional interactions, by taking the changes in prices and 
income estimated by the GEM as exogenous values for the household energy 
demand model. Joining the output (prices) from the GEM to the 
microeconomic model, it was possible to disaggregate the policy effects 
on household welfare and to aggregate the results to different groupings 
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of the population. The GEM allowed knowing the policy effects on social 
welfare, relative prices and levels of activity of different sectors and 
institutions.  
 
As we said above, there are also models that integrate GEM with 
technological models. The models can be linked mainly by three ways (C. 
Böhringer & Rutherford, 2008). First, integrating a reduced form of a 
bottom-up into a top-down model (Bosetti, Carraro, Galeotti, Massetti & 
Tavoni, 2006), or vice-versa (Manne, Mendelsohn, & Richels, 2006; Rivers 
& Jaccard, 2005).  
 
Second, by integrating the full versions of the models24. Although this 
method results in complex models, it has been used, namely for Böhringer 
and Löschel (2006), to analyze renewable energy policies. 
 
And third, by a soft-link of the models, that allows the communication 
between the top-down and bottom-up models until they converge. This last 
method provides the highest degree of detail without forfeiting 
computational feasibility, but have more inconsistencies in behavioural 
assumptions and accounting concepts than the previous approaches. Serious 
problems are certain to be encountered around the convergence of the 
solution algorithm (C. Böhringer & Rutherford, 2007). Labandeira, 
Linares, and Rodriguez (2009) follow this methodology and integrate a GEM 
and an electricity industry model to study the European emissions trading 
scheme in Spain. 
 
 
2.3.3 Simulated policies and results 
There are a relevant number of studies that use GEM to simulate 
environmental and energy policies. The first ones appeared in the middle 
of the 70’s, and were concerned with energy supply in the aftermath of 
the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979. Hudson and Jorgenson (1975) and Manne 
(1977) were some of these earlier studies. The first one, like most of 
them, used an energy sector model in which the rest of the economy was 
represented by an exogenously determined rate of energy demand growth. In 
contrast, the second one used a detailed energy technology assessment 
                                                          
24 See Böhringer and Rutherford (2008) to a full description of this methodology. 
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model, which was linked to a neoclassical one-sector model of the rest of 
the economy. 
 
In the beginning of the 90’s, studies turned on issues related with 
externalities linked with the combustion of fossil fuels in economic 
activities, that is, mainly CO2 emissions. The GREEN model was developed 
by the OECD secretariat (Burniaux, Martin & Martins, 1992) to analyze 
climate change policy issues at a global scale. Simultaneously, other 
models were developed for single countries, like Hazilla and Kopp (1990). 
They estimated the social cost of environmental quality regulations using 
a GEM of the US economy. Whereas Bergman (1990) analyzed the social cost 
of phasing out nuclear power in the presence of SO2, NOx and CO2 emission 
constraints, using a GEM of the Swedish economy. 
 
Some models tested the implementation of a carbon tax (Aasness, et al., 
1996; S. Bach, M. et al., 2002; C. Böhringer & Rutherford, 1997). In 
particular, Muto, Morisugi and Ueda (2003) modelled a carbon tax on 
automobile fuels, which was in part appropriated by a subsidy to the 
purchase of clean energy vehicles.  
 
Morris et al. (1999) represented scenarios centred on the introduction of 
environmental load fees on emissions of SO2, NOx and particulates, and 
emission abatement requirements for these pollutants. On the contrary, 
Naqvi (1998) tested the short-term result of removing import tax on high-
speed diesel in Pakistan. 
 
Other models focus on the implementation of energy taxes (see for 
instance Pench (2001), Sahin (2002) and Bovenberg and Goulder (1997).   
 
In the recent years, another popular simulated policy was a tradable 
permits system (Dellink & Van Ierland, 2004; Farmer & Steininger, 1999; 
Iorwerth & al, 2000; X. Labandeira & Rodriguez, 2010; Nwaobi, 2004). For 
instance, in Sahin (2002) total emissions are limited and determined 
differently for each sector in each region.  Fisher-Vanden, et al. (1997) 
modelled two emissions allowance allocation schemes: 1) grandfathered 
emissions allocation- allowances are allocated based on each country's 
1990 carbon emissions; 2) equal per capita emissions allocation- 
allowances are allocated based on each country's share of global 
population in the current period. Labandeira and Rodriguez (2010) mainly 
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focus on the (positive) efficiency and distributional effects of the EU 
emissions trading system, with the use of a static general equilibrium 
model for the Spanish economy. 
In the context of application of environmental taxes, the simulations 
frequently assume that the government keeps tax changes revenue-neutral, 
by recycling revenues of environmental taxes or emissions permits through 
a reduction in labour or capital taxes, in the SSC or through lump-sum 
transfers. Revenues can also be used to compensate the adversely affected 
consumers (Farmer & Steininger, 1999) or to subsidize producers of most 
affected sectors25. That is, some models simulate the application of a 
GTR or the existence of the double dividend hypothesis. For the 
Portuguese economy, Pereira and Pereira (2011) simulated the revenue 
recycling through policies that stimulate demand, namely, value added tax 
replacement and public consumption financing; employment oriented 
policies, including personal income tax replacement, firms' social 
security contribution replacement, and human capital investment 
financing; and, policies that encourage investment in physical capital, 
including private capital and wind energy capital investment tax credits 
and public capital financing. This model includes the traditional tax 
policies, but also includes tax expenditure, renewable energy and public 
expenditure policies, and so expands the traditional focus of the 
literature on the double dividend to the quest for a third dividend that 
is fiscal sustainability. 
 
 
Results differ between models that simulate different revenue recycling, 
and between static and dynamic models. 
 
The majority of the static GEM estimate negative effects of this reform 
on welfare and on the GDP (see Rodriguez (2002) for an extensive survey). 
However, if this may show the inexistence of the double dividend, we must 
point out that 24 of the 37 studies analyzed by Rodriguez (2002) 
considered the devolution of environmental tax revenues through “lump-
sum” transfers. This assumption does not optimize the second dividend. It 
is important, on the other hand, to notice that 40% of the simulations 
that reduced the labour costs, 67% of the simulations that reduced VAT 
and 100% of the simulations that reduced the personal income tax or the 
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 in Hill (1998) the revenues are used to give labour subsidies to the “steel and metal 
sector”, in order to limit negative employment impacts. 
Effects of a Green Tax Reform in Portugal – A General Equilibrium Analysis 
40 
 
public deficit (not neutral reforms), had non negative results on the 
second dividend. 
 
We can refer for instance the study of Hakonsen & Mathiesen (1997), that 
includes, in a model applied to Norway, some externalities provoked by 
air pollution and the traffic of vehicles (costs for the health, 
materials, productivity). From this work the authors infer that the 
optimum tax policy without externalities would consist of reducing the 
CO2 emissions in 10%. When externalities are included in the model, as 
congestion or public expenses provoked by traffic accidents, the optimum 
environmental policy would be to reduce CO2 emissions in 15%, through the 
introduction of a tax of 80US$ for ton of CO2.  
 
Regarding dynamic general equilibrium models, the results obtained in 69 
simulations analyzed by Rodríguez (2002) reveal a different panorama 
concerning the variable that is used to measure the effect of the reform. 
90% of the simulations consider that its effect on the job level will be 
positive or null, whereas only 49% of simulations estimate positive or 
null effects on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 19% estimate a non 
negative effect on welfare. Using a dynamic model, Pereira and Pereira 
(2011) conclude that it is possible to achieve the emission goals while 
at the same time promoting economic performance and fiscal consolidation.  
 
These results represent, without a doubt, an important support to the 
double dividend hypothesis and, mainly, to the employment double 
dividend. This idea is further strengthened if we consider that the 
welfare measures habitually used do not consider the positive effect 
provoked by the first dividend, that is, the environmental 
improvements26. We can refer Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993), Bye (1996) 
and Carraro et al (1996) as examples. Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) found 
that a strong double dividend exists when the revenues from the 
environmental tax are used to reduce capital taxes. If the revenues were 
used instead to reduce labour taxes, there would be no strong double 
dividend. However, neither Goulder (1995) nor Bovenberg and Goulder 
                                                          
26
 The welfare consequences of policy simulations can be measured in several ways. A large 
number of models use the concept of equivalent variation (EV). The EV can be defined as a 
percentage of benchmark income and could be interpreted as the amount the household would 
be willing to pay for the policy to take place. Aasness, Bye, and Mysen (1996) use “money 
metric utility” and define it as the cost of obtaining a particular utility level at the 
prices of their base year. Other authors use domestic production, real consumption, private 
investment, export and import, labour demand and supply and the level of emissions, to 
measure the policy effects. 
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(1997), who also used dynamic models of the U.S. economy, found evidence 
of a strong double dividend. One reason for this may be that both Goulder 
and Bovenberg & Goulder assumed that capital was immobile across sectors, 
while Jorgenson and Wilcoxen assumed full inter-sector capital mobility. 
 
In contrast to the results by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993), Bye (2000), 
who used a dynamic model of the Norwegian economy, found that a revenue-
neutral swap, between an increased environmental tax and a reduced tax on 
labour income, was welfare increasing. According to Bye, the differences 
between Jorgenson´s and Wilcoxens´s results and her own results depend on 
the fact that the marginal excess burden is higher for capital taxation 
than for labour taxation in the U.S., while the opposite holds in Norway. 
However, in Böhringer and Pahlke (1997), who also used a dynamic model, 
no strong double dividend could be found.  
 
In static or dynamic models, results can be very different due to the way 
the recycling of environmental tax is made and to some details in 
modelization, as we saw in the examples referred above. Following the 
survey of Rodriguez (2002), we can summarize some conclusions of his 
study. 
 
The reduction of the SSC paid by the companies is the recycling way most 
used in the analyzed simulations. 98% and 87% of these simulations 
estimated positive or null effects in employment and GDP (respectively). 
Approximately 50% of the simulations consider that its effect on welfare 
would be non negative. As we said above, since welfare measures commonly 
used do not consider the positive effect provoked by the first dividend, 
we can conclude that the effect on welfare is positive in most studies. A 
GTR that recycles revenues reducing SSC gives a high probability of 
obtaining a double dividend, and in particular an employment double 
dividend27. 
 
The GTRs that recycle environmental taxes through “lump-sum” transfers 
are the second most used in simulations. In this case, 96% and 85% of the 
simulations consider that the effects of this kind of reform are negative 
for the GDP and welfare, respectively. 80% estimate positive or null 
                                                          
27
 Also in an extensive survey Bye and Fæhn (2009) conclude that redistribute tax revenues 
diminishing the labour tax generates a welfare gain relatively to the unilateral 
application of the tax. 
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effects on employment. So, this kind of reform will provoke a smaller 
economic growth. 
 
The empirical evidence dissuades GTRs that reduce private income tax, due 
to its negative effect on GDP (82% of the simulations show this). But, on 
the other hand, 57% of simulations estimate positive or null effect on 
employment. 
 
Finally, there are few simulations that recycle revenues of the 
environmental tax through the reduction of the companies’ income tax or 
the value added tax. The results are not very conclusive. We can observe 
that of the 9 simulations reviewed in which a reduction of VAT was 
considered, only 1 measure the effect on employment and only 3 measure 
the effect on welfare. 
 
Bye and Fæhn (2009) also present some conclusions of the empiric work on 
this issue. They survey two decades of analyses of carbon policies for 
the small, open economy of Norway. They refer that it is better to 
welfare if the environmental policy is international instead of 
unilateral, if the domestic carbon policy apply a uniform price on all 
carbon emissions, if the redistribution of the carbon tax revenue is made 
by reducing other distortionary taxes, such as labour taxes, and if there 
is a differentiated carbon tax system instead of grandfathered tradable 
emission permits. The introduction of the EU-ETS reduced the public net 
revenues and the possibility to reach the double dividend through carbon 
policies. The welfare costs of carbon policies are reduced when it is 
possible to adopt new technologies, since they are driven by restrictive 
carbon policies. 
 
Cooperation between countries increases the probability of achieving the 
employment double dividend, while tax harmonization, without having 
cooperation in the revenue recycling, cannot reach that goal (Bosello, 
Carraro, & Fasullo, 1998; Carraro & Galleoti, 1997). 
 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
The objective of this chapter was to introduce GEM applied to the 
evaluation and prediction of energy and environmental policies, for a 
better understanding of the study that we are going to present in the 
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next chapters, which includes simulations of environmental policies 
through a GEM for the Portuguese economy (like environmental taxes, 
environmental tax reforms or emission trading schemes). 
 
In comparison to other methodologies, GEM appear as the most adequate to 
simulate energy and environmental policies, since they simulate the 
interaction of various economic agents across markets subject to 
behavioural and institutional constraints. These models deal with all 
markets in the economy, interacting among one another. But there are also 
some experiences that use GEM linked with technological or microeconomic 
models, enjoying the advantages of this other kind of models and making 
the approach more complete. 
 
Dynamic and nondynamic models appear as the main categories of GEM. Both 
have been used to evaluate environmental and energy policies, but they 
have important differences in modelization and in its results. Dynamic 
models are more aggregated, demand a high level of information and are 
more complex. On the other hand, they analyse the evolution of the 
economy throughout time, showing the economic effects of a GTR in the 
short, medium and long run. Static models only compare the situation of 
an ex-ante balanced economy with different ex-post equilibrium, obtained 
after the application of the policy. But they are more simple models and 
allow for more disaggregation. 
 
The way authors relate consumers with environment involves including 
energy as a consumption good and/or including environmental quality in 
the utility function. The production sectors are modelled with pollutant 
emissions linked to the use of different sources of energy or to specific 
technologies. Pollution can also be included in production, affecting 
labour productivity. 
 
Extensions to basic models include labour markets with involuntary 
unemployment, the redistributive effects of environmental taxes analysis, 
the incorporation of technological change and the integration of GEM with 
technological or microeconomic models. 
 
The simulated policies in these kind of models are the application of 
carbon/energy taxes, the simulation of a tradable emission permits system 
and the test of the Double Dividend hypothesis. As we said before, these 
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are the policies that we are going to simulate for the Portuguese economy 
in the next chapters. 
 
In what concerns the Double Dividend hypothesis, static models results 
are more restrictive, but the more positive results are achieved with 
models that recycle revenues reducing labour costs, IVA or personal 
income tax, “vis-à-vis” “lump-sum” transfers. Dynamic models give a 
bigger and stronger support to the Double Dividend hypothesis, in 
particular to the employment Double Dividend. 
 
In general, the most used simulations recycle revenues reducing SSC, 
maybe because this strategy is the one that have more positive results on 
jobs, GDP and welfare. 
 
There are other details in modelling that increase the probability of 
positive results for welfare, details that are related with the 
geographic scope of the policy (national or international), with the tax 
being uniform or differentiated between sectors or even with the 
possibility of the introduction of new technologies in the economy. 
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3. A General Equilibrium Model applied to the analysis of 
Environmental Policies 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to describe the general equilibrium 
model used in the thesis. This is a static model and has been constructed 
to evaluate the effect of environmental policies on a small open economy. 
For this reason, we put emphasis in the treatment of the energy goods 
produced and consumed by the different economic agents. 
 
In empirical literature we can find diverse applications of static models 
that simulate environmental policies. Of these, we emphasize the works of 
Böhringer (together with other authors), which we will use as the basic 
reference for the construction of our model. In the particular case of 
Portugal, we only know the work of Pereira and Pereira (2011) that 
analyzes the effects of environmental policies through an applied general 
equilibrium model. Their model is very different from the one presented 
in this thesis, mainly because it is a dynamic model with two sectors 
(energy sector and non energy sector), and ours is a static model 
disaggregated in 31 economic sectors. With our model we can simulate 
substitution effects between sectors and productive factors, and better 
capture the changes in energy consumption, labour, goods and services, 
etc. This represents one of the main contributions of the thesis. Another 
contribution of this model, comparing with others used in the literature, 
is the treatment given to the consumption of the diverse energy goods by 
households. A distinction is made between energy goods for the home and 
energy goods for private transportation.  
 
Besides this introductory section, in section 2 we present the structure 
of the model and in section 3 the calibration of the model is described.  
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3.2 The Model 
We used an applied static general equilibrium model28 that describes a 
small open economy. Its structure is similar, except for small 
differences, to the one used in Böhringer, Ferris, & Rutherford, 1997. As 
we said before, the data base used in the model considers the existence 
of thirty one productive sectors. We departed from the sixty sectors of 
the National Accounts, aggregating some of them, because other 
information available (like fossil fuels consumption) had not the same 
disaggregation. There are three additional institutional sectors in the 
economy: the public sector, the foreign sector and the private sector 
(that includes households, the financial and no financial firms, and the 
NPISH29). 
The different taxes used in the model have been programmed ad-valorem, 
and we have not considered the existence of exchange rates. This decision 
is a consequence of the monetary union in the UE. Therefore we supposed 
that the reforms being simulated will have an insignificant impact in 
international exchange markets and, in particular, in the exchange rate 
of Euro versus other currencies. This assumption is reasonable 
considering that most of the foreign commercial relations of Portugal 
take place with UE countries members of the monetary union. As a general 
criterion, notation follows the following convention: the endogenous 
variables are denoted by capital letters, the exogenous variables are 
denoted by capital letters and a bar, and the parameters of the model are 
denoted by Greek and Latin letters. There are n productive sectors (i, 
j=1,…, n) and, consequently, n consumer goods. 
 
For the resolution of the general equilibrium model we used the method 
proposed by Rutherford (1999). The analytical approach is based on the 
work of Mathiesen (1985) that solves a general equilibrium model by a 
mixed complementarity problem30. 
 
                                                          
28
 See Shoven and Whalley (1992) for one first approach to applied computational general 
equilibrium models. 
29
 The aggregation of households, firms and NPISH was made to simplify the model and do not 
reduce the output quality or the information requirements on the issues we want to study in 
this thesis. We also avoid the controversy around the disaggregation of these institutional 
sectors, because economic decisions taken by the firms or by the NPISH would have to be in 
the scope of the households, who are the true owners of these institutions. 
30
 For a very brief and clear description of this approach of analysis see Gomez (2002). 
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3.2.1 Production 
The productive sectors use a technology with constant returns, 
characterized by a succession of nestings in which different 
intermediate goods and primary factors are combined31. In each nesting 
the producer minimizes its costs, subject to technological restrictions. 
We suppose that the markets are perfectly competitive and, therefore, 
the equilibrium profits will have to be null in each productive 
activity. The solution to the optimization problem will result in a 
function of unit costs associated to the production of each good that in 
equilibrium will be equal to the net price received by the producers. 
The first level, or nesting, will determine the function of unit costs 
associated to each good. Here we combine a good made up of primary 
productive factors and energy goods KEL, with different intermediate 
goods CID (from which electricity, coal, natural gas, and refined 
products of petroleum, have been excluded). A Leontief technology32 was 
used so that the problem can be characterized the following way:
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Where the PBi is the market unitary price of output Bi (the gross 
producer price), TBi is the effective marginal tax on the production, 
SBi is the marginal subsidy on the production, PKELi is the unitary 
price of the good KELi, PD is the unitary domestic market price of the 
intermediate goods CIDi, and c0i, cni are the Leontief coefficients. 
Next, we present the solution to this problem; this solution will be 
applied, in a symmetrical way, to the remaining optimization problems. 
The resolution of the previous problem of optimization will provide us 
the cost function of each branch of activity. From the condition of null 
                                                          
31
 The nested functions allow us to specify different elasticities of substitution between 
the different productive inputs. This characteristic is especially interesting in the case 
of energy goods. Rutherford and Perroni (1998) describe the specification of Allen-Uzawa 
elasticities of substitution between different productive factors with non-separable nested 
functions CES.  
32
 It is usual in applied GEM that the producers combine primary productive factors (capital 
and labour) with intermediate goods by means of a Leontief technology. See for instance 
Kehoe and others (1989). 
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benefits (3) we can obtain the demand of each good (4) and (5) applying 
the Shepard’s Lemma, 
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In the second level, we combine primary productive factors KLi with the 
different energy goods Ei. A CES technology is used, so that the problem 
can be characterized like: 
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Where PKLi is the unitary price of composed good KLi, PEi is the unitary 
price of composed good Ei, αi is the scale parameter, ia  is the weight of 
KLi, and 
KEL
iσ is the substitution elasticity. 
 
In order to obtain the unit costs associated to the use of primary 
productive factors KL and to the consumption of energy E, we must solve 
in the third level (or nesting) the following problems: 
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Where PK is the unitary price of the capital Ki, w is the unitary price 
of labour Li, CSS_ACTi is the effective marginal social contributions 
paid by the employers, iKLα  is the scale parameter, iKLa  is the weight of 
labour, and KLiσ is the substitution elasticity. 
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Where PEPi is the unitary price of energy primary goods EPi, PELEC is the 
unitary price of electricity ELECiA consumed by each branch of activity, 
αiE is the scale parameter, iEa  is the weight of electricity in energy 
consumption, and Eiσ is the substitution elasticity. 
 
In the fourth level, the coal consumption COALA and hydrocarbons HIDRO 
are combined by a CES function, so that each activity must solve the 
following problem: 
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Where PCOAL is the unitary price of coal COALiA, PHIDROi is the unitary 
price of hydrocarbons HIDROi, αiEP is the scale parameter, iEPa is the 
weight of coal in EP, and EPiσ is the substitution elasticity. 
 
Finally, in the fifth level the unit costs are determined to be 
associated to the hydrocarbon consumption. By means of a CES function we 
obtain the optimal combination of petroleum refined products REFiA and 
natural gas GASiA consumed by each branch of activity. 
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Where PREF is the unitary price of petroleum refined products REFiA, PGAS 
is the unitary price of gas GASiA, αiPET is the scale parameter, iPETa  is 
the weight of REF, and PETiσ  is the substitution elasticity. 
 
The total supply of goods in the economy is a good Ai composed by the 
national production Bi and imported goods IMPi, assuming, as it is usual 
in these models33, that the goods of different origin are imperfect 
substitute products. Using a CES technology, each branch of activity 
determines the optimal combination of national and imported goods that 
minimizes the price of products supplied in the economy. Therefore, the 
problem which each branch of activity faces is the following, 
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Where PAi is the unit cost of the Armington good Ai, PXMi is international 
unitary price of imported goods IMPi (considered exogenous), λi is the 
scale parameter, bi is the weight of the national production, and 
A
iσ  is 
the substitution elasticity. 
 
The final destination of supplied goods in the economy Ai is: exports 
EXPi or domestic consumption Di. Using a transformation function CET34, 
each branch of activity determines the optimal product combination 
supplied in the domestic or international markets that maximize their 
income, subject to the restriction of null profits. Therefore, the 
problem which each branch of activity faces is the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 See Shoven and Whalley (1992) 
34
 CET functions allow certain degree of substitution between different goods that have 
different markets. For a brief description see Shoven and Whalley (1992). 
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Where PDi is the unitary sale price to the public of good Di in the 
domestic market, TDi is the effective marginal tax on products, SDi is the 
effective marginal subsidy to products, TEi is the marginal environmental 
tax on products, γi is the scale parameter, di  are the weights, and 
εσ i is 
the transformation elasticity. 
 
3.2.2. Private Sector 
 
As we said above, this model aggregates the households, the financial and 
no financial firms, and the NPISH. The financial and nonfinancial firms 
represent a peculiar type of agents who exert property rights on the 
diverse productive activities on behalf of other agents, namely the 
households or the public sector. 
 
They take decisions about the destiny of the property rents (to 
distribute dividends, for example). In addition, they receive and make 
diverse transfers in favor of different agents, and pay a tax on the 
rents of the firms. Similarly, the NPISH could be interpreted as a 
particular kind of institution, halfway between firms and the public 
sector. They also exert property rights on diverse productive activities 
in representation of other agents, although they do not pay any tax on 
the generated rents. In addition, they receive and make diverse transfers 
to different agents.  
 
We assume the consumer has a fixed endowment of capital and labour. The 
labour endowment represents the maximum time endowment that the consumer 
can dedicate to work (the maximum labour supply), and is equal to the sum 
of time dedicated to leisure and to work, in the equilibrium. The problem 
of the consumer is to maximize his utility, subject to a budgetary 
restriction. The decisions of the representative consumer have been 
modelled by means of nested CES functions. 
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In the first nesting the consumer decides the optimal combination between 
leisure (LEISURE) and a good made up of saving, goods and services (UA). 
This combination is determined by means of a CES function, as described 
below: 
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Where YCONS is the available yield of the representative consumer, PSAV is 
the price of saving, SAVCONS is the saving, CSS_HOU is the effective 
marginal social contributions in charge of the employees, sUB is the 
weight of leisure, and σUB is the substitution elasticity. 
 
In the second nesting the consumer decides the optimal combination 
between saving SAVCONS and a good made up of different goods and services 
FCHOU, minimizing the expense in both goods. We will suppose, like in 
Böhringer and Rutherford (1997), that the consumers have a constant 
marginal propensity to save on the set of their available yield, which 
seems reasonable being a static model. For it, we used a Leontief 
function so that the problem is the following: 
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Where PUA is the unitary price of composed good UA formed by saving and 
the final consumption of goods and services FCHOU, sUA is the weight of 
saving in composed good UA. 
 
The main contribution of this model, versus others in the literature, is 
the treatment given to the consumption of the diverse energy goods by 
households. We distinguished between energy goods for the home and energy 
goods for private transportation. 
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The energy goods for the home35 provide to their members a set of 
services, like heat (of a heating system), refrigeration, artificial 
light, cooked food, washing of clothes and dishes, etc. Under energy 
goods for the home we grouped electricity, coal, natural gas, and refined 
products of petroleum, like heating oil and LPG. 
 
As a result of the previous nestings, the consumer decides in the third 
nesting the optimal combination between energy for home (EHOU), refined 
products of petroleum for private transport36 (FUELOIL), and a good made 
up of the remaining goods and services (OTHERS), by means of a CES 
function: 
 
FCHOUPFCHOTHERSFUELOILEHOU .min ,,                                       (24) 
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Where PEH is the price of EHOU, PFUEL is the price of FUELOIL, POTHERS is 
the price of OTHERS, FCHϕ  is the scale parameter, sE and sF are the 
weights of EHOU and FUELOIL respectively, and σCFH is the substitution 
elasticity. 
 
In the fourth nesting, the consumer decides, on the one hand, the optimal 
combination between electricity (ELECH) and a good made up of other 
primary energy goods for home (EPHOU) (coal, heating oil, propano and 
butano) by means of a CES function and, on the other hand, the optimal 
                                                          
35
 The distinction between energy goods for home and other energy goods is usual in 
microeconometric models that analyze the energy consumption of the households. See for 
instance Baker, Blundell and Micklewright (1989). 
36We assumed that 62% of the households consumption of refined products of petroleum were 
destined to the private transport during the year of 2005. The other 38% were destined to 
provide energy services for the home, like the production of hot water, food heating, 
cooking. This assumption is based on the data offered by the Continuous Survey of Familiar 
Budgets, elaborated by INE for year 2005/2006. 
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combination between the remaining goods and services DiH by means of a 
Cobb-Douglas function. 
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Where PEPH is the price of EPHOU, POTHERS are the price of OTHERS, EHϕ  
is the parameter of scale, sEH is the weight of ELECH in EHOU, SOi is the 
weights of DiH in OTHERS (the weights of energy goods in this function are 
null), and σEH is the elasticity of substitution between ELECH and EPHOU. 
 
Finally, in the fifth nesting the consumer decides the optimal 
combination of primary energy goods for the home, excluding electricity. 
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Where NEHϕ  is the scale parameter, sC and sG are the weights of COALH and 
GASH respectively, and σNEH is the substitution elasticity. REFH 
represents the products derived from petroleum that provide energy for 
the home. 
 
The available yield of the representative household is, 
 
[ ] CRTRANSFHOUTIMEHOUCSSwKPKTCONSY CONSCONS −+−+−= )._1(.)1(
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where TCONS is the effective marginal tax on the rents of the households, 
KCONS is the capital endowment, CSS_HOU is the effective marginal social 
quotations in charge of the workers, TIME is the time endowment that the 
consumer can dedicate to leisure or the work, TRANSFHOU are the net 
received transfers37, and CR is the consumption made abroad by the 
resident households. 
 
3.2.3. Public Sector 
 
The public sector provides diverse goods and services of collective 
character (health and public education, security, etc), and serves social 
protection by means of transfers. The public consumption of goods and 
services is an aggregated good FCGOV, through a Cobb-Douglas function of 
the diverse products supplied in the economy DiG. The public sector 
finances this with the income generated by the fiscal system, property 
rents and transfers. In addition, it has a fixed endowment of capital 
that also provides income. The problem of the public sector is to 
maximize the public consumption subject to a budgetary restriction, as it 
is indicated next: 
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where GOVi is the weight of each good in FCGOV, YGOV is the rent available 
of the public sector, KGOV is the endowment of capital of the public 
sector, RECTCONS is the total revenue from the tax on the rent of the 
representative consumer, TRANSFGOV are the net transfers received38 by 
                                                          
37
 The net received transfers TRANSFHOU, are the sum of the property rents, wages paid by 
the rest of the world, social benefits, transfers of other institutions, an adjustment of 
the national accounting by the variation of the net participation of the households in the 
reserves of pensions, except the social contributions paid by the households to the 
financial and nonfinancial firms. 
38
 The net received transfers, TRANSFGOV, are the sum of the revenues of the rent tax on the 
nonresident, the received transfers of the rest of the world, except the net property rents 
of the public sector, the social contributions paid to the rest of the world, the social 
benefits paid by the public sector, and other transfers paid by the public sector to other 
institutions. 
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the public sector, and SAVGOV is the financing received in form of saving 
of the remaining institutions. 
 
The taxes are programmed ad-valorem in the general equilibrium model. 
Nevertheless, the environmental tax that we want to simulate represents 
an ad-quantum tax (unitary). With the purpose of making both objectives 
compatible, the tax rate of the environmental ad-valorem tax is an 
endogenous variable of the model, in such a way that its revenues will be 
equivalent (identical) to those of the ad-quantum tax. For it, we have 
used in the model the following restriction 
 
iiiii AQETDDPDTE ... =                                                  (35)   
 
Where TEi is the advalorem endogenous environmental tax on the good Di, 
and AQETi is the ad-quantum exogenous environmental tax on good Di. 
 
3.2.4. Investment and saving 
 
The total investment of the economy INV is a good made up of the gross 
formation of capital in the different branches of activity, using a 
Leontief function of fixed coefficients. Therefore, the optimization 
problem, which the economy is due to face, aims to diminish the unit 
costs of the total investment, 
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Where DiINV is the gross formation of capital in the good Di, and viINV are 
the fixed coefficients. 
 
The national saving is the sum of the saving made by each one of the 
previous described institutions, and so it has an endogenous character. 
The macroeconomic equilibrium of the model will be determined by the 
economy capacity or necessity from financing of the outside CAPNEC, that 
will be equal to the difference between national saving and investments, 
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CAPNECINVPINVSAVSAVPSAV GOVPRIV =−+ .).(                           (38) 
 
 
3.2.5. Foreign sector 
 
In this model we have assumed a small open economy, in such a way that 
prices of the goods and services in the international markets PXMi are 
fixed and, therefore, exogenous. This means that the supply of imports 
and the demand of exports are perfectly elastic. Also the transfers and 
the net property rents coming from the outside are perceived as exogenous 
by the different institutions, and so is the consumption made abroad by 
the resident households. 
 
Finally, we must not forget the final consumption made by the 
nonresidents (CNR), mainly formed by the tourists’ consumption. The 
amount of goods and services consumed by the nonresidents DiRW will be 
considered exogenous in our model, due to the impossibility to represent 
the budgetary restriction which the nonresident consumers face. The 
equation that describes the balance of payments (40) will determine the 
macroeconomic balance of this economy versus the outside. 
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Where TRANSFRW are the net transfers received39 by the rest of the world. 
 
3.2.6. Market of factors 
 
In this economy there are two primary productive factors: capital and 
labour. The supply of capital is equal to the sum of the fixed endowments 
of each one of the institutions considered in the model. The supply of 
capital is inelastic, movable between sectors, but perfectly immovable 
internationally. The demand of capital by each branch of activity is 
                                                          
39
 The received net transfers, TRANSFRW, are the sum of the social quotations paid to the 
rest of the world, the property rents paid to the rest of the world, less wages paid by the 
rest of the world, the rent tax of the nonresidents, social quotations associated to the 
work made by the households resident in the rest of the world, the transfers made by the 
UE, and other transfers paid by the rest of the world to other institutions. 
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determined by the solution to the problem of minimization of costs which 
each producer faces, as was indicated previously. The remuneration of the 
capital is an endogenous variable of the model, so that it satisfies the 
restriction of market clearing. That is to say, equalizing supply and 
demand of capital: 
 
∑
=
=+
n
i
iGOVPRIV KKK
1
                                                  (41) 
 
The representative consumer is the only supplier of work. As we have 
indicated previously, the representative consumer has a fixed endowment 
of time (TIME) that can use to supply labour or to consume in leisure 
form. Like in Böhringer and Rutherford (1997), we supposed a competitive 
labour market and, therefore, an economy without involuntary 
unemployment40. The supply of work is movable between sectors, but 
perfectly immovable internationally. The demand of work made by each 
branch of activity is determined by the solution to the problem of 
minimization of costs which each producer faces, as was previously 
indicated. The remuneration of the work is an endogenous variable of the 
model, so that it satisfies the restriction of market clearing. That is 
to say, equalizing supply and demand of labour: 
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                                               (42) 
 
3.2.7. The environmental model 
 
At the present time, there are no technical processes that allow reducing 
CO2 emissions which take place during the fossil fuel combustion. That is 
to say, there is a relation of proportionality between the physical units 
consumed of different fossil fuels and the CO2 emissions to the 
atmosphere.  
 
The environmental submodel, will simulate the inner CO2 emissions, i.e., 
those that are generated by the different domestic branches of activity 
                                                          
40
 In our model, with a household or representative consumer, the amount of work in 
equilibrium represents the work made by the occupied population, and the leisure 
consumption in fact represents the leisure consumed by the occupied population, and the 
leisure (voluntary or not) consumed by the active population but not occupied. Therefore, 
the possible changes in the supply of work considered by the model represent changes in the 
supply of work of the active population. 
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(CO2i) and the inner consumption from resident households (CO2H). In 
order to do this, we calculated an emission coefficient that relates the 
consumption of each one of the different primary energy goods and the 
emissions generated during its combustion. 
 
iAiiAiiAii GASGCOREFPCOCOALCCOCO .2.2.22 ++=                        (43) 
 
HHHHHHHH GASGCOREFFUELOILPCOCOALCCOCO .2).(2.22 +++=       (44) 
 
Where CO2Ci and CO2CH are the coefficients of emission of the coal 
consumed by sector i and the representative household, respectively. In a 
similar way, CO2Pi and CO2PH are the coefficients of emission of refined 
products of petroleum, and CO2Gi and CO2GH are the coefficients of 
emission of natural gas. 
 
 
3.3. Calibration of the model 
 
The data that we have used to calibrate the model come from a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the Portuguese economy constructed on purpose 
for this study, from the national accounting for the year 1999. The steps 
for the elaboration of the Portuguese SAM for the year 1999 are described 
in chapter 4. Taking the data contained in the SAM we can calibrate41 
(specify) the necessary parameters of the model so that it is able to 
reproduce these data like an optimal solution of general equilibrium. 
Nevertheless, certain fundamental parameters of the model, like the 
substitution elasticities, have not been calibrated but taken from 
empirical literature. The elasticities, along with the amounts and prices 
of reference in the initial equilibrium, characterize the technologies 
and the preferences of the agents through the calibration of the model. 
 
The data contained in the national accounting and in the SAM represent 
monetary values, and do not distinguish between prices and amounts. 
Therefore, it is normal in applied GEMs to follow the convention 
originally used in Harberger (1962). Following this convention, the units 
used to measure the different goods and services, and also the factors, 
have been chosen in such a way that their prices are equal to the unit in 
                                                          
41
 For a brief introduction to this methodology, see Shoven and Whalley (1992). 
Effects of a Green Tax Reform in Portugal – A General Equilibrium Analysis 
66 
 
the initial equilibrium situation. The model of general equilibrium has 
been programmed with GAMS/MPSGE, and the calibration has been implemented 
following the method proposed in Rutherford (1999). 
 
The elasticity of the supply of labour has been calibrated following the 
procedure used in Ballard et al. (1985), in such a way that the model is 
able to reproduce the uncompensated elasticity of the supply of labour 
contained in empirical literature. In a model with a representative 
consumer, the elasticity of the supply of labour must be interpreted as 
the changes in the effective supply of labour of the economy versus 
changes in the net real wage (Goulder et al., 1997).  
 
Therefore, it is the result of changes in the participation of the 
households in the labour market, changes in the duration of the work day, 
and changes in the effort. 
 
The preferences of the representative household in relation to the 
different goods and services have been calibrated using the following 
elasticities of substitution, calculated by Rutherford and Paltsev 
(2000). The elasticity of substitution between fuels for private 
transport, energy goods for the home, and a composed good by the 
remaining goods σCFH is 0,1. The elasticity of substitution between 
electricity and the remaining energy goods for the home σEH is 1,5. The 
elasticity of substitution between coal, natural gas, and the remaining 
refined products of petroleum that provide energy for the home σNEH is 1. 
 
The technology of the different branches of activity was calibrated using 
the elasticities of substitution that are presented in Table 3. The 
concerned elasticities of substitution between capital and work σiKL in 
each productive sector, as well as elasticities between national 
production and imported goods σiA, have been taken from GTAP (Hertel, 
1997). The elasticities of transformation of the supply between products 
for exports and products for the domestic markets σiε have been taken 
from deMelo and Tarr (1992). The substitution elasticities between 
aggregate E (energy) and aggregate KL (capital and work) in each 
productive sector σiKEL has been taken from Kemfert and Welsch (2000). The 
elasticity of substitution between electricity and EP (the remaining 
primary energy goods) σE, the elasticity of substitution between coal and 
hydrocarbons σEP, and the elasticity of substitution between natural gas 
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and ref (the remaining refined products of petroleum) σPET, have been 
taken from Boheringer et al. (1997). 
 
Table 3 – Substitution elasticities 
 
  σi
KEL
 σ
E
 σi
KL
 σ
EP
 σ
PET
 σi
A
 σi
ε
  
AGRSIL 0,5 0,3 0,56 0,5 0,5 2,2 3,9 
PESCA 0,5 0,3 0,56 0,5 0,5 2,2 3,9 
EXTENE 0,5 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
EXTRAC 0,96 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 1,9 2,9 
ALITAB 0,5 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
TEXTIL 0,8 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
COURO 0,8 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
MADCOR 0,8 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
PAPIMP 0,8 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
REFPET 0,5 0,3 1,12 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
QUIMIC 0,96 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 1,9 2,9 
PLAST 0,8 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
MINER 0,96 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 1,9 2,9 
METAL 0,8 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
MAQEQU 0,8 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
EQUIEL 0,8 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
MATRANS 0,8 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
INDTRAN 0,96 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 1,9 2,9 
ELECT 0,5 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
GAS 0,5 0,3 1,12 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
AGUA 0,5 0,3 1,26 0,5 0,5 2,8 2,9 
CONST 0,5 0,3 1,4 0,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 
COMER 0,5 0,3 1,68 0,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 
RESTA 0,5 0,3 1,68 0,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 
TRANSCOM 0,5 0,3 1,68 0,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 
FINAN 0,5 0,3 1,68 0,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 
IMOBALUG 0,5 0,3 1,68 0,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 
ADMPUB 0,5 0,3 1,68 0,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 
EDUCA 0,5 0,3 1,68 0,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 
SAUDE 0,5 0,3 1,68 0,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 
SERVI 0,5 0,3 1,68 0,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 
EMPDOM 0,5 0,3 1,68 0,5 0,5 1,9 0,7 
Source: own elaboration.  
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4. A Social and Environmental Accounting Matrix of the 
Portuguese Economy for 1999 
 
 
 
The data that we have used in the model come from a SAM for the 
Portuguese economy constructed from the national accounting for the year 
1999. In order to elaborate the SAM-1999 we have taken as starting point 
the Input Output Symmetric Table (IOST) at acquisition prices. 
 
The activity sectors considered in the IOST (60 altogether) have been 
reduced to 31, because the available data about sectoral energy 
consumption was divided into 30 sectors. In these data, the sectors of 
production and distribution of electricity, production and distribution 
of gas and hot water and water collection and supply were aggregated, so 
we used the information available in DGEG, Balanços energéticos-1999, to 
disaggregate it. In Table 6 we present the economic sectors, its 
nomenclature and the code. 
 
We chose the year 1999 because it was the only one for which we had a 
symmetrical Input-Output matrix at acquisition prices for the Portuguese 
economy. The cells referring to the families, society and NPISH, have 
been aggregated for simplification of the SAM and the model. The costs of 
this simplification for the simulation are null, since we do not intend 
to get individual results for each one of these three economic agents. 
 
The SAM had the sectors of electricity, gas and hot water aggregated, and 
we wanted to have them separate, at least the sector of electricity and 
gas, for policy simulation. The Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) 
didn’t have this data available for the year of 1999, but only for the 
years 2000 and forward, in I-O tables. 
 
We disaggregated of the sector “Electricity, gas and hot water” in (i) 
Production and distribution of electricity and (ii) Production and 
distribution of gas and hot water. We arrived at the disaggregated values 
for the year 1999 in the following way: we calculated the weights of each 
sector in the aggregate “electricity, gas and hot water” for year 2000; 
we divided the line/column of “electricity, gas and hot water” of 1999 in 
two new lines/columns, (i) Production and distribution of electricity and 
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(ii) Production and distribution of gas and hot water”, attributing to 
each one the weight that it had in the aggregate for year 2000.  
 
The I-O table for 2000 did not have, for the electricity sector and for 
the gas and hot water sector, disaggregated data about (i) SSC paid by 
employees, (ii) taxes and subsidies on products and production (iii) 
exportations and importations and (iv) CNR, so we could not use the 
previous procedure for these variables. In the first case, we distributed 
the values proportionally to the wages. In the second case, 
disaggregation existed only for total taxes and total subsidies; we 
distributed the taxes and subsidies on products and on production 
proportionally to production (taking into account that the value added 
tax is the same for electricity and gas). In the third case, we applied 
to the 1999 data the weights of the importations and exportations of 
electricity and gas on the total importations and total exportations of 
the aggregated sector for the year 2000. In the last case, we used the 
weights of households’ final consumption disaggregated for the 
electricity and the gas and hot water, on the total expenditures in the 
aggregate of these sectors. 
 
We aggregated the sectors of “Other activities of collective, social and 
personal services” with “Activities of households as employers; 
undifferentiated goods and services producing activities of households 
for own use”. 
 
For the calculation of the CO2 emissions of each sector, we started by 
introducing in the INE the data for 1999 on fossil fuel consumption42: 
coal, refined oil products and natural gas (inside of refined oil 
products we considered fueloil, gasoil, gasoline, gpl and other energy 
products). Then, we associated with each type of fuel conversion factors 
of GJ in CO2 emissions, using coefficients of emission (see Table 4). We 
calculated for the year 1999 a total of 60.722.710,6 tons metric of CO2 
emissions. This number is similar to the offered in INE for the year 1999 
(66.119.600,0), which means a deviation of 8% for our estimative. In 
Table 5 we present sectoral CO2 emissions. Table 7 is the SAM for the 
year 1999 of the Portuguese economy that we used to calibrate the general 
                                                          
42
 INE, NAMEA - Energia (Conta Satélite do Ambiente) 
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equilibrium model and the subsequent simulations. The monetary data are 
valued in million Euros. 
 
Table 4 - emission factors of CO2 emissions (ton) by energy (Gj) 
Coal 100 
Natural gas 55 
Fueloil 76 
gasoil  73 
Gasoline 73 
GPL 65 
Source: Own elaboration with data of Corine Aire (1991) 
 
 
Table 5 - Sectoral CO2 Emissions 
CO2 emissions % 
AGRSIL 992.207,4 1,6% 
PESCA 354.427,7 0,6% 
EXTENE 136,1 0,0% 
EXTRAC 196.987,4 0,3% 
ALITAB 1.321.104,7 2,2% 
TEXTIL 1.221.656,6 2,0% 
COURO 24.495,6 0,0% 
MADCOR 425.379,5 0,7% 
PAPIMP 1.023.411,3 1,7% 
REFPET 2.828.110,2 4,7% 
QUIMIC 1.132.745,5 1,9% 
PLAST 69.173,1 0,1% 
MINER 4.156.709,9 6,8% 
METAL 563.328,8 0,9% 
MAQEQU 332.009,8 0,5% 
EQUIEL 16.188,1 0,0% 
MATRANS 30.490,2 0,1% 
INDTRAN 63.083,0 0,1% 
ELECT 23.246.077,8 38,3% 
GAS 12.369,1 0,0% 
AGUA 2.930,7 0,0% 
CONST 2.462.964,8 4,1% 
COMER 1.464.831,6 2,4% 
RESTA 613.513,5 1,0% 
TRANSCO 5.576.809,9 9,2% 
FINAN 13.571,8 0,0% 
IMOBALU 646.214,2 1,1% 
ADMPUB 1.072.139,2 1,8% 
EDUCA 82.588,2 0,1% 
SAUDE 1.762.743,5 2,9% 
SERVI 219.342,6 0,4% 
HOUSEHOLDS 8.794.969,0 14,5% 
TOTAL 60.722.710,7 100,0% 
 Source: Own elaboration 
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Table 6 - Sectors considered in SAM 1999 and the corresponding nomenclature in National Accounts 
Sectors in 
SAM 1999 Description 
Nomenclature national 
accounts P60 
AGRSIL Agriculture, animal production, hunting and forestry 01,02 
PESCA Fishing 05 
EXTENE Extraction of energetic products 11 
EXTRAC Mining with exception of energetic products 12 
ALITAB Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products  15,16 
TEXTIL Manufacture of textiles 17,18 
COURO Manufacture of leather and related products 19 
MADCOR Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 20 
PAPIMP Manufacture of paper and paper products; Printing and reproduction of recorded media 21,22 
REFPET Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products and nuclear combustible  23 
QUIMIC Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products and synthetic or artificial fibres 24 
PLAST Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 25 
MINER Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 26 
METAL Manufacture of basic metals 27,28 
MAQEQU Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 29 
EQUIEL Manufacture of electric equipment and optical products 30,31,32,33 
MATRANS Manufacture of transport equipment 34,35 
INDTRAN Other manufacturing 36,37 
ELECT Production and distribution of electricity 401 
GAS Production and distribution of gas and hot water 402,403 
AGUA Water collection and supply 41 
CONST Construction 45 
COMER Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and domestic and personal use goods 50,51,52 
RESTA Accomodation and food service activities 55 
TRANSCOM Transports, storage and communications 60,61,62,63,64 
FINAN Financial and insurance activities + financial intermediation services indirectly measured (FISIM) 65,66,67 
IMOBALU Real estate Activities, leasing and business support activities 70,71,74 
ADMPUB Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 75 
EDUCA Education 80 
SAUDE Health and social work activities 85 
SERVI Other activities of collective, social and personal services + Activities of households as employers; 
undifferentiated goods and services producing activities of households for own use 72,73,90,91,92,93, 95 
Source: Own Elaboration 
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Table 7 - Social and Environmental Accounting Matrix for Portugal, 1999 
(Values in million Euros and CO2 emissions in tons)  1 2 3 4 5 
1 
G
o
od
s
 a
nd
 S
e
rvices
 
AGRSIL 579,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 3.442,3 
2 PESCA 0,0 40,8 0,0 0,0 72,2 
3 EXTENE 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
4 EXTRAC 0,0 0,0 0,0 9,4 3,0 
5 ALITAB 1.053,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 2.869,9 
6 TEXTIL 0,1 2,5 0,0 12,4 9,9 
7 COURO 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
8 MADCOR 3,3 0,0 0,0 0,2 10,8 
9 PAPIMP 22,1 7,2 0,0 6,7 294,4 
10 REFPET 157,2 25,9 0,0 42,3 54,7 
11 QUIMIC 295,9 2,4 0,0 26,6 31,5 
12 PLAST 0,0 2,1 0,0 0,0 172,8 
13 MINER 19,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 107,6 
14 METAL 7,3 3,1 0,0 9,1 162,0 
15 MAQEQU 49,2 0,3 0,0 11,5 66,5 
16 EQUIEL 0,2 0,7 0,0 0,2 0,2 
17 MATRANS 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,1 0,0 
18 INDTRAN 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
19 ELECT 66,3 3,1 0,0 21,7 60,5 
20 GAS 3,2 0,0 0,0 1,7 7,7 
21 AGUA 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,3 18,7 
22 CONST 51,4 4,7 0,0 23,2 43,8 
23 COMER 1.360,1 276,5 24,9 125,1 3.941,8 
24 RESTA 1,2 0,7 0,0 5,3 22,3 
25 TRANSCO 33,1 5,2 0,0 43,8 126,9 
26 FINAN 25,6 5,7 0,0 15,5 87,8 
27 IMOBALU 89,2 11,7 0,0 32,5 783,5 
28 ADMPUB 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
29 EDUCA 0,5 1,1 0,0 4,0 38,3 
30 SAUDE 26,4 0,1 0,0 0,5 13,9 
31 SERVI 1,8 0,4 0,0 1,8 12,2 
32 
Generation of 
Income 
Compensation of Employees 371,0 118,2 0,0 156,3 1.333,6 
33 
Net Operating Surplus/ Mixed 
Income (capital) 2.809,0 255,7 0,0 190,2 1.838,8 
34 SSC paid by firms 72,0 23,0 0,0 30,3 258,9 
35 Product Taxes 148,0 25,3 0,3 23,9 2.189,2 
36 Product Subsidies -433,1 -1,7 0,0 0,0 -107,6 
37 Production Taxes 5,1 0,8 0,0 1,9 23,8 
38 Production Subsidies -192,5 -18,0 0,0 -3,6 -45,2 
39 Allocation of 
Primary Income 
Private Sector 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
40 Public Sector 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
41 
Transfers 
Property Rents 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
42 Rent Tax 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
43 SSC 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
44 Social Benefits 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
45 Current Transfers 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
46 Use of Income Private Sector 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
47 Public Sector 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
48 Financial Accounts Gross Capital Formation 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
49 Rest of the World CNR 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
50 RW 1.803,6 135,5 1.891,2 125,6 3.397,5 
51 
CO2 Emissions 
Coal 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
52 Refined Petroleum Products 992.198,7 354.427,7 136,1 196.447,5 1.261.610,6 
53 Natural Gas 8,7 0,0 0,0 539,9 59.494,1 
54 Total CO2 992.207,4 354.427,7 136,1 196.987,4 1.321.104,7 
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6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 259,8 0,9 647,0 242,9 0,0 3,5 10,9 0,0 
2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1.513,2 0,0 0,0 15,3 
4 0,0 0,0 0,0 13,7 0,0 18,9 0,0 366,5 
5 0,0 69,8 0,0 9,1 0,0 16,5 0,0 0,0 
6 4.141,8 62,6 1,4 6,2 4,8 22,8 33,4 17,0 
7 17,5 1.100,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
8 2,1 1,0 713,9 15,0 0,0 1,5 3,6 13,9 
9 76,7 38,2 26,6 1.349,6 3,6 68,1 18,6 75,2 
10 76,9 6,6 30,6 16,4 114,4 155,6 10,6 21,8 
11 489,0 128,3 61,4 174,4 73,0 1.344,7 693,4 189,6 
12 33,3 94,5 20,6 52,6 0,0 36,3 226,9 30,3 
13 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,0 0,0 10,2 8,6 713,3 
14 22,8 19,1 9,0 9,6 0,0 89,7 24,0 110,6 
15 57,7 13,1 17,6 0,6 0,3 15,7 16,2 154,2 
16 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,3 0,0 
17 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
18 68,7 1,3 0,4 16,1 0,6 0,0 7,9 17,6 
19 110,6 14,5 14,4 210,6 77,3 15,9 31,1 82,2 
20 20,6 1,1 2,4 8,7 0,0 10,3 1,0 78,0 
21 3,0 0,5 0,6 1,4 1,1 3,1 0,5 2,7 
22 36,7 9,9 20,6 30,2 14,3 24,1 12,9 52,2 
23 2.568,3 461,1 227,8 952,4 1.246,6 1.792,4 749,7 311,9 
24 25,9 11,7 12,3 25,8 0,9 19,3 12,9 8,9 
25 99,2 19,9 63,3 191,5 86,6 60,8 38,1 90,2 
26 105,8 19,2 46,4 31,2 15,0 47,2 15,1 39,3 
27 328,9 53,7 54,2 417,6 45,0 480,5 92,8 161,6 
28 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
29 32,7 5,7 5,9 19,6 9,9 26,1 7,4 18,4 
30 2,6 0,6 0,5 5,4 0,0 0,8 0,8 1,3 
31 12,9 2,7 2,4 80,8 8,2 11,0 2,8 5,3 
32 1.758,9 472,9 385,1 687,0 13,7 483,4 268,7 686,4 
33 1.106,7 278,2 392,9 594,8 -14,0 274,9 166,9 707,1 
34 341,5 91,8 74,8 133,4 2,7 93,9 52,2 133,3 
35 663,2 144,2 78,3 123,1 3.166,2 352,0 85,1 208,5 
36 -1,5 0,0 0,0 -2,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
37 13,0 3,2 3,9 6,1 2,7 8,0 3,3 9,7 
38 -63,7 -15,2 -13,9 -21,8 0,0 -5,6 -6,3 -17,6 
39 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
40 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
41 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
42 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
43 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
44 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
45 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
46 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
47 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
48 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
49 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
50 2.737,1 763,4 375,5 1.063,0 679,7 3.760,1 1.220,8 597,9 
51 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 964.262,4 
52 1.188.630,5 24.405,9 423.408,0 1.006.303,2 2.828.110,2 1.040.651,6 69.084,3 2.063.927,7 
53 33.026,0 89,6 1.971,5 17.108,1 0,0 92.093,8 88,8 1.128.519,8 
54 1.221.656,6 24.495,6 425.379,5 1.023.411,3 2.828.110,2 1.132.745,5 69.173,1 4.156.709,9 
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
3 24,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 179,3 173,6 0,0 0,0 
4 17,8 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 312,8 
5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
6 6,3 3,1 12,7 57,2 166,8 15,3 0,3 0,0 118,9 
7 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,0 20,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
8 39,8 2,6 2,5 4,5 255,2 0,0 19,3 0,0 783,0 
9 33,8 16,7 21,1 37,0 58,0 0,6 0,2 7,8 58,9 
10 42,7 12,4 7,3 6,3 41,5 249,2 4,4 22,7 683,2 
11 44,7 26,6 60,1 51,9 55,3 1,0 0,0 37,5 295,7 
12 44,5 79,4 419,7 161,4 108,6 0,0 0,0 1,1 189,8 
13 11,9 33,8 20,5 118,9 14,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 2.537,7 
14 1.326,3 482,0 359,8 591,3 232,6 6,6 3,1 10,4 1.237,3 
15 43,9 854,7 36,9 62,9 12,6 0,0 0,0 13,7 461,8 
16 0,1 221,3 1.798,7 336,5 9,2 54,9 14,1 0,0 363,2 
17 0,0 4,8 0,3 1.916,9 1,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
18 83,5 3,7 0,1 177,0 278,0 1,0 0,3 0,3 101,4 
19 72,1 19,2 22,1 19,3 18,1 1.879,8 1,3 17,8 48,0 
20 22,9 2,3 1,7 2,2 1,1 169,3 0,0 0,0 1,6 
21 3,6 1,4 1,6 1,6 1,2 0,5 0,1 71,0 12,8 
22 25,8 12,8 16,7 11,2 11,5 0,8 0,0 1,4 6.009,5 
23 785,3 1.277,1 1.551,3 1.243,9 1.212,8 0,1 0,0 8,7 64,6 
24 31,5 25,7 23,7 6,8 16,8 2,5 0,7 3,1 138,7 
25 54,4 41,4 63,1 24,7 32,5 20,0 22,4 30,0 177,1 
26 20,3 79,9 37,4 18,4 26,8 57,8 6,1 3,8 212,2 
27 132,9 105,0 209,0 85,4 130,5 197,5 11,4 16,5 720,0 
28 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
29 22,7 15,8 51,7 30,5 6,7 0,8 0,0 2,1 39,3 
30 1,4 1,2 1,4 0,6 0,8 0,2 0,0 0,1 12,4 
31 5,1 17,7 55,8 14,3 2,2 67,8 3,2 3,3 14,1 
32 575,2 276,2 812,1 598,6 454,9 456,2 41,2 137,2 3474,3 
33 420,7 202,7 307,6 391,2 275,0 1.935,2 131,2 143,9 3.279,7 
34 111,7 53,6 157,7 116,2 88,3 88,6 8,0 26,6 674,6 
35 131,2 180,6 480,5 2.109,5 361,5 98,2 8,1 16,1 659,3 
36 -1,8 0,0 0,0 -8,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 -7,3 0,0 
37 5,2 4,6 5,9 10,5 3,7 12,8 1,1 0,5 26,8 
38 -16,3 -5,7 -15,0 -9,1 -13,9 -3,8 -0,3 -0,4 -83,8 
39 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
40 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
41 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
42 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
43 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
44 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
45 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
46 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
47 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
48 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
49 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
50 2.814,9 3.524,5 5.357,6 7.382,2 873,6 119,6 1,4 1,7 3,5 
51 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 13.619.430,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 
52 513.765,8 291.820,0 16.005,8 30.399,5 63.048,3 5.658.961,9 12.369,1 2.930,7 2.462.514,8 
53 49.563,0 40.189,8 182,3 90,7 34,6 3.967.685,4  0,0  0,0 450,0 
54 563.328,8 332.009,8 16.188,1 30.490,2 63.083,0 23.246.077,8 12.369,1 2.930,7 2.462.964,8 
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23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 0,0 304,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 10,3 1,8 88,7 
2 0,0 94,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,1 
3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
4 0,0 5,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,9 0,0 
5 0,1 2.361,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 49,8 35,6 316,1 
6 231,9 120,8 37,7 0,0 21,8 18,0 2,8 136,5 
7 14,1 0,0 0,8 0,0 0,0 1,2 0,1 0,3 
8 97,3 2,2 0,0 0,0 19,1 0,0 0,5 0,3 
9 618,4 14,7 93,0 111,1 1.017,2 5,0 83,3 123,5 
10 323,0 247,9 856,3 2,7 153,0 223,2 27,2 457,1 
11 209,5 53,4 4,0 3,5 52,3 3,7 13,4 942,3 
12 359,7 1,1 18,1 0,0 257,0 0,2 1,4 1,6 
13 93,0 54,2 0,3 0,0 58,3 0,0 7,4 0,6 
14 405,1 42,1 0,5 0,0 149,4 0,0 5,0 25,0 
15 87,2 33,6 0,3 0,0 48,6 48,7 3,9 13,7 
16 430,3 120,2 215,6 102,4 18,0 39,3 27,5 121,7 
17 432,5 10,1 109,4 0,0 0,5 50,3 1,0 4,1 
18 276,6 73,2 0,3 18,6 9,4 69,4 37,0 15,4 
19 340,4 176,1 92,8 54,2 273,9 136,4 104,0 59,7 
20 0,4 11,1 0,3 0,0 0,2 0,3 1,3 1,1 
21 37,5 40,5 7,8 3,5 16,1 53,7 21,2 21,6 
22 160,0 21,0 189,9 35,4 677,9 27,4 25,6 22,7 
23 1.095,5 108,4 104,2 6,4 112,7 41,9 12,3 42,8 
24 549,5 36,8 102,9 116,2 333,3 129,0 61,8 88,5 
25 2.106,4 73,3 1.966,1 237,5 575,5 254,9 130,6 162,2 
26 393,7 46,6 95,9 5.013,1 313,1 9,3 7,6 19,2 
27 2.633,8 437,7 743,9 1.492,3 4.112,9 366,7 547,1 610,9 
28 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
29 89,7 23,1 104,4 16,0 49,4 17,8 8,6 2,4 
30 21,6 4,5 3,4 0,0 64,7 2,5 12,9 365,4 
31 152,8 125,1 236,8 182,8 1.417,5 111,7 91,9 97,8 
32 5.154,6 1439,2 2.632,8 2.268,4 2.493,3 5494,8 5045,9 3177,0 
33 7.454,4 1.139,2 3.020,4 -1.720,9 11.148,9 1.115,5 648,3 1.485,6 
34 1.000,9 279,5 511,2 440,5 484,1 1066,9 979,8 616,9 
35 363,8 733,7 485,7 509,7 1.917,9 0,0 8,5 36,7 
36 0,0 0,0 -96,4 0,0 -12,5 0,0 -12,4 0,0 
37 59,5 12,5 40,7 10,6 359,8 0,0 4,9 5,4 
38 -123,1 -41,2 -105,6 -6,0 -503,4 0,0 -99,9 -16,2 
39 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
40 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
41 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
42 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
43 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
44 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
45 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
46 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
47 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
48 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
49 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
50 313,9 347,3 805,6 251,9 1.022,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 
51 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
52 1.464.831,6 566.679,0 5.576.809,9 13.571,8 644.162,4 1.068.939,1 82.588,2 1.740.531,0 
53  0,0 46.834,5  0,0 0,0 2.051,8 3.200,1  0,0 22.212,5 
54 1.464.831,6 613.513,5 5.576.809,9 13.571,8 646.214,2 1.072.139,2 82.588,2 1.762.743,5 
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31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
2 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
4 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
5 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
6 47,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
8 85,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
9 149,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
10 63,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
11 161,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
12 34,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
13 2,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
14 24,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
15 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
16 151,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
17 4,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
18 66,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
19 122,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
20 13,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
21 35,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
22 73,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
23 23,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
24 54,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
25 308,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
26 82,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
27 1.456,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
28 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
29 18,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
30 12,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
31 450,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
32 2.355,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
33 1.635,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
34 457,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
35 707,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
36 -114,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
37 25,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
38 -118,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
39 0,0 43.649,8 39.604,5 1.093,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
40 0,0 0,0 2.010,8 7.377,0 15340,8 -315,7 671,4 -1503,1 0,0 0,0 
41 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 21.410,7 3.589,6 
42 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 10.606,5 0,0 
43 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 7.039,0 0,0 
44 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2.830,6 12.839,9 
45 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 4.542,6 13.410,8 
46 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 87.133,0 0,0 
47 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 22.658,2 
48 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
49 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
50 544,4 119,2 0,0 0,0 674,7 -482,8 0,0 -62,9 0,0 0,0 
51 0,0                   
52 214.504,8                   
53 4.837,8                   
54 219.342,6                   
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41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 
1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2.218,9 0,0 352,1 66,3 200,5 
2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 637,3 0,0 0,0 19,0 68,0 
3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 9,6 0,0 0,0 
4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 8,3 0,0 1,5 0,2 159,6 
5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 12.542,9 0,0 174,5 374,9 1.469,3 
6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 4.732,0 0,0 -11,0 141,4 4.973,8 
7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1.010,5 0,0 -4,8 30,2 1.683,1 
8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 96,5 0,0 18,9 2,9 1.080,5 
9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 918,9 0,7 -27,9 27,5 1.108,3 
10 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2.409,6 0,0 23,2 72,0 424,3 
11 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1.586,2 964,2 2,0 47,4 1.115,7 
12 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 740,5 0,0 109,9 22,1 590,1 
13 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 166,0 0,0 32,3 5,0 886,1 
14 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 105,7 0,0 320,7 3,2 1.141,7 
15 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 667,3 0,0 3.540,6 19,9 1.223,3 
16 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1.350,9 0,0 3.085,7 40,4 3.378,2 
17 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 5.378,5 0,0 3.586,2 160,8 3.911,7 
18 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2.259,6 0,0 597,1 67,5 509,7 
19 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1.272,8 0,0 0,0 38,0 135,8 
20 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 84,3 0,0 0,0 2,5 1,2 
21 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 198,7 1,2 0,0 5,9 0,5 
22 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 86,3 0,0 14.887,6 2,6 4,6 
23 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2.729,3 0,0 440,2 81,6 403,0 
24 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3.993,1 1,6 0,0 2.521,7 168,5 
25 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2.976,0 15,9 0,0 197,4 1.950,9 
26 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1.862,9 0,0 0,0 55,7 333,8 
27 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 6.282,1 10,5 2.846,3 386,5 575,5 
28 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 213,4 9.130,8 0,0 3,6 0,0 
29 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1.187,1 5.959,5 0,0 32,9 0,0 
30 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3.560,6 4.831,6 0,0 97,1 0,0 
31 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 4.333,8 337,9 600,6 265,4 207,0 
32 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 147,1 
33 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
34 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
35 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
36 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
37 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
38 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
39 22.395,2 0,0 2.150,2 15.651,3 9.018,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
40 1.021,3 10.606,5 4.888,8 0,0 12.400,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
41 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 3.974,8 
42 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
43 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
44 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 33,2 
45 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 4.793,7 
46 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 412,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
47 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
48 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 19.738,7 1.404,3 0,0 0,0 2.881,1 
49 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 4.791,6 
50 5.558,6 0,0 0,0 52,4 1.328,3 1.784,3 0,0 -6.561,2 0,0 0,0 
51           0,0         
52           8.720.141,0         
53           74.828,0         
54           8.794.968,9         
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51 52 53 54 Total 
1         8.430,8 
2         933,2 
3         1.916,5 
4         918,5 
5         21.344,5 
6         15.148,5 
7         3.875,1 
8         3.276,3 
9         6.464,7 
10         7.065,8 
11         9.242,0 
12         3.810,0 
13         4.902,8 
14         6.938,7 
15         7.577,2 
16         11.881,7 
17         15.573,1 
18         4.758,3 
19         5.611,9 
20         451,4 
21         569,3 
22         22.628,3 
23         25.384,0 
24         8.553,5 
25         12.279,1 
26         9.150,1 
27         26.662,5 
28         9.347,7 
29         7.849,1 
30         9.048,1 
31         8.937,7 
32         43.769,0 
33         41.615,4 
34         8.470,2 
35         16.015,5 
36         -798,6 
37         671,4 
38         -1.566,0 
39         133.562,3 
40         52.498,5 
41         28.975,1 
42         10.606,5 
43         7.039,0 
44         15.703,7 
45         22.747,1 
46         87.545,8 
47         22.658,2 
48         24.024,1 
49         4.791,6 
50         44.326,3 
51         14.583.692,8 
52         40.593.916,9 
53         5.545.100,9 
54         60.722.710,7 
Source: Own Elaboration; data from INE and DGEG. 
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5. Effects of a Green Tax Reform in Portugal  
 
 
In this chapter we describe the main contribution of the thesis, from a 
methodological point of view: the analysis of the economic and 
environmental effects of a GTR in Portugal, by means of a general 
equilibrium model. First we briefly remind the advantages of a GTR as 
well as the empirical simulations with best results. Then we present some 
data on environmental and labour taxes in Portugal, in order to 
contextualize the simulations. Then, the methodology is synthetically 
described, and so are the results of the model. 
 
A GTR have the potential of improving the environment, through CO2 
emissions reductions, and simultaneously raise GDP and employment, 
validating the “double dividend” hypothesis. This is an interesting issue 
as economies like Portugal have to accomplish Kyoto targets and to 
improve the economic situation in the present times of crisis. Therefore 
it is important and convenient to analyse the effects of this policy, and 
the existence (or not) of double or multiple dividends. 
 
As discussed in chapter two, the simulations that were made in recent 
years to evaluate the economic effects of a GTR illustrate some 
particular characteristics that influence the final results. Our 
objective was to simulate the reforms with better results, so we follow 
some of the “advices” given by previous works. 
 
Concerning static models (as we based our study in a static model), we 
saw that its results are more restrictive than those from dynamic models. 
The majority of the static GEM estimate negative effects on welfare and 
on the GDP. But the more positive results are achieved with models that 
recycle revenues reducing labour costs, VAT or personal income tax, “vis-
à-vis” “lump-sum” transfers. 
 
Analysing static and dynamic models results, we saw that simulations 
usually recycle revenues by reducing SSC, maybe because this strategy is 
the one that have more positive results on jobs, GDP and welfare. The 
GTRs that recycle environmental taxes through “lump-sum” transfers 
represent the second most common simulated policy.  
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Given the previous results we decided to focus our analysis in a GTR with 
recycling of revenues through reducing SSC, and compare it with a GTR 
with lump-sum transfers. 
 
Before presenting GTR simulations for the Portuguese economy, it is 
important to compare the levels of Portuguese taxes with UE levels, 
particularly environmental and labour taxes, which are the ones involved 
in this kind of reform. 
 
To design a GTR aiming to achieve any kind of “employment double 
dividend”, it is important to start by analysing the unemployment numbers 
in Portugal. 
 
Ten years ago, the levels of unemployment in Portugal were clearly below 
the European average (4% versus 8,7% in 2000), but have increased quickly 
in recent years. Portugal crossed the European trajectory in 2006 and has 
since kept levels of unemployment above the average, having, in 2009, 
9,6% of the workforce unemployed (8,9% for the European average). 
 
Figure 1 - Unemployment rate, annual average %
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Eurostat 
 
Presently, the employers' SSC amount to 23,75% of gross wages. This 
contribution is, both in % of GDP and in % of total receipts of social 
protection, lower in Portugal than in the EU-27 average. In 2007 this 
difference was of 2,4 and 7,3 percentage points, respectively, for each 
indicator. This important difference to the EU-27 average (particularly 
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in the employers SSC in % of total receipts of social protection) was due 
to the strong increment of unemployment since 2001. 
 
Figure 2 - Employers’ Social Contribution % of GDP 
 
 Source: Own elaboration with data from Eurostat 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - Employers’ Social Contribution % of total receipts 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Eurostat 
 
 
Regarding the environmental taxes43, in Figure 4 we can see that revenues 
from total environmental taxes as percentage of the GDP have always been 
above the UE average (except in the year 2000). However, the values of 
this indicator do not mean that the environmental quality is increasing. 
Quite the opposite: if a tax reaches its goal (reducing the harmful 
behaviour) the tax base diminishes, diminishing the revenues. It may be 
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due to higher tax rates, as it is actually the case for taxes related to 
transport fuels (i.e., much higher than in Spain, as everybody living 
near the border knows). 
Figure 4 - Total environmental taxes in % of GDP 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Eurostat 
 
It is important to distinguish two periods: before 2004 we see that 
environmental tax revenues diminished, although energy consumption rose 
more than GDP (see Figure 5). This might have happened due to the 
maintenance of oil prices in steady levels or with a slight decreasing 
trend until 2004, which allowed the weight of energy expenses in GDP to 
remain steady. After 2004, the reduction of environmental tax revenues on 
GDP could be due to an energy increment smaller than the GDP growth, as 
almost all of environmental revenues come from energy taxes. On the other 
side, innovations in policy instruments, like CO2-emissions trading, also 
influence the reduction of environmental tax revenue (European 
Commission, 2007).  
 
Regarding the structure of environmental taxes in Portugal, we should say 
that pollution taxes practically do not exist (0,01% of total 
environmental taxes) while energy taxes predominate (73% of total 
environmental taxes)44. 
 
The existing GTR experiences reveal that, by increasing energy taxes or 
CO2 taxes, it is feasible to design a more efficient tax system. In the 
case of Portugal, energy taxes for transport purposes are already at a 
                                                          
44
 According to data from Direcção-Geral de Geologia e Energia, the main consumption of  
final energy in 2008 was for transport (36%), so we can infer that the bigger part of 
energy taxes comes from the transport sector. 
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high level. But a restructuring of energy taxes could be designed with no 
increase in the global rate, just to make them more efficient, namely 
through their effect in agent’s behaviour. Moreover, there is a high 
burden of energy taxes in the transport sector, which represents also one 
of the main energy consumers in Portugal. So energy taxes for other uses 
(domestic or industrial use, electricity generation) could be raised. 
Actually the European Commission published that about 30% of GHG 
emissions are made by the domestic and services sectors, through energy 
requirements of buildings. As in Portugal pollution taxes are practically 
inexistent, the CO2 tax applied indirectly through the fossil fuels 
taxation would be a good bet.  
 
Figure 5 - GDP and final energy consumption annual variation rate 
 
Source: DGEG, Balanços Energéticos  and  INE, Contas Nacionais Anuais 
 
Figure 6 - Environmental taxes in Portugal 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Eurostat 
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5.1 The simulated environmental policies 
 
We analyze the environmental and socioeconomic effects of two 
environmental policies to contain climate change; these are the policies 
usually analysed in empirical literature. 
 
Firstly, we study the effects of a new environmental tax within the most 
general framework of a GTR. The income generated by the environmental 
tax, finances a reduction in the social contributions in charge of the 
employers, maintaining the public budget balance in real terms. 
 
Afterwards, we obtain the effects of an environmental tax when the 
receipts generated are given back to the citizens, by means of lump sum 
transfers. This alternative environmental policy is also subject to the 
restriction of constant public budget balance. In both reforms, the 
simulation was made for an environmental tax of 20€, because this value 
is similar not only to other carbon taxes in place in other countries, 
but also to the expected prices of carbon allowances in the EU ETS during 
phase II (although this price dropped in reality, mainly due to the 
economic crisis) and the expected price for the next Kyoto phase. 
Furthermore, this is the value proposed for the European Commission in 
April 2011, for a CO2 emission tax for energy products45. 
 
An important question in the design of both policies is the way in which 
the environmental tax can be implemented. The design of this tax as an 
instrument to reduce the CO2 emissions must follow a pragmatic approach. 
In this sense, the environmental tax does not have to burden directly the 
emissions that each productive sector or each home causes with daily 
activity; instead, it may tax the consumption of certain primary energy 
goods, according to their carbon content. These goods (coal, refined 
products of petroleum, and natural gas) are the origin of the CO2 
emissions that take place during their combustion. 
 
As mentioned in chapter three, there is a relation of proportionality 
between the physical units consumed of different fossil fuels and the 
emissions of CO2 to the atmosphere, which causes a tax on the fossil fuel 
consumption to be equivalent to a tax that burdens the CO2 emissions 
directly. 
                                                          
45
 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2011 
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5.2. The effects of a GTR with reduction in the social contributions 
 
The immediate effect of the GTR is a -23,3% reduction in the marginal 
value of the social contributions in charge of the employers  (equivalent 
to a new tax of 18,2%). As a result we obtain lower wage costs. This 
stimulates a greater demand of labour by the different productive 
sectors. The level of employment increases in +0,8%, which means almost 
45 thousand new jobs46. A greater rate of employment also creates 
tensions in the labour market, so the real income of labour increases 
+1,6%. These numbers represent a very conservative estimation. The lector 
should keep in mind that our model assumes a Portuguese economy without 
unemployment. In the actual circumstances, the new jobs generated by this 
reform will be greater with a small or null impact on labour income 
(wages) and therefore lower impact on prices, as long as the unemployment 
rates in 2010 guarantee no tensions in the labour market. 
 
The Gross Domestic Product in acquisition prices (GDPpa), i.e., at 
consumer prices including taxes and subsidies, experiences a growth of 
+0,9% but diminishes -0,4% in real terms.  
 
For a more precise understanding of the effects on economic activity, we 
have calculated an “Activity Index”, which weighs the variations of 
production in each sector by its importance on total production at the 
benchmark situation. This index shows that economic activity after the 
GTR will represent 99,24% of the benchmark situation (see 
Table 8). Therefore there is a modest impact on aggregate activity 
levels. The rise in employment and on real wages, combined with a lower 
level of activity (production) results in a slight increase in the 
consumer price index of +1,3%.  
 
Figure 7 shows the sectoral effects of the simulated GTR in terms of 
variation in the production, as well as in the prices of acquisition of 
each one of the produced goods. 
 
As we expected, the GTR negatively affects the level of activity of the 
sectors that produce and commercialize primary energy goods, like refined 
products of petroleum (-15,7%) and natural gas (-14,4%). It also 
negatively affects other sectors but in a lower magnitude, like 
                                                          
46 Based in INE statistics for the 2nd trimester of 2010,in Inquérito ao Emprego, 
http://www.ine.pt  
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transports and communications, electricity, mining and manufacture of 
chemicals. 
 
Figure 7 - Sectoral effects of a GTR with SSC reduction and environmental tax of 20€ 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
On the other hand, the sector that benefits more with the GTR is the 
manufacture of leather. Education, manufacture of electric equipment, 
manufacture of transport equipment and manufacture of textiles, all 
present modest ascents. This is also the case for some services, like 
financial services and education, which are quite intensive in labour. 
 
In what prices are concerned, the effects of the GTR also differ between 
sectors. The energy products are the ones that experience the greater 
increases in their prices: the price of coal increases +15,2%47; the 
price of refined products of petroleum +30,9% and of natural gas +31%. It 
also affects the electricity sector (+3,6%) because this sector 
transforms primary energy sources in secondary energy sources48, and the 
transport and communications sector (+2,2%). Manufacture of leather, 
financial and insurance activities, education and health, are among the 
sectors that become cheaper. 
 
                                                          
47 The increase is lower than for other energy sources because there is an important 
hydroelectric generation capacity than alleviates the demand for coal. 
48 In 2008, this sector produced 71,1% of electricity based on thermal energy, 15,9% based 
on hydroelectric energy, 12,5% based on eolic energy, 0,4% on geothermal energy and 0,1% on 
solar energy (Source: Direcção Geral de Energia e Geologia) 
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In environmental terms, the GTR is an effective instrument to reduce the 
CO2 emissions. The CO2 emissions are reduced in -11,6%. As Table 8 shows, 
the electricity sector is, by far, the one that makes the biggest 
reduction (-1360 thousand CO2 tons), but the sectors of manufacture of 
chemicals, refined petroleum products, gas and other manufacturing, are 
the ones that make more effort in relative terms (vis-a-vis the initial 
level of emissions). 
 
Table 8 - Sectoral effects in prices, production and CO2 emissions with a GTR with SSC reduction and 
environmental tax of 20€ 
 
Prices Production CO2 emissions 
  
var % var % var ton var % 
AGRSIL 0,3% -0,3% -114.156 -11,5% 
PESCA 0,4% -0,6% -43.675 -12,3% 
EXTENE 15,2%   
  0,0% 
EXTRAC 1,4% -1,4% -36.560 -18,6% 
ALITAB 0,0% 0,1% -141.759 -10,7% 
TEXTIL -0,1% 0,3% -174.772 -14,3% 
COURO -0,7% 3,2% -2.693 -11,0% 
MADCOR 0,2% -0,7% -73.175 -17,2% 
PAPIMP 0,1% -0,3% -111.694 -10,9% 
REFPET 30,9% -15,7% -584.329 -20,7% 
QUIMIC 0,6% -1,9% -234.725 -20,7% 
PLAST 0,1% -0,1% -8.769 -12,7% 
MINER 0,8% -0,7% -673.592 -16,2% 
METAL 0,3% -0,9% -85.251 -15,1% 
MAQEQU 0,0% 0,0% -47.165 -14,2% 
EQUIEL -0,2% 0,6% -2.071 -12,8% 
MATRANS -0,1% 0,5% -3.934 -12,9% 
INDTRAN 0,1% -0,1% -12.123 -19,2% 
ELECT 3,6% -1,2% -1.360.410 -5,9% 
GAS 31,0% -14,4% -2.789 -22,5% 
AGUA 0,9% -0,4% -316 -10,8% 
CONST 0,9% 0,0% -288.501 -11,7% 
COMER 0,0% -0,9% -167.938 -11,5% 
RESTA 0,6% -0,4% -65.597 -10,7% 
TRANSCO 2,2% -2,1% -721.890 -12,9% 
FINAN -0,7% 0,3% -1.269 -9,4% 
IMOBALU -0,3% -0,1% -66.529 -10,3% 
ADMPUB -0,3% 0,1% -119.936 -11,2% 
EDUCA -1,0% 0,7% -7.647 -9,3% 
SAUDE 0,9% -0,8% -218.438 -12,4% 
SERVI -0,3% 0,2% -22.403 -10,2% 
TOTAL 1,3%a -0,76%b -7.025.080,7c -11,6%c 
Source: Own Elaboration 
Notes: % prices not deflated; ainflation; bactivity index; caggregated variation of CO2 
emissions 
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We consider the previous analysis, in terms of cost for the economy, as 
quite interesting. We were concerned with the possibility that these 
reductions in emissions, caused by the rise of prices of energy goods, 
would cause a reduction in the welfare of the consumers. For this reason, 
we analyzed which were the effects of the GTR in terms of welfare, 
measuring the hicksian equivalent variation in real terms49. The GTR 
produces a decrease of -0,3% in the non environmental welfare, i.e., the 
welfare not associated directly to changes in the CO2 emissions. The 
losses are of -327 million Euros. 
 
Although we have seen that the level of employment and wages are better 
with the GTR, the loss of welfare is related to the reduction of leisure, 
on which the utility of the representative household partly depends. 
There is more labour supply and so less time for leisure. On the other 
side, the value of leisure in our model is equal to its opportunity cost, 
hourly wage, which rises with the GTR. It is worth to mention, that there 
is also a reduction on consumption, as long as there is a lower 
production level and higher consumer prices which also impact negatively 
on welfare. 
 
As mentioned earlier, these numbers represent a very conservative 
estimation of welfare (in this case, over estimation of welfare costs, to 
be more precise). The lector should remember that our model assumes a 
Portuguese economy without unemployment. In the present circumstances, 
the opportunity cost for leisure should be lower, thus increasing the 
chances of obtaining an increase on welfare, instead. 
 
The environmental benefits of the GTR have been measured assuming that 
the environmental tax expresses the monetary damages caused by the 
polluting emissions. That is to say, one ton of CO2 emitted to the 
atmosphere causes damage on the society and economic activities valued in 
20 Euros by ton of CO2. This way, the environmental changes caused by the 
GTR would increase the environmental welfare in +141 million Euros.  
 
As a result of the previous partial effects, the social welfare would 
experience a decrease of -187 million Euros, that represents a tiny loss 
of -0,17%. 
                                                          
49
 That is, the cost of the reform, for the representative household, measured at initial 
prices, or the compensation that he must get, to maintain initial welfare, if the prices 
did not change with the reform. 
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Concerning the trade balance (or net exports) and energy dependence 
towards other countries, the GTR has interesting results. The sectors 
whose trade balance improves more are: extraction of energy products, 
manufacture of leather and manufacture of electric equipment. The sectors 
whose net exports worsen are: refined petroleum products, transports, 
manufacture of chemicals and electricity. 
 
Regarding energy sectors, we can see that net exports of refined 
petroleum products and electricity are smaller, but with the GTR, in 
contrast, we become less dependent on carbon towards other countries. 
Furthermore, the last effect surpasses the first, making the energy 
balance improve in +88 million Euros. Environmentally speaking, we can 
say that with these changes, we are importing less CO2 emissions. 
Considering the emissions linked with fossil fuel consumption, with the 
GTR the economy reduces imports (net of exports) by -1 Co2 million tons 
(this represents less -6,8% of the net imported emissions on benchmark). 
 
As it was mention before, we should notice that our model considers full 
employment. In the Portuguese economy there is a considerable level of 
unemployment (10,9% in 3rd trimester of 201050), so the effects of the GTR 
on the employment would be greater. Considering the same idea, the 
effects on GDP would also be more positive and the effects on wages and 
prices would be smaller. Consequently, the above results represent a very 
conservative scenario. 
  
 
5.3 The effects of an environmental tax with lump-sum transfers 
 
We also analyzed the results of a reform in which the income generated by 
the environmental tax is given back to the citizens by lump-sum 
transfers. In this case, the fiscal reform must have, as its only 
objective, to reduce CO2 emissions. As a consequence, their effects on 
the economy are slightly more negative than the GTR analyzed previously. 
The introduction of the environmental tax reduces in -1% the real wealth 
of the economy in terms of the real GDPpa, whereas the real Gross 
Domestic Product at basic prices (GDPbp) experiences a fall of -2,6%. The 
activity index is now of 98,54% and the level of employment and real 
wages are reduced by -0,5% and -2%, respectively.  
                                                          
50
 Source: INE 
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Figure 8 summarizes the sectoral effects of the environmental tax in 
combination with lump-sum transfers. Manufacture of leather, public 
administration and education, are the only sectors that are benefited (in 
a slight way). Among the more harmed sectors are refined petroleum 
products (-16,1%), natural gas (-14,9%) and mining (-3,5%). In relation 
to the effects of the reform on the sectoral prices of acquisition, the 
differences with respect to the results obtained with the GTR are of 
little significance. As a result, there is an increase on CPI of +1,4%. 
 
Figure 8 - Effects of a GTR with lump sum transfers and environmental tax of 20€ 
 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 
The environmental tax along with lump-sum transfers, allows a greater 
reduction in the CO2 emissions with respect to the GTR, as shown in Table 
9. The emissions are reduced now in -7,3 million of tons, which 
represents around 0,4 percentage points more, result coherent with the 
kind of simulated environmental policy. Now, there is not the 
counterbalance effect on employment through lower SSC. The distribution 
of the emission reduction between the different sectors is not very 
different to the one shown by the GTR. The sectors that reduce more are 
electricity, transports, manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products and refined petroleum products. In relative terms, the sectors 
that make more effort are natural gas (-23,1%) refined petroleum products 
and manufacture of chemicals (-21%) and mining (-20,2%). In addition, it 
is stated that the sectors that have greater effort reducing their 
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emissions with respect to the levels reached with the GTR, were indeed 
the most harmed sectors in production terms. 
 
Table 9 - Sectoral effects in prices, production and CO2 emissions with a GTR with lump sum 
transfers and environmental tax of 20€ 
 
Prices Production 
CO2 
emissions 
  
var % var % var ton var % 
AGRSIL 0,1% -0,4% -116.478 -11,7% 
PESCA 0,4% -0,5% -43.545 -12,3% 
EXTENE 15,2%   
  0,0% 
EXTRAC 1,5% -3,5% -39.849 -20,2% 
ALITAB 0,0% 0,2% -141.109 -10,7% 
TEXTIL 0,2% -0,5% -180.659 -14,8% 
COURO -0,3% 1,5% -2.993 -12,2% 
MADCOR 0,3% -2,4% -78.852 -18,5% 
PAPIMP 0,2% -0,9% -115.595 -11,3% 
REFPET 30,9% -16,1% -594.801 -21,0% 
QUIMIC 0,6% -2,5% -237.695 -21,0% 
PLAST 0,2% -1,3% -9.280 -13,4% 
MINER 0,9% -2,7% -739.420 -17,8% 
METAL 0,4% -2,7% -93.253 -16,6% 
MAQEQU 0,1% -2,2% -52.743 -15,9% 
EQUIEL 0,0% -1,5% -2.292 -14,2% 
MATRANS 0,0% -0,8% -4.197 -13,8% 
INDTRAN 0,3% -0,9% -12.355 -19,6% 
ELECT 3,4% -1,4% -1.427.680 -6,1% 
GAS 30,9% -14,9% -2.855 -23,1% 
AGUA 1,1% -0,7% -322 -11,0% 
CONST 1,1% -2,3% -338.035 -13,7% 
COMER 0,1% -1,7% -177.824 -12,1% 
RESTA 0,7% -0,6% -66.015 -10,8% 
TRANSCO 2,3% -2,6% -745.921 -13,4% 
FINAN 0,3% -0,8% -1.206 -8,9% 
IMOBALU -0,5% -0,7% -71.173 -11,0% 
ADMPUB 0,2% 0,1% -117.454 -11,0% 
EDUCA -0,4% 0,5% -7.546 -9,1% 
SAUDE 1,1% -0,8% -214.940 -12,2% 
SERVI -0,1% -0,2% -22.951 -10,5% 
TOTAL 1,4%a -1,46%b -7.275.940c -12%c 
Source: Own Elaboration 
Notes: % prices not deflated; ainflation; bactivity index; cvariation of CO2 emissions 
 
The effects on welfare of the environmental tax in combination with lump 
sum transfers, are a little better when analysing the equivalent 
variations of welfare in real terms. However, we can observe a variation 
of +0,2% in the non environmental real welfare which means a gain of +218 
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millions of Euros, while in GTR we verified a loss of -0,3% (less 327 
millions of Euros). The environmental benefits increase welfare in +145,5 
millions of Euros, a greater effect than the one the GTR provided to 
society. As a result of the previous partial effects, the social real 
welfare would experience, with the second reform, a gain of +364 million 
Euros, which represents an increase of +0,33%. 
 
With reference to trade balance and energetic dependence towards other 
countries, we conclude that the sectors with greater improvements on 
trade balance with this reform are extraction of energy products, 
manufacture of machinery and manufacture of electric equipment. The 
sectors whose balance worsens are refined petroleum products, transports 
and manufacture of textiles. 
 
In relation to net exports of energy sectors, the effects are similar to 
the ones of the GTR with SSC reductions. In this case, the energy balance 
improves in +96 million Euros. With this reform, the economy imports (net 
of exports) less -1,2 CO2 million tons (this represents less -7,2% of the 
net imported emissions on benchmark). 
 
 
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis of results 
 
The intention of this section is to test the sensitivity of the results 
obtained by the model to changes in the simulated policy. 
 
We thought it was important to evaluate the GTR effects with different 
values of the environmental tax. So, we repeated the two simulations 
using a tax of 10 € and a tax of 40€. 
 
The first value was chosen because it leads to a reduction of emissions 
close to 5%, which was the estimated deficit of Portugal for the period 
2008-2012, to comply with the Kyoto target51. Presently it is estimated 
that this deficit will be lower or even will not exist at the end of the 
period, mainly due to the economic crisis. On the other side, this is a 
                                                          
51
 See Comissão para as Alterações Climáticas (2009) Memorando – Estado de Cumprimento do 
Protocolo de Quioto, in http://www.cumprirquioto.pt/documents/List.action 
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lower band for CO2 prices in 2008-2012[2], which are also being affected 
by the economic crisis. 
 
It was also important to simulate a tax of 40€, to evaluate the effects 
of a more restrictive environmental policy, leading to an emission level 
near to the European goal to 2020 (21% of reduction comparing to 2005). 
Furthermore, this value could reflect the reality of the CO2 market when 
the economic crisis is surpassed.  
 
In Table 10 we can see the interval of variations for these values of 
environmental tax in terms of employment, wages, prices, GDP and CO2 
emission reductions. 
 
Table 10 - Sensitivity of main results with different values for the environmental tax 
 
 
Simulated Scenarios 
  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
Employment 0,8% 0,8% 1,5% -0,3% -0,5% -0,8% 
  
Wages 1,5% 2,9% 5,3% -0,4% -0,6% -1,1% 
  
Prices 0,7% 1,3% 2,5% 0,7% 1,4% 2,7% 
  
Real Wages 0,8% 1,6% 2,7% -1,1% -2,0% -3,7% 
  
GDP pa 0,5% 0,9% 1,6% 0,1% 0,4% 0,7% 
  
GDP bp -0,4% -0,7% -1,4% -0,7% -1,2% -2,2% 
  
real GDP pa -0,2% -0,4% -0,9% -0,5% -1,0% -1,9% 
  
real GDP bp -1,1% -2,0% -3,8% -1,4% -2,6% -4,8% 
  
CO2 emissions -6,4% -11,6% -19,6% -6,6% -12,0% -20,2% 
  
  
        
Notes: 
  
      
simulated 
scenarios 
1 GTR with CSS reduction and environmental tax of 10€ 
2 GTR with CSS reduction and environmental tax of 20€ 
3 GTR with CSS reduction and environmental tax of 40€ 
4 GTR with lump sum transfers and environmental tax of 10€ 
5 GTR with lump sum transfers and environmental tax of 20€ 
6 GTR with lump sum transfers and environmental tax of 40€ 
 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 
This range of values for the environmental tax allows us to evaluate the 
marginal cost evolution in terms of GDPpa, as we raise the tax. As can be 
seen in Figure 9, the curve of economic cost of the different simulated 
GTR is a convex curve. That means that, when we raise the environmental 
goal, the economic cost raise in a bigger proportion. The same effect can 
be seen in other variables, like prices and employment. 
                                                          
[2] Accordingly to data published in the European Carbon Market Monthly Bulletin by Caissê 
des Dépôts. 
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Figure 9 - Cost of GTR with different values of environmental tax
 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 
Figure 10 (lower graph) shows us the results in CO2 emission reduction as 
we raise the tax. As we can see, the results are very similar whether the 
revenues are used to lower SSC or returned as lump sum transfers. The 
convex curves reveal that, for bigger environmental goals, the tax have 
to rise more than proportionally, which causes bigger losses in GDP as we 
saw in Figure 9. 
 
On the other side, the different use for the revenues has different 
effects on welfare as shown by Figure 10 (upper graph). The blue line 
shows that with SSC reductions we have decreasing welfare costs, i.e., as 
we reduce emissions more, the welfare cost is shrinking. The red line 
shows that with lump sum transfers we have welfare improvements (negative 
costs) that are increasing with the reduction of CO2.  
 
From these we can conclude that the bigger the environmental goal, the 
bigger the costs for the economy, but the lesser are the welfare costs. 
We remind that welfare, in our model, has an environmental and a non 
environmental component. So, as we reduce emissions, there are economic 
costs that negatively affect welfare, but the environmental components 
become stronger and compensate a bigger proportion of these costs. 
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Figure 10 - Welfare Costs, Emissions Reductions and Carbon Tax Rates 
 
 
Source: Own Elaboration 
Note: Upper graph shows welfare costs of emission reductions. Lower graph shows the carbon 
taxes required for particular emissions reductions. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The objectives of this chapter were to evaluate and present the economic 
effects of a GTR implemented in the Portuguese economy. Two kind of 
reforms where studied: first, a reform with introduction of an 
environmental tax on fossil fuel consumption and recycling of revenues 
through SSC reduction; and second, the same reform but with recycling of 
revenues through lump sum transfers. We also made a sensibility analysis 
using three different values for the environmental tax. 
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The environmental improvement is slightly bigger in the simulation with 
lump sum transfers, because this is more focused in the environmental 
goal. The electricity sector is the one that reduces more emissions in 
both reforms, perhaps because it has more possibilities of substitution 
of energy inputs used in its production and also because it is the most 
important consumer of fossil fuels.  
 
As the tax increases, the effects are more positive for the employment 
level in the reform that reduces the SSC, whereas they are worse in the 
reform that makes lump sum transfers. 
 
GTR has more positive effects in national production than the reform with 
lump sum transfers. The Activity Index for the first one is of 99,24% and 
98,54% for the second one.  So, GTR minimizes the costs that producers 
should assume due to emissions reductions. For real GDPbp the results are 
worse than for real GDPpa52. 
 
The sectors most damaged in production and prices are, as expected, the 
more energy intensive sectors. In terms of trade balance, we have a 
reduction of the energy bill in both kinds of simulation. 
 
We verify that a GTR produces an increasing improvement of real wages 
which is counterbalanced with a simultaneous increase on prices, but 
still the economy could account for an increase of the consumer purchase 
power. In the second simulation, the increase in prices is similar, but 
there is a reduction on nominal and real wages. 
 
We must conclude therefore that, with a GTR with reduction in the social 
contributions due by employers, there is not a “double dividend”, 
following the definitions presented in chapter one. We only can say that 
this policy lead to an “employment double dividend”, since it has 
important environmental effects and improve employment. But this reform 
would have a cost in economic terms, decreasing the real value added 
generated by the economy by a 0,4%, leading to a redistribution of the 
economic activity between the different sectors, with positive but 
moderate effects on the price index (+1,3%) and no significant welfare 
effects. 
                                                          
52Other studies present simulations that don’t differentiate between these two variables. We 
presume that the variable considered for their conclusions is GDPpa. In our opinion real 
GDPpa could better reflect welfare and real income. 
Effects of a Green Tax Reform in Portugal 
 
101 
 
With a GTR with lump sum transfers there is a “double dividend” following 
the “weak” definition of Goulder, the definition of the public finance 
approach, and the definition of the environmental approach (see chapter 
one). Through Gimenez and Rodriguez definition we only obtain the first 
dividend but not the second one. In this reform we obtain environmental 
and welfare gains, but have an economic cost of -1%, measured in real 
GDPpa, with positive but moderate effects on the price index (+1,4%). 
 
It is important to notice that these simulations present very modest 
results concerning job creation, variation in GDP, welfare and prices, 
because, as was already pointed, full employment is assumed as benchmark 
and, in reality, Portugal has a rate of unemployment clearly different 
from zero. On the other hand, the model does not consider the possibility 
of adaptation to the tax through technology change and through measures 
to improve efficiency. Therefore, the scenario is more pessimistic in 
terms of tax induced employment variation. Beyond this, we consider a 
unilateral application of the tax by Portugal. A multilateral cooperation 
upon a GTR by several related countries would have more positive effects 
(Carraro and Galleoti, 1997; Bosello et al., 1998). 
 
Anyway, these simulations showed us that it is possible to comply with 
the Kyoto targets without damaging employment and social welfare.  
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6. Sectoral and regional impacts of the European Carbon 
Market in Portugal 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997, the EU has pledged 
to reduce the emissions of GHG. The EU ETS was established to that effect 
by Directive 2003/87/CE. An ETS (emission permit system) is a pollution-
control instrument based on requiring pollution sources to hold 
transferable permits. The regulator issues the desired number of permits 
and each source designs its own compliance strategy, including sale or 
purchase of allowances and pollution abatement. The incentives created by 
this system ensure that each source has enough flexibility to minimize 
its compliance costs and, as a consequence, the policymaker’s 
environmental goals are achieved cost-effectively, i.e., at the lowest 
possible cost for the whole economy.  
 
In spite of the desirable theoretical properties of emission permit 
schemes, the nature of the EU ETS raises a few efficiency and fairness 
concerns. Cost-effectiveness of any environmental regulation requires a 
full coverage of emitters, especially when non-subject sectors present 
lower abatement costs (see Böhringer et al, 2006). Also, any unequal 
treatment of sectors generates distributional consequences. For instance, 
Kettner et al (2008, 2010) show that the power and heat sector has been 
the only net allowance buyer and discuss whether allocations have 
favoured large installations relative to smaller ones. In defence of the 
EU ETS design, we must argue that a market limited to main emitters is 
appealing, mainly due to a reduction of administrative and compliance 
costs. Furthermore, there is no evidence of market power, which, if it 
existed, would diminish trading efficiency (Convery and Redmond, 2007). 
For a more complete discussion, Convery (2009) reviews the literature on 
emissions trading in Europe. 
 
Another problem is associated with the free allocation of pollution 
permits by most governments, despite the empirical evidence on the 
superiority of auctioning. In the EU ETS, governments could auction up to 
5% of allowances in phase I (2005-2007) and up to 10% in phase II (2008-
2012). In phase I, only four out of 25 Member States used auctions at 
all, and in only one case were auctions fully employed to the 5% limit 
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(see Hepburn et al (2006) and Ellerman and Buchner (2007)). Cramton and 
Kerr (2002) note that auctioning “allows reduced tax distortions, 
provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater 
incentives for innovation, and reduces the need for politically 
contentious arguments over the allocation of rents.” This is in line with 
the conclusions of the literature on revenue recycling through 
distortionary tax reduction (Parry et al. 1999; Fullerton and Metcalf 
2001). Environmental instruments aim to correct pre-existing market 
distortions; therefore, when they are used to raise revenue (such as with 
environmental taxes or auctioned permits), other taxes which carry 
deadweight losses (such as labour or income taxes) can be reduced. This 
type of “green” fiscal reform could thus allow a reduction of the total 
tax burden in the economy.  
 
Additionally, since climate is affected by the global stock of GHG, the 
possibility that emissions rise outside the EU because of its stricter 
policy (i.e. carbon leakage) can seriously hamper the environmental 
effectiveness of EU efforts.  The problem is more acute for tradable 
sectors that are GHG-intensive, such as iron and steel or cement. 
However, Reinaud (2008) concludes that there is no significant evidence 
for carbon leakage due to the EU ETS in the first three years of the 
scheme. Likewise, EC (2010) states that the expected ETS-related 
reductions in production for covered industries until 2020 are very 
small, albeit this is partly due to the favourable treatment such 
industries have received.  
 
A final point is that regulation falls on installations that in turn are 
anchored in a physical territory. The EU ETS does not have an explicit 
regional dimension, which is understandable given the global nature of 
the GHG problem. Nonetheless, the specialization of the different regions 
in the production of different goods and services can lead to different 
economic impacts of the carbon market from a regional point of view. If 
there is no proportionality between the regional share of affected 
installations and population, value added or employment, we can expect 
important distributional effects between regions, in Europe and even 
within countries. The European Commission recognizes the importance of 
enhancing emission reduction without jeopardizing growth in different 
areas of Europe, and refers cohesion policy, which has a strong regional 
focus, as an important instrument in this regard (EC, 2010). Hence it is 
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important to study both the sectoral and regional impact of the EU ETS. 
There is some research on the distributional consequences of financial 
flows among countries and firms as a consequence of the EU ETS (see for 
instance Kettner et al 2010, Trotignon and Delbosc, 2008 and the 
references therein). However, there is usually no data providing economic 
context of such flows and little attention has been paid to the regional 
impacts inside countries in the literature, with the exception of Spain 
(Rodriguez and del Rio, 2008).  
 
The contribution of this chapter is to focus on the Portuguese case, 
analysing in detail both regional and sectoral EU ETS economic impacts. 
To this goal we use data from 2005 to 2009 for Portuguese installations 
covered by the EU ETS. More important, the main novelty of this piece of 
research is to conduct the analysis by pooling together data from the 
Community Transaction Log database and installations financial data from 
the “Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System” (SABI) database for the first 
four years (it is created and produced jointly by INFORMA D&B and Bureau 
Van Dijk). The regions are shown according to the European NUTS III 
classification, consisting of 28 regions in continental Portugal and the 
Autonomous Regions of Madeira and Azores.  
 
The data reveal that: i) Portuguese carbon emissions allowances are 
extremely concentrated in a small number of installations; ii) the 
thermoelectric sector was the only one that had significant negative 
balances; iii) other sectors appear to have benefited from EU ETS 
participation, some significantly so; iv) a limited number of regions 
show a high concentration of regulated emissions, surpluses and deficits. 
Those results, together with the fact that about 60% of national 
emissions remain unregulated by the EU ETS, highlight the necessity of 
considering the full distributive impacts when analysing policy measures.  
 
The chapter is made up of eight sections, including this introduction. 
Section 2 describes the EU ETS, whereas Section 3 focuses on the first 
Portuguese National Allocation Plan (NAP). Sections 4 and 5 analyze the 
sectoral and regional effects of the EU ETS in Portugal, respectively. 
The Portuguese NAP for the second period, 2008-2012, is described in 
Section 6. Finally, some policy implications and the main conclusions are 
set out in Sections 7 and 8, respectively. 
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6.2. The European Union Emission Trading System 
 
The EU ETS was established to that effect by Directive 2003/87/CE. It is 
based on six fundamental principles: i) it is a “cap-and-trade” system 
(an overall cap is set, defining the maximum amount of emissions, and 
sources can buy or sell allowances on the open market at European level); 
ii) it is focused on CO2 from large industrial emitters; iii) 
implementation is taking place in two phases (2005-2007 and 2008-2012) 
with periodic reviews; iv) emission allowances are decided within 
national allocation plans; v) it includes a strong compliance framework; 
vi) the market is EU-wide but taps emission reduction opportunities in 
the rest of the world through the use of the Clean Development Mechanism 
and Joint Implementation, and it also provides links with compatible 
systems in third countries. 
 
The installations covered by the EU ETS initially received allowances for 
free from each EU Member State’s government, in what is known as 
“grandfathering”. However, since unused permits53 can be sold, 
installations are stimulated to invest in emissions reduction even when 
they are under their “cap” (the grandfathered allocated permits).  
 
Until now, each Member State was able to decide the sum of permits to 
attribute to the installations regulated by the Directive, following 
criteria provided by the European Commission. In the two initial phases, 
a limited number of sectors was included: energy activities (combustion, 
refineries, coke ovens); iron and steel (production and processing); 
mineral industries (cement, glass, ceramic products); and pulp and paper. 
It should be noted that the emissions of the installations covered by the 
market represent approximately 40% of the total CO2 EU emissions.  
 
In April 2009, the new energy-climate package was approved54. This 
includes a revision of the EU ETS (Directive 2009/29/EC) which 
contemplates: (i) an EU-wide target for GHG industrial emissions to 
achieve a 21% decrease in 2020 compared to 2005 emissions55; (ii) an 
extension of the EU ETS to include two other GHG, nitrous oxide and 
perfluorocarbons, and to cover other sectors, namely aviation and the 
petrochemical, ammonia and aluminium sectors; (iii) a greater share 
                                                          
53
 Carbon permits in the EU ETS are named European Union Allowances (EUA) and each covers 
one ton of carbon. Henceforth we will use the word “permit” when referring to EUA. 
54 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/climate_action.htm 
55
 And 30% compared to 1990 emissions (see European Commission (2007a)) 
Sectoral and regional impacts of the European Carbon Market in Portugal 
 
107 
 
(above 50 %) of auctioned permits, albeit differentiated among sectors; 
(iv) an opt-out possibility for small installations, emitting below 25 
000 ton CO2/year, which show alternative reduction measures. These 
changes will enter into force in January 2013. The package also contains 
other provisions, such as national binding targets for renewable-energy 
use and for non-ETS sectors, in order to reach, respectively, a share of 
renewables in final energy demand of 20% and an average reduction of 10% 
in these sectors’ GHG emissions, by 2020. 
 
In the first year of trading (2005) 362 Mt (million tonnes) of CO2 were 
traded on the market for a sum of €7,2 billion, as well as a large number 
of futures and options (Point Carbon (2006)). The price of permits 
increased, more or less steadily, to its peak level, in April 2006, of 
about €30 per tonne CO2, but fell in May 2006 to under €10 on news that 
overall emission caps were so generous that, in many countries, there was 
no need to reduce emissions. The trading price collapsed to 1,2€ in March 
2007, declining further to €0,10 in September 2007. Verified emissions, 
on the other hand, grew in the first phase of the scheme, although by 
less than GDP. For the countries for which data is available (all 27 
member states except Romania, Bulgaria and Malta), emissions increased by 
1,9% between 2005 and 2007 (European Commission, 2008). 
 
Phase I is widely believed to have been over allocated. Note that 
countries are said to be short (long) if they had emissions greater 
(smaller) than their allocation, so that they are potential buyers 
(sellers) of allowances from (to) other countries, in order to achieve 
compliance. The same terminology can be used for sectors. The number of 
permits distributed to installations in 2005 exceeded those 
installations’ emissions by about 176 Mt or 7,7 % of the total EU cap 
(see Table 11).  
 
Only 5 countries were in a short position in Phase I, which could imply 
that few additional overall emission reductions have been achieved. 
However, Ellerman and Buchner (2008) emphasize that simply comparing 
emissions with the cap does not take into account abatement brought about 
by ETS participation. In their analysis, they compare actual emissions 
with business-as-usual scenarios, to show that abatement might actually 
explain a significant part of the overall Phase I surplus. At any rate, 
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caps for the second trading period have been lowered 9,5% for the EU as a 
whole.  
 
Some of the EU15 member states had a net “short” position in 2005, 
notably Spain, which had the highest deficit (close to 5%). All the EU10 
countries, on the other hand, were “long”, often significantly, as in the 
case of the Baltic countries. 
 
Table 11 -  Caps by Member State in 1st and 2nd period of EU ETS (quantities in Mt CO2) 
 
Member State 1
st
 period 
cap 
2005 
verified 
emissions 
Deficit (-) or 
surplus (+) 
 in %  
Cap allowed  
2008-2012 
Austria 33 33,4 -1,2% 30,7 
Belgium 62,1 55,58 10,5% 58,5 
Bulgaria 42,3 40,6 4,0% 42,3 
Cyprus 5,7 5,1 10,5% 5,48 
Czech Rep. 97,6 82,5 15,5% 86,8 
Denmark 33,5 26,5 20,9% 24,5 
Estonia 19 12,62 33,6% 12,72 
Finland 45,5 33,1 27,3% 37,6 
France 156,5 131,3 16,1% 132,8 
Germany 499 474 5,0% 453,1 
Greece 74,4 71,3 4,2% 69,1 
Hungary 31,3 26 16,9% 26,9 
Ireland 22,3 22,4 -0,4% 22,3 
Italy  223,1 225,5 -1,1% 195,8 
Latvia 4,6 2,9 37,0% 3,43 
Lithuania 12,3 6,6 46,3% 8,8 
Luxembourg 3,4 2,6 23,5% 2,5 
Malta 2,9 1,98 31,7% 2,1 
Netherlands 95,3 80,35 15,7% 85,8 
Poland 239,1 203,1 15,1% 208,5 
Portugal 38,9 36,4 6,4% 34,8 
Romania 74,8 70,8 5,3% 75,9 
Slovakia 30,5 25,2 17,4% 30,9 
Slovenia 8,8 8,7 1,1% 8,3 
Spain 174,4 182,9 -4,9% 152,3 
Sweden 22,9 19,3 15,7% 22,8 
UK 245,3 242,4 1,2% 246,2 
Total 2298,5 2122,16 7,7% 2080,93 
Source: European Commission (2007b); Additional information on which installations are 
included is given in the source. 
Ellerman and Buchner (2007) discuss the disparities among countries for 
2005, presenting the gross positions for each one as well as the net 
ones. Kettner et al (2010) provide a similar analysis for the three years 
of the first period. Both papers note that the member states which 
comprise a large part of the potential demand are also important 
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suppliers, indicating that many trades were among installations within 
each country. They also provide a brief sectoral analysis. It is clear 
that for the EU as a whole, the Power & Heat sector was the only one to 
have a short position, while the other industrial sectors were all long, 
often by large percentages (around 20% for Ceramic, Iron, Steel & Coke, 
and Pulp & Paper). The underlying reasons for this uneven distribution of 
permits among sectors appear to have been: the fear of loss of 
competitiveness for GHG-intensive tradable sectors, carbon leakage and 
also the cheaper abatement options available to the power sector. As a 
result, the NAPs were generous in the number of allowances allocated 
except for the Power & Heat sector. Unsurprisingly, this sector, which 
makes up around 60% of EU ETS emissions, represented in 2005 nearly 90% 
of potential permit demand. It also accounted for some 50% of the 
potential supply, thus justifying most of the market’s activity. 
 
6.3 The first Portuguese National Allocation Plan 
 
The target established by the Directive for Portugal was that, during the 
Kyoto compliance period (2008-2012), mean emissions cannot exceed a 27% 
increase over the emission levels of 1990.  
 
Figure 11 illustrates the evolution of emissions until 2009 and the linear 
path to achieving the target in 2010, excluding land use change and 
forestry (LULUCF). The latest official estimates say the GHG emissions in 
2009 were about 74,6 MT CO2e, an increment of 26% compared with the 1990 
levels56. 
 
The value of these emissions is lower than the predicted in previous 
years, due to the significant inflexion in emission path during the last 
two years, explained by the economic crisis but also by the efficiency 
gains of the economy (lowering the carbon intensity of national product).  
 
As we can also see in Figure 11, emissions show significant annual 
variability, mainly due to the fluctuations in hydroelectric power 
generation, that are caused primarily by precipitation variability, as 
discussed in Section 4.  
 
 
                                                          
56
 See Agência Portuguesa do Ambiente(2011).  
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Figure 11 - Emissions and linear path to Kyoto target 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from Agência Portuguesa do Ambiente 
 
 
The first Portuguese NAP, covering the period 2005-2007, considered 38,9 
Mt of CO2 per year, of which 36,9 Mt for 244 industrial installations and 
the remainder left aside for new installations. Mostly, historical 
emissions were used to distribute allowances between sectors and 
installations. Exceptions were made for new installations and for the 
sectors of electricity generation and iron and steel, where historical 
data was seen as inappropriate, considering technological potential for 
emission reduction. Moreover, as in most other EU countries, benchmarking 
was not used (see Ellerman and Buchner, 2007).  
 
The actual distribution of permits among the 244 installations covered by 
the EU ETS was based specifically on two criteria: (i) the historical 
emissions of each one, which had previously been used for the definition 
of the total permits assigned to each sector and (ii) combustion 
emissions assuming an “average fuel” for each activity sector. Individual 
assignments were given out based on the sum of adjusted combustion 
emissions with historical emissions. Finally, this sum was multiplied by 
a factor of global adjustment (equivalent to that used for the 
calculation of the emissions for each sector).  
 
An undeniable characteristic of the first Portuguese NAP was the 
inclusion of a large number of small installations.  
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Figure 12 ranks the 244 Portuguese installations according to their 
allocated emissions and reveals the extreme inequality of their size. We 
can highlight from the permit allocation that 10% of installations have 
90% of emissions permits. Also, two installations jointly have 31,5% of 
permits, and there are 163 installations classified as small (less than 
25 000 tons of CO2), which together account for less than 4% of 
emissions. Portuguese allowances are thus extremely concentrated. This is 
similar to findings for all EU countries, where Kettner et al (2008) 
conclude that the biggest 1,8% of installations account for 50% of 
emissions. Naturally, regions where these are located will bear a large 
percentage of the emission reduction effort. 
 
Figure 12 - Inequality in the distribution of emissions and allocated allowances (2005) 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets 
 
 
6.4 Sectoral effects of the European Carbon Market in Portugal 
 
Based on the final reports of the EU ETS for the years 2005, 2006 and 
2007, we can identify sectors that were short and long and assess the 
potential monetary flows from allowance purchases or sales. Unfortunately 
this ex-post analysis does not provide any insight into the drivers of 
actual emissions for the firms. In particular, for “long” installations 
we do not have any information on abatement efforts nor on the associated 
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costs, which would allow a fuller view of the net result of market 
participation.  
 
Recall that the Portuguese NAP attributed the equivalent of 36,9 Mt of 
CO2 for each year in the first period. Along this period, Portuguese 
installations had a surplus that could have provided revenues of 
approximately 10,4 M€, 58,8 M€ and 7,5 M€ for all installations. Table 12 
shows the sectoral breakdown in terms of emissions and Table 13 the 
possible monetary flows. Positive values indicate potential income from 
allowance sales and not actual revenues, as it is unlikely that all 
surplus allowances were actually sold. Moreover, even if they had been, 
the net economic position from EU ETS participation would need to take 
into account transaction costs, which tend to be higher for smaller 
firms, and the abatement cost incurred, if any. Still, ETS data indicates 
that, in the first phase, fewer than 10% of Portuguese EUA expired 
worthless (Trotignon and Ellerman, 2008). 
 
 
Table 12  - Emissions (in Mt) and Attributed Allowance Coverage (%) for 2005, 2006 and 2007 
 2005 2006 2007 
Sectors CO2 % CO2 % CO2 % 
Thermoelectric 
generation 21,91 96 18,67 112 16,42 128 
Ceramic 0,87 134 0,81 143 0,88 132 
Cement and lime 6,98 102 6,86 104 7,11 100 
Cogeneration 2,06 121 2,06 121 2,22 112 
Other Comb. 
Facilities  0,42 127 0,39 135 0,42 128 
Iron and steel 0,22 140 0,24 130 0,23 132 
Pulp and paper 0,31 115 0,31 117 0,31 115 
Refineries 3,01 109 3,02 108 2,94 111 
Glass 0,64 106 0,64 104 0,70 98 
Total 36,4 101 33,0 112 31,23 118 
Source: Own elaboration using the data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets. 
Note: totals for 2006 exclude 3 installations which were removed, as there were problems with their 
emissions data. 
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Table 13 - Potential financial outcome of EU ETS transactions (in Million€) for 2005, 2006 and 2007 
 2005 2006 2007 
Sectors price 21,73€/ton 
price 
15,14€/ton 
price 
1,3€/ton 
Thermoelectric 
generation -20,50 34,85 6,00 
Ceramic 6,47 5,24 0,37 
Cement and lime 3,32 4,14 0,04 
Cogeneration 9,26 6,49 0,36 
Other Comb. 
Facilities  2,42 2,09 0,15 
Iron and steel 1,92 1,09 0,10 
Pulp and paper 1,05 0,80 0,06 
Refineries 5,58 3,75 0,43 
Glass 0,89 0,39 -0,02 
Total 10,40 58,82 7,48 
Source: Own elaboration using the data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets. 
Notes: Prices are the weighted average prices of permits traded by European companies, calculated from 
the monthly average prices and the monthly volume of allowances (tons of CO2) interchanged in the 
European market, using the data in the ECM Monthly Bulletin published by Caissê des Dépôts 
(www.caissedesdepots.fr/missionclimat/). 
 
Thermoelectric plants have a negative balance in 2005, that is, they 
discharged more emissions than the allowances allocated to them 
(approximately one million tons of CO2 in excess). The assigned 
allowances in that year covered 96% of emissions, mainly due to a drought 
that reduced hydroelectricity generation, as discussed in section 6.4.1. 
There was also a small deficit for Glass in 2007. In the remaining 
sectors there was a surplus of emission allowances for all years, 
especially so for Ceramic, Iron and Steel, Other Combustion Facilities 
and Cogeneration. For comparison, at a European level, the sectors with 
larger surpluses were Pulp and Paper, Iron and Steel and Ceramic (Kettner 
et al 2010). We provide some analysis on the significance for each sector 
of the potential extra revenues and costs below. 
 
One important advantage of microdata is that we can perform a detailed 
analysis of the potential outcome of the carbon market, with data for 
each installation.  
 
Figure 13 shows the wide discrepancies in the net positions held by 
different installations. Obviously, these discrepancies reflect the 
interaction between allowance allocation, abatement activities, and 
general activity level. The right-hand tail in this figure, with positive 
100% positions, refers to installations that had zero carbon emissions 
despite having positive allowance allocations. On the other hand, those 
with negative 100% positions represent installations that had to cover 
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double their initial allocations57. In 2005 and 2006 around 20% of 
installations were short and 80% long. Nonetheless, the figure shows that 
there was a slight shift to the left side, accounting to more positive 
positions in 2006. On the contrary, in 2007 there was a slight shift to 
the right plus a slight rotation in such a way that a few more 
installations were short but those that were long were more so. For the 
same period, in the EU around 27% of installations were short (Kettner et 
al 2008). 
 
In order to assess the economic implications of these positions for each 
sector’s installations, we use the SABI database. It contains general 
information and, more important for our purposes, the financial accounts, 
for a large number of Iberian firms. We were able to get financial data 
for 80% of the EU ETS installations, representing approximately 59% of 
emissions for 2005 and 2006 (about 62% for 2007). The representativeness 
is even greater (in most sectors close to 100%) if we exclude from 
calculations Thermoelectric Generation (coverage for this sector is 
around 34%). 
 
Figure 13- Net position as % of allocated allowances in 2005, 2006 and 2007 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets 
 
 
Table 19 in the Appendix includes detailed information about the sectoral 
coverage of emissions for each year. Some interesting conclusions can be 
presented regarding the possible significance of EU ETS participation in 
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terms of financial accounts. We calculated potential revenue from 
allowance sales (or cost from allowance purchases) for each installation, 
using average annual allowance prices as explained in Table 13, as a 
percentage of that installation’s operational revenues. The results are 
presented in  
Figure 14 for 2005 and 2006. Results for 2007 are not shown since the low 
prices made potential ETS flows much lower as compared to costs/revenues. 
Ceramic is shown separately as it contains a much larger number of 
installations than other sectors and it has generally higher values (note 
the difference in scale). 
 
Clearly, some installations may have generated a significant monetary 
inflow from EU ETS participation, especially in the Ceramic sector where 
quite a few had the possibility of making allowance sales above 5% of 
their operational revenues. However, these results should be viewed with 
caution, in light of possible transaction cost burdens, since the Ceramic 
sector is characterized by a large number of small installations. Again, 
we do not consider possible abatement costs. Among the other sectors, 
Cogeneration was the biggest potential beneficiary, with many 
installations earning an allowance return between 2 and 10% of 
operational revenues. It should also be noted that the proportion of 
potential revenues from allowance sales was generally higher in 2005, 
despite the slightly worse volume positions of firms, shown in 
Figure 13. The price effect thus seems to have been paramount. 
 
It is interesting to split this type of analysis between big and small 
emitters. We use as a criterion the Directive 2009/29/EC where 
installations under 25 000 tons CO2/year are classified as small 
emitters. Considering all sectors, coverage values tend to be higher for 
small emitters than for large ones (266% against 142% for 2005-2006 and 
199% against 109% for 2007). However, this would be expected given that 
the sectors that are dominated by large emitters have generally lower 
levels of coverage (this is true for Thermoelectric, Cement and Lime, 
Refineries and Glass, although Iron and Steel is an exception), and the 
one sector that is dominated by small emitters (Ceramic) consistently 
shows the most favourable coverage values. For those sectors where small 
and large emitters are both relevant (Cogeneration, Other Combustion 
Facilities, Pulp and paper),  
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Figure 15 presents coverage levels for 2005 to 2007. From the data it is 
easy to appreciate that surpluses of allowances over emissions are 
systematically larger for small emitters, even within these sectors. 
There may be different reasons to explain this result, such as the lack 
of data to accurately allocate the right number of allowances to smaller 
emitters, a deliberate over allocation policy in favour of smaller 
emitters, or more intensive abatement actions by smaller emitters. 
Nonetheless, such analysis is beyond of the scope of this research. 
 
Figure 14 - Potential Allowance Sales (Purchases) as % of Operational Revenue in 2005 and 2006 
respectively for Ceramic and the other sectors 
 
2005 2006 
 
 
 
             
Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets and 
SABI data. 
Note: All installations with zero emissions were removed from the sample for this figure, 
as well as a few outliers (4 with strongly positive permit revenues in 2005 and 1 in 2006). 
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Figure 15 - Allowance coverage for sectors with a mix of sizes, 2005-2007 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
6.4.1 Thermoelectric Generation Sector 
 
The thermoelectric generation sector deserves a closer analysis because 
of the bigger effort required of it, the volume of emissions it produces, 
and also the variability of emissions it shows in Portugal, depending on 
the weather patterns that affect hydroelectric production. InFigure 16 we 
show the net positions for 2005, 2006 and 2007 of the thermoelectric 
sector, divided into the subsectors of Fuel, Combined Cycle Gas Turbine 
(CCGT), and Coal. Other subsectors (Biomass and Gasoil) are not shown in 
the Figure due to their small size. 
 
Overall, in Phase I the Thermoelectric sector had a net surplus of almost 
6Mt CO2 (9% of allowances received), but there were relevant differences 
among years and subsectors. In 2005, the only “long” facilities were the 
ones using CCGT. The strong deficit shown by coal facilities and to a 
lesser extent, fuel facilities, meant that the sector as a whole 
presented a deficit. On the contrary, in 2006 this sector had a surplus 
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even if coal facilities continued to show a negative balance, whereas all 
subsectors had surpluses in 2007.  
 
Figure 16 - Thermoelectric Generation Net Positions (in Mt CO2) 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from http://www.dgge.pt/ 
 
To understand what happened in the period, we need to look at weather 
factors. The deficit in 2005 can largely be explained by that year’s 
drought. It should be noted that renewable energy sources in Portugal, of 
which hydroelectric production is the largest by far (over 60% of 
installed capacity), normally account for a significant part of 
electricity consumption (between 20% and 40%). In 2005, that value was 
only 19,2%, with hydropower generation less than half its average value 
(the hydraulic index for the year was 0,42, which means that it rained 
58% less than in an average hydrologic year). 2006, on the other hand, 
was an average hydrological year, and hydro production was 124% higher 
than in 2005. In contrast, 2007 was drier but renewable energy production 
still increased by 2%, since the slight decrease in hydro was more than 
offset by the growth in wind power generation. Interestingly, the large 
sectoral emissions reduction between 2006 and 2007 (-12% fewer emissions 
with only a -3,6% drop in electricity generation) cannot be fully 
explained by this factor, indicating that there were efficiency gains 
during the period.58 
  
We end this section by noting that wide variations in emissions (hence in 
allowance transactions) should be expected for the power sector whenever 
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renewable sources, especially hydroelectricity, face large variability. 
For example, Ellerman and Buchner (2007) note that emissions also 
fluctuate greatly in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, depending on 
hydroelectricity production in the two latter countries. The effect may 
or may not show up in the allowance prices, depending on weather 
conditions throughout Europe. Although a couple of studies have looked at 
the effects of weather on allowance prices (Mansanet-Bataller et al 
(2007), Alberola et al (2008)), they focus on temperatures, which only 
drive demand, and not precipitation, which may also affect supply. 
 
 
6.5 Regional effects of the European carbon market in Portugal 
 
 
As noted in the Introduction, not much research has looked at the 
possible impact of EU ETS in regional terms in spite of the dissimilar 
impacts that can be expected among regions due to their specialization 
patterns in the production of goods and services. The European Commission 
recognizes the importance of enhancing emission reduction without 
jeopardizing growth in different areas of Europe, and refers cohesion 
policy, which has a strong regional focus, as an important instrument in 
this regard (EC, 2010). There are 30 NUTS III regions in Portugal, of 
which 5 have no registered emissions for any year and 13 have very low 
emission levels, of less than 1% of national emissions. The remaining 12 
regions consistently account for around 97% of emissions. Figure 17 shows 
the relative weight of each one of these 12 regions in terms of 
emissions, population and Gross Value Added (GVA) for 2005 (values do not 
change much for different years). 
 
There are relevant asymmetries in the contribution of each region to the 
different variables. In particular, we can see that the two largest 
metropolitan areas (Grande Porto (GP) and Grande Lisboa (GL)) have the 
largest shares of population and GVA, yet account for a smaller share of 
emissions. Also noticeable are the regions whose relative level of 
emissions largely exceeds their contribution to the GVA, such as 
Peninsula de Setúbal (PS), Médio Tejo (MT) and the most evident case, 
Alentejo Litoral (AL), which contributes with 32,1% to national emissions 
and only 1,3% to GVA. We can also see (and confirm with Table 18 in the 
Appendix) that 80% of regulated emissions come from only 5 regions, which 
together represent 52% of national GVA. As in the sectoral analysis, 
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there is a high concentration of regulated emissions in a limited number 
of regions which are those where most industry is located.  
 
Figure 17 - Relative Emissions, Population and GVA (%) in selected regions (2005) 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets and INE 
(2006) www.ine.pt  
Note: See Appendix for full region names 
 
In Figure 18 we provide an analysis of emissions relative to industrial 
GVA (including energy and construction) considering average values for 
2005-2007. Here we might expect to find a stronger correlation. However, 
there are significant disparities between regions, even in this case. A 
simple regression analysis (not shown) between per capita emissions and 
industrial GVA has very low explanatory power (R2=0,06 if we exclude 
Alentejo Litoral, a clear outlier in the data set). If we recall that the 
levels of emissions and allocated allowances vary between sectors, and 
that the largest emitter in the EU ETS is thermoelectric generation, we 
see that there is a significant correspondence between the regions with 
the highest level of emissions and the location of thermoelectric plants: 
this is especially clear for Alentejo Litoral (AL) and Médio Tejo (MT), 
since the only two Portuguese thermoelectric installations still based on 
coal are sited there (Sines and Pêgo, respectively). The high level of 
emissions in these two regions is therefore related with this type of 
industry and not with general economic activity, or even industrial 
activity. Unfortunately, we do not have data on GVA for ETS vs. non-ETS 
sectors in order to provide a finer analysis.  
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Figure 18 - Relative weight of Emissions compared to Industrial GVA by regions in 2005-2007 
 
Source: Own elaboration using CO2 data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets and 
GVA from INE (2006) 
 
Although regional GVA data includes all economic activity that is 
physically in each area, it should be noted that not all impacts of 
financial flows due to EU ETS participation occur necessarily within the 
same region. In particular, some installations belong to national and 
multinational companies, whose shareholders can be spread among different 
regions. Using the tax identification numbers given in the SABI database 
for each installation, we have selected those companies that are present 
in more than one region and subtracted their emissions from regional 
totals. For 2005, there are two regions (Alentejo Litoral and Algarve) 
where “true” regional emissions are below 10% of verified emissions and 
three regions (Baixo Mondego, Grande Lisboa and Peninsula de Setúbal) 
where they are below 50%. The largest companies, which account for most 
of the subtracted emissions, are Grupo EDP (Power sector), Cimpor 
(Cement) and Petrogal (Refineries) which jointly represent as much as 62% 
of Portuguese GHG in 2005. 
 
In spite of this qualification, we believe it is instructive to analyse 
the regional dispersion of EU ETS potential economic impacts. In order to 
evaluate this, we calculated the net difference between the emission 
allowances attributed to each region (on the basis of installation 
location) and the actual emissions for Phase I. A positive value 
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indicates that the sum of installations located in the region received 
more allowances than they used. The eventual proceeds from selling the 
surplus may then contribute to increase the regional GVA. Likewise, a 
negative difference indicates that the installations located in this 
region had to buy allowances and therefore transferred part of their GVA 
to other regions. Table 14 summarizes these effects. The last two columns 
show the allowance deficits (-) and surpluses (+) by region in tons and 
as a participation over the total Portuguese balance, respectively. The 
other columns illustrate the regional deficit or surplus by sector.  
 
As mentioned in section 4, if we consider the whole of Phase I, all 
sectors had an allowance surplus. Yet if we do the same analysis by 
regions, we see that some regions had a deficit and others a surplus, as 
shown in Figure 19. Particularly, Alentejo Litoral, Minho-Lima and Região 
Aut. Madeira had deficits of around 2% of the national surplus. Still, 
most regions have a surplus; the ones with larger surpluses are shown in 
green, and these are concentrated in the coastal regions between Lisboa 
and Porto, where most Portuguese wealth is generated. Remarkably, the 
metropolitan areas (GL and GP), as well as the next most heavily 
populated area (PS), had very large surpluses (18,7%, 25,2% and 38,4%, 
respectively). These are already the richest regions in the country. 
 
As in section 4, to determine the economic impacts of the EU ETS on 
regions we will consider prices of 21,73€, 15,14€ and 1,3€ per ton of CO2 
in 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively. 
  
Table 15 illustrates the regional significance of allowance costs or 
potential revenues. In the 4 regions that usually present costs (Minho-
Lima (M-L), Médio Tejo (MT), Alentejo Litoral (AL) and Região Autónoma da 
Madeira (RAM)) these are not always very significant. The worst cases are 
Alentejo Litoral (AL) and Médio Tejo (MT) where the costs of the EU ETS 
reached for the Phase I 13,78 million and 8,62 million euros 
respectively. The remaining regions present surpluses, the highest 
corresponding to the regions of Grande Porto (GP) and Grande Lisboa (GL), 
with average potential revenues of approximately 26,8, and 20,8 million 
euros respectively. 
 
However there is a large variation in the values as they are strongly 
correlated with carbon prices which fluctuated substantially along the 
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period. Therefore the 2005-2006 values are perhaps more meaningful for 
our analysis. By taking the regional industrial GVA we can measure the 
economic relevance of the EU ETS. Thus the weight of the net allowance 
value on the industrial GVA for Alentejo Litoral (AL) and Médio Tejo (MT) 
was in range (-1,28%, -0,24%). Whereas, if we have a look to the top 
winner we found that is now Península de Setúbal, with a potential +0,93%  
weight of the net allowance value on the industrial GVA in 2006. So, 
eventually the EU ETS might have a significant impact for some regions if 
the carbon price is high enough. And that may be the case in the near 
future according to more stringent environmental objectives in the EU. 
 
Since most of the emission reduction effort in Portugal is concentrated 
on the thermoelectric sector, there is, in territorial terms, a 
distortion on the energy-producing regions, which assume a 
disproportionate responsibility for emission control. On the other hand, 
the regions that do not produce energy may still contribute through 
energy consumption effects. Price pass-through, if allowed, could be a 
significant distributional factor, but so far that has not been the case 
because of public restrictions on consumer electricity prices, as 
discussed in Section 6.  
 
Figure 20 shows the different values for consumption and production of 
electricity at the regional level. Both the total production of 
electricity and the thermoelectric generation alone are shown. Five 
regions (PS, MT, Oe, GP and AL) represent 87% of Thermoelectric 
generation, 75% of electricity generation, and 29% of electricity 
consumption. Together they account for 80% of the CO2 regulated by the EU 
ETS and 41% of Portuguese population. The most unequal cases are Alentejo 
Litoral (AL), with 27% of the national thermal electricity generation and 
only 2,4% of electricity consumption, and Oeste (Oe), with 16% of thermal 
electricity generation and only 3% of consumption. On the other hand, we 
have the opposite situation in Grande Lisboa (GL), which has 18% of 
electricity consumption and only 0,9% of thermal production. 
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Table 14 - Deficit (-) or surplus (+) of emission rights in 2005-2007 (t CO2) 
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Minho-Lima 
  23.162   -189.382     4.853     -161.367 -1,60% 
Cávado 
  21.519     4.083   9.244     34.846 0,30% 
Ave 
      142.657 128.782         271.439 2,70% 
Grande Porto 2.206.190 19.170   76.350 19.460 66.058 -634 165.439 -23.940 2.528.093 25,20% 
Tâmega 
                  
0 0,00% 
Entre Douro e Vouga 
  12.768   5.182 19.520   12.101     49.571 0,50% 
Douro 
        -445         -445 0,00% 
Alto-Trás-os-Montes 
  14.431               14.431 0,10% 
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Baixo Vouga 
  264.980   331.454 55.909   -9.634     642.709 6,40% 
Baixo Mondego 
  66.089 -15.291 240.599     80.097   -4.780 366.714 3,70% 
Pinhal Litoral 
  90.019 219.736 73.268     -582   83.639 466.080 4,70% 
Pinhal Interior 
Norte   94.222   26.803           121.025 1,20% 
Dão-Lafões -235 3.843   30.353 15.168   -2.149     46.980 0,50% 
Pinhal Interior Sul 
                  
0 0,00% 
Serra da Estrela 
                  
0 0,00% 
Beira Interior Norte 
                  
0 0,00% 
Beira interior Sul 
            -10.724     -10.724 -0,10% 
Cova da Beira 
  11.950               11.950 0,10% 
Oeste 
  122.192               122.192 1,20% 
Médio Tejo -4.581 33.971   16.176     37.641     83.207 0,80% 
L
i
s
b
o
n
 
Grande Lisboa 1.965.217   -156.009 -5.933 71.125   6.509   -3.757 1.877.152 18,70% 
Península de Setúbal 2.905.071 24.058 417.222 269.240 52.722 168.016 13.477     3.849.806 38,40% 
Alentejo Litoral -994.490     126.057       666.409   -202.024 -2,00% 
Alto Alentejo 
      -9.797           -9.797 -0,10% 
Alentejo Central 
                  
0 0,00% 
Baixo Alentejo 
  7.982   -2.397           5.585 0,10% 
Lezíria do Tejo 
  35.386 -26.083 5.944 -9.411   6.596     12.432 0,10% 
 Algarve -4.306 52.225 13.629             61.548 0,60% 
 Região Aut. Açores 33.619     -12.698 10.091         31.012 0,30% 
 
Região Aut. Madeira -196.939                 -196.939 -2,00% 
 
Total 5.909.546 897.967 453.204 1.123.876 367.004 234.074 146.795 831.848 51.162 10.015.476 100,00% 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Figure 19 - Participation (%) of each region on the Portuguese balance of the EU ETS in 2005-2007 
 
Source: own elaboration from Table 14. 
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Table 15 - The potential regional impacts of the EU ETS (values in 1000€ and % of Industry GVA) 
 
  
2005 Net 
Allowance value 
2006 Net 
Allowance value 
2007 Net 
Allowance value 
2005-2007 Net 
allowance value 
 Region 1000 €  % Ind GVA 1000 €  
% Ind 
GVA 1000 €  
% Ind 
GVA 1000 €  
% Ind 
GVA 
N
o
r
t
h Minho-Lima -1.116 -0,17% -1.172 -0,18% -49 -0,01% -2.337 -0,12% 
Grande Porto 6.757 0,16% 18.743 0,43% 1.360 0,03% 26.860 0,21% 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l 
Baixo Vouga 4.586 0,25% 4.102 0,22% 268 0,01% 8.956 0,15% 
Baixo Mondego 3.189 0,31% 2.141 0,21% 100 0,01% 5.430 0,17% 
Pinhal Litoral 4.596 0,34% 6.217 0,44% 126 0,01% 10.940 0,26% 
Pinhal Interior 
Norte 1.023 0,29% 1.046 0,28% 44 0,01% 2.113 0,19% 
Beira Interior 
Sul -242 -0,14% 17 0,01% -1 0,00% -226 -0,04% 
Médio Tejo -7.481 -1,01% -1.915 -0,24% 773 0,09% -8.623 -0,36% 
L
is - bo
n
 
Península de 
Setúbal -404 -0,02% 20.323 0,93% 2.629 0,11% 22.549 0,35% 
A
le
n
t
e
j
o
 
 Alentejo Litoral -10.058 -1,28% -4.896 -0,55% 1.168 0,13% 
-
13.786 -0,54% 
R. A. Madeira -1.109 -0,17% -768 -0,11% -124 -0,02% -2.001 -0,10% 
 Total Portugal -10402 -0,03% -51374 -0,15% -7542 -0,02% -69317 -0,07% 
 
Source: Own elaboration and INE (2006); regions which have no installations, as well as 
regions where allowances costs are below |0,1%| of Industrial GVA for every year, 
are excluded from the Table. 
 
Figure 20 -  Production and consumption of electricity by regions, as % of national total (2005) 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from http://www.dgge.pt/ 
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Considering all sectors of economic activity, we can trace the regional 
economic implications of the EU ETS more closely. Figure 21 shows the 
sectoral composition of GVA in Portuguese regions. The division used here 
considers three groups of sectors: I (agriculture, hunting and forestry, 
fisheries and aquiculture), II (industry, including energy and 
construction) and III (services). There are no overall regional emissions 
data available to compare with EU ETS regional emissions. Nonetheless, 
sectors I and III are largely excluded from emission cap regulations 
although they account for an important part of national emissions. Sector 
III is paramount in Grande Lisboa (GL), Grande Porto (GP) and Península 
de Setúbal (PS), representing 83%, 73% and 69% of economic activity, 
respectively. These are also the main population centres, and may 
therefore be the overall main emitters of non-ETS GHG. If all sectors 
were covered by emission-reduction schemes, these regions could be 
expected to show the highest costs (instead of reaping the most potential 
benefits as in Figure 19). 
 
Figure 21 - Sectoral composition of 2005 GVA in % for Portuguese regions 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data available in INE (2006). 
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6.6 Portuguese Emissions Reductions in 2008 and beyond 
 
In the second Portuguese National Plan (NAP II), covering the period 
2008-2012, 152,5 million allowances (CO2 equivalent tons) were issued, 
implying an annual value of 30,51 Mt (a decrease of about 17%). Between 
the first and second NAP there was also a modification in the industries 
included in the emissions market, in accordance with new EC rules and 
some national modifications. In Phase II part of the ceramic industry is 
excluded, and units of cogeneration and combustion facilities of the 
chemical sector are included. Comparing equivalent installations in both 
periods, the decrease in attributed allowances is -22,4%. Table 16 shows 
the sectoral distribution of these reductions.  
 
The electricity generation sector will once more have to make the largest 
reduction effort. This could strengthen the conclusions that we reached 
for Phase I, namely in terms of the higher damage concentration in the 
regions where these installations are located. The actual cost will 
depend on hydrological conditions. Moreover, it should also be mentioned 
that Portuguese electricity prices are mostly regulated and cannot be 
freely increased. 
 
As the costs of providing electricity have increased (due to many 
factors, including the EU ETS), and prices have not been raised 
accordingly, EDP, which is the main electricity provider in the country, 
was by the end of 2008 burdened with a debt (the so called tarif-deficit 
“défice tarifário”) of around 2 thousand million euros, to be recovered 
from consumers, with interest, starting in 2010 (Jornal de Negócios, 
2008).  
 
The same problem with cost pass-through is noted for Spain, namely by 
Oberndorfer (2008), which points out that this may be one of the reasons 
stockmarket values of electricity firms in that country are inversely 
correlated with permit prices, unlike in other countries. In energy 
markets without price regulation, on the other hand, results indicate 
high levels of pass-through, leading to significant windfall profits from 
EU ETS participation for the power sector (Sijm et al, 2006). 
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Table 16 - Comparison of attributed allowances (Mt CO2) by sectors 
Sector /Subsector NAP I 
NAP II (without 
new entrants 
2005/07) 
NAP II vs NAP I 
Energy Supply 26,8 18,8 -29,7% 
        Production of 
electricity 21,0 13,5 -35,5% 
        Refineries 3,3 3,0 -6,7% 
        Cogeneration 2,5 2,2 -11,4% 
Industry 10,1 9,8 -3,3% 
        Cement and Lime 7,1 7,0 -1,4% 
        Ceramic 1,2 1,0 -15,8% 
        Glass 0,7 0,7 -2,6% 
        Pulp and Paper 0,4 0,3 -6,9% 
        Iron and Steel 0,3 0,3 8,4% 
        Other Combustion 
facilities 0,5 0,5 -6,5% 
Total for existing 
installations 36,9 28,6 -22,4% 
Reserve for new entrants 1,3   
TOTAL 38,2   
 
Source: PNALE II (2008) 
 
Table 17, like Table 12 and Table 13, presents data for emissions, 
coverage, and potential allowance revenues or expenses, now considering 
2008 and 2009. The only sector that was “short” was, again, 
thermoelectric generation, while the country’s ETS participation as a 
whole continues to show a surplus. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
for these two initial Phase II years it is highly unlikely that firms 
have sold a significant part of their allowance surplus. There are two 
main reasons for this: first, Portugal had, as most other European 
countries, a recession in 2008-09, so firms may be holding on to 
allowances while expecting a rebound of economic activity; second, Phase 
II allowances are bankable, which means they can still be used in 2013 
and beyond. 
 
Still, if we have a look at the potential allowances sales (purchases) as 
% of operational revenue in 2008 (Figure 22) we will find values similar 
to those for 2005-06, although a lower variance of results is noticeable, 
especially for non-ceramic installations. We do not present the results 
for 2009 because of lack of financial data in the SABI database. Finally, 
we found again for phase II similar differences between big and small 
emitters as coverage values tend to be higher for small emitters than for 
large ones (145% against 136% for 2008 and 167% against 142% for 2009), 
albeit these differences are lower than for the Phase I.  
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Table 17 - Emissions (in Mt), Coverage (%) and Potential financial outcome for 2008 and 2009 
Sectors Emissions 2008 Coverage % price 18,56 €/ton 
Thermoelectric 
generation 15,78 89 -32,93 
Ceramic 0,27 211 5,54 
Cement and lime 6,78 106 7,91 
Cogeneration 2,53 137 17,36 
Other Combustion 
Facilities  0,40 135 2,56 
Iron and steel 0,20 164 2,43 
Pulp and paper 0,34 114 0,86 
Refineries 2,95 110 5,30 
Glass 0,66 117 2,02 
Total 29,91 102 11,06 
 
   
Sectors Emissions 2009 Coverage % price 12,58 €/ton 
Thermoelectric 
generation 15,80 89 -22,61 
Ceramic 0,21 267 4,48 
Cement and lime 5,45 132 22,09 
Cogeneration 1,80 144 10,06 
Other Combustion 
Facilities 0,31 174 2,88 
Iron and steel 0,15 217 2,27 
Pulp and paper 0,37 104 0,18 
Refineries 2,62 124 7,79 
Glass 0,57 135 2,52 
Total 27,28 118 29,65 
Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets. 
 
Figure 22 - Potential Allowance Sales (Purchases) as % of Operational Revenue  in 2008 
2008 
Ceramic Other sector 
 
             
Source: Own elaboration using data available in http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets and 
SABI data. 
Note: All installations with zero emissions were removed from the sample for this figure, 
as well as a few outliers (4 with strongly positive permit revenues in 2005 and 1 in 2006). 
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The analysis performed above shows that Portuguese ETS targets have been, 
and continue to be, fairly loose. However, the EU climate and energy 
policy encompasses all sectors, 
 
Figure 23 shows the weight of each sector in national emissions. The 
largest non-ETS sector is Transport, which accounted for 17% of emissions 
in 1990 and has since grown to 24%, although other non
also significant. 
 
A few European Directives were aimed at improving the performance of 
uncovered sectors, namely the European Energy Performance in Buildings 
Directive (EPBD), the Ecodesign Directive, the Biofuels Directive and the 
Energy Services Directive.
and their costs cannot easily be calculated. Moreover, the inclusion of 
additional regulations such as these reduces flexibility and may increase 
compliance costs, especially when there is no clear distinction between 
ETS and non-ETS policies. Two different issues can arise: the 
inefficiency of unlinked policies for ETS and non
marginal abatement costs will not be equal in all sectors) and the 
inefficiency of multiple policies within each group of secto
Figure 23 - Sectoral CO2 emissions (%) in 1990 (inner) and 2007 (outer)
Source: Own elaboration using data available in EEA, 
http://dataservice.ee
Transport; 
24%
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It is true that a single system of emissions trading may be unsuitable 
for most of the uncovered sectors, because the transaction costs of 
registering and monitoring small emitters could be prohibitive. 
Theoretically, emission taxes would be capable of achieving targets in a 
cost-effective manner, by making sure marginal abatement costs are equal 
for all emitters if all sectors were covered. They would, nonetheless, 
impose much higher costs on emitters than grandfathered allowances, which 
were chosen as a starting point in EU-overall emission reduction efforts.  
 
The same reasoning may be applicable to the full auction of allowances, 
which may erode the international competitiveness of domestic industries. 
As noted in MacKenzie et al. (2008), grandfathering allocations resembles 
the usual distribution of property rights embedded in command and control 
environmental policies thus providing a “closer fit to existing 
regulatory approaches”. Nevertheless, grandfathering based on historical 
emissions can be seen as a reward to those installations that made low 
efforts to abate emissions in the past. For further insights about 
alternative allocation schemes see MacKenzie et al. (2008) and Böhringer 
and Lange (2005). They analyse the impact and optimality of implementing 
a dynamic relative performance mechanism for the initial allocation of 
pollution permits. Accordingly, the revision of the EU ETS, which will 
enter into force in January 2013, will reinforce the efficiency problems 
raised in this paragraph as it contemplates a greater share (above 50 %) 
of auctioned allowances. 
 
As for the second source of inefficiencies, although climate and energy 
policies often claim several goals, such as energy security, 
technological innovation, job creation, or local environmental 
improvements, the GHG emissions goal is the only one that is clearly 
defined and well reasoned. As Böhringer et al (2009a) note, excess costs 
created by additional policies may be treated as the “price tag” for 
other goals, but these need to be quantifiable and subjected to cost-
benefit analysis. These excess costs may be very significant. For 
instance, Böhringer et al (2009b), indicate that the overall inefficiency 
could translate into costs that are 100-125% too high by 2020 when 
compared to costs of reaching the simple emission reductions target. 
 
As a consequence, there is a growing literature on the costs of 
overlapping policies. The interaction between multiple policies has been 
Sectoral and regional impacts of the European Carbon Market in Portugal 
 
133 
 
surveyed in del Rio (2007) and most recently in Fischer and Preonas 
(2010). Eichner and Pethig (2010) and Böhringer et al (2008) analyse the 
interaction between the ETS and energy taxes, while Böhringer and 
Rosendahl (2010) discuss the simultaneous application of emissions quotas 
with renewable quotas, and Tol (2009) provides a cost analysis for 
different schemes of non-ETS reduction. Interestingly, the latter paper 
finds that Portugal may be one of the few countries where non-ETS 
allocations may be larger than projected emissions for 2020. 
 
Del Rio (2007) emphasizes that interactions between multiple policies are 
likely to be context-specific. For Portugal, a recent paper by Simões et 
al (2008) provides energy and environmental policy scenarios to gauge the 
impact of different policies on CO2 marginal abatement costs. Theirs is a 
partial-equilibrium model of Portuguese energy system which compares 
abatement costs for different hypothetical values of emission caps, to be 
achieved in the period 2020-2030. The reference scenario is one where 
existing policies (such as the ban on nuclear power and the renewable 
energy goals) continue to be implemented. This scenario is compared to 
alternative scenarios where emissions reductions are achieved without 
some of the existing restrictions, i.e. with more flexibility. The 
simulations indicate that the reference scenario has 42-91% higher 
marginal abatement costs than the scenarios where existing policy 
restrictions are dropped. It also implies that the full costs of the 
Portuguese energy system from 2000 to 2030 are 10-13% higher under the 
current policies than they could be if all reductions were allocated 
efficiently).  
 
Unfortunately, none of the Simões et al scenarios considers the 
possibility of emissions trading. Considering the global nature of GHG 
emissions and the transnational character of the EU ETS, country-specific 
caps are only the starting point since high-cost users can purchase 
allowances abroad instead of abating emissions domestically, thus 
lowering national compliance expenses. Thus, the authors’ estimated 
costs, assuming that specific emission targets have to be achieved within 
the national energy system, are higher than necessary.     
  
In Portugal, the current recessionary period provides a difficult 
background for a discussion of costly new policies, whether or not there 
are theoretical advantages. Nonetheless, existing fuel taxes could be 
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further adjusted to reflect emissions in transport, and electricity 
prices should be allowed to gradually increase to reflect true power-
generating costs. Some existing energy policies, such as a reduced VAT 
rate for energy or diesel fuel tax reductions, can be classified as 
environmentally harmful subsidies.59 These should ideally be removed. 
Furthermore the European Commission energy strategy “Energy 2020” points 
that “the quality of National Energy Efficiency Action Plans, developed 
by member states since 2008, is disappointing, leaving vast potential 
untapped” despite the fact that they are generally recognised as the most 
economic way of meeting the EU’s energy and climate change goals. For 
instance, houses and buildings produce on average around ¼ of national 
GHG in the EU. 
 
Ad-hoc partial targets (such as those for renewable power generation, 
energy efficiency and so on), existing or future, should be evaluated 
taking into account EU ETS carbon prices, allowing their cost-
effectiveness to be clearly assessed. This type of economic analysis was 
not performed to evaluate the National Program for Climate Change 
(PNAC)60 nor is it performed in the recent National Action Plan for 
Renewable Energy (PNAER)61, which lists a large number of policies, many 
of which are precisely ad-hoc targets. PNAER contains the mandatory 
estimates for quantitative policy impacts, but no cost assessment.  
 
Finally, our own results also indicate an additional problem that may 
come about, due to strict renewable energy targets, namely because 
hydroelectricity (as well as, to a lesser extent, wind power) can show 
significant variability, so that reliance on such energy sources may 
bring large, and possibly undesirable, fluctuations in compliance costs. 
This kind of problems could be removed, for instance, with further 
infrastructure investments in order to increase electricity grid 
connections through the EU. Besides that, infrastructure investments 
could contribute to solve some concerns raised by the European Commission 
energy strategy “Energy 2020”, as it explains that “the market is still 
largely fragmented into national markets with numerous barriers to open 
and fair competition”. 
                                                          
59
 Valsecchi et al (2009) define an environmentally harmful subsidy as: “A result of a 
government action that confers an advantage on consumers or producers, in order to 
supplement their income or lower their costs, but in doing so, discriminates against sound 
environmental practices.” 
60
 http://www.apambiente.pt/politicasambiente/AlteracoesClimaticas/PNAC/Paginas/default.aspx 
61
 PNAER, preliminary version for public consultation, available in http://www.dgge.pt/, 
June 2010 
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6.7 Conclusions  
 
This work provides an analysis of the consequences of the EU ETS for 
Portugal at the sectoral and regional level, the last one representing a 
novelty in the literature. We used data on allocated and verified 
emissions for all regulated installations for 2005 through 2009. We 
provide also, and that is one the main contribution of this chapter, 
economic data (aggregate and firm-level), when available, to provide 
context and relevance by pooling together data from the Community 
Transaction Log data base and regional and installations financial data. 
The country as a whole has been long, i.e. it has received more 
allowances than the emissions its industries produced, for every year 
since the EU ETS started operating, but the distribution between sectors 
and regions has been uneven.  
 
The first conclusion obtained from the raw emissions data deals with the 
pronounced inequality of the size distribution of Portuguese 
installations. Allowances are extremely concentrated in a small number of 
large installations. For instance, in 2005 50% of emissions came from 
1,6% of installations (the four largest ones), which is similar to 
overall EU values (1,8% of installations account for 50% of emissions, 
Kettner et al, 2008). Moreover, we show that, in Portugal, small emitters 
have generally had better positions, even if sectoral biases are taken 
into account, while, at the European level, installation-size allocation 
disparities are analogous but less clear-cut.  
 
A second conclusion refers to the sectoral effects of the EU ETS, where 
asymmetries are very pronounced. Only the thermoelectric generation 
sector has had significant negative balances (in 2005, 2008 and 2009), 
but even this sector was long in Phase I as a whole. The sectoral bias in 
the allotment of emissions is also clear at the European level, where the 
Power & Heat sector stands out for its net short positions in all periods 
(Kettner et al 2010). Some possible reasons for this bias are worries 
about competitiveness in tradable sectors and carbon leakage, as well as 
the apparent availability of cheaper abatement options in the sector. 
Interestingly, for Portugal the results for thermoelectric generation are 
seen to be highly dependent on weather conditions, namely precipitation, 
due to the necessity of replacing hydropower, which accounts for the most 
significant part of domestic energy production, when hydrological 
conditions are dry. A final point regarding the thermoelectric sector is 
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that unlike what has happened in many EU countries, price pass-through 
has not been a significant feature in the strongly-regulated Iberian 
market.   
 
Still, most installations in all sectors may have gained from EU ETS 
participation, with firms in sectors like ceramic and cogeneration 
showing considerable potential for additional revenues. Taking firm-level 
financial data into account, possible allowance sales are above 5% of 
operational revenues in most of the installations in these two sectors, 
and a few reach values above 20%. These results, however, need to be 
viewed with caution for various reasons. First of all, these sectors 
encompass many small installations, for which transaction costs can be a 
serious drain on resources. Secondly, low verified emissions can be a 
result of abatement efforts, entailing costs for firms that would need to 
be evaluated against possible allowance sales income. Thirdly, there is a 
clear difference between long and short positions: while the latter imply 
that firms need to buy additional allowances to make up for their 
deficit, the former are not necessarily brought to market. This is 
especially true for 2008 and 2009 data, as unsold allowances can be used 
in later years.  
 
A third set of conclusions deals with the regional impact. As expected, 
there is a high concentration of regulated emissions in a limited number 
of regions. Although the EU ETS does not have a specific regional focus, 
it is still instructive to look at the distributive consequences of 
participation. We find no obvious relationship between regional emissions 
and economic data (namely Industry GVA). Regions that house the main 
thermoelectric installations (in particular, those that have coal-based 
power production) show the highest asymmetries between emissions and 
Industry GVA and account for the greatest losses (allowance costs above 
1% of Industry GVA for at least one year). We also find evidence for 
larger EU ETS surpluses in the richer Portuguese regions, where non-ETS 
sectors account for more of the produced wealth.  
 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the transport sector, agriculture, 
households and other services are responsible for a large share of 
emissions but remain unregulated by the EU ETS. We provide a discussion 
of the literature on overlapping policies, highlighting two different 
issues: the inefficiency of unlinked policies for ETS and non-ETS 
Sectoral and regional impacts of the European Carbon Market in Portugal 
 
137 
 
reductions (since marginal abatement costs will not be equal in all 
sectors) and the inefficiency of multiple policies within each group of 
sectors. And this fact probably reinforces our concerns with the regional 
distribution of environmental costs. As policy interactions can be very 
complex, an important recommendation is for context-specific analysis, 
which indicates a need for more applied research for individual 
countries. 
 
Future research should focus on a regional-sectoral model of interaction, 
considering the key sectors, including EU ETS covered and uncovered 
sectors, or on the use of a GEM for the Portuguese economy that simulates 
alternative policies. Another important line of work is to provide 
econometric testing of the relationship between firm-level economic data 
and emissions (as is done for Germany in Anger and Oberndorfer, 2008; 
even though they worked with a small sample of firms, only 419). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 18 - Regional CO2 regulated Emissions, GVA and Industrial GVA (2005) 
 
Portuguese Regions 
Nuts III 
 
CO2 (ton)  CO2 (%) GVA % 
Industrial 
GVA % 
N
o
r
t
h 
Minho-Lima M-L 182.013 0,5 1,5 1,9 
Cavado Ca 28.426 0,1 3 4,2 
Ave Av 253.848 0,7 3,7 6,7 
Grande Porto GP 3.239.134 9,3 12 12,4 
Tâmega Ta 0 0 2,9 4,5 
Entre Douro e Vouga EDV 74.387 0,2 2,2 4,4 
Douro Do 3.998 0 1,4 0,9 
Alto-Trás-os-Montes ATM 10.936 0 1,4 1,2 
C
e
n
t
r
a
l 
Baixo Vouga BV 590.515 1,7 3,5 5,5 
Baixo Mondego BM 2.257.925 6,5 3,3 3,0 
Pinhal Litoral PL 1.792.759 5,2 2,5 4,0 
Pinhal Interior Norte PIN 142.624 0,4 0,8 1,0 
Dão-Lafões D-L 76.735 0,2 1,9 2,3 
Pinhal Interior Sul PIS 0 0 0,3 0,3 
Serra da Estrela SE 0 0 0,3 0,2 
Beira Interior Norte BIN 0 0 0,7 0,6 
Beira interior Sul BIS 31.220 0,1 0,6 0,5 
Cova da Beira CB 546 0 0,6 0,6 
Oeste Oe 96.261 0,3 2,8 3,3 
Médio Tejo MT 4.122.429 11,9 1,8 2,2 
Lisbon Grande Lisboa GL 4.796.533 13,8 31,8 20,8 
Península de Setúbal PS 4.011.021 11,6 5,2 5,8 
A
le
n
t
e
jo
 
Alentejo Litoral AL 11.131.160 32,1 1,3 2,3 
Alto Alentejo AA 40.307 0,1 1 0,7 
Alentejo Central AC 0 0 1,4 1,3 
Baixo Alentejo BA 8.191 0 1 0,9 
Lezíria do Tejo LT 383.273 1,1 2,1 2,2 
 Algarve Al 517.755 1,5 4,1 2,9 
 
Região Autónoma dos 
Açores RAA 463.588 1,3 2 1,4 
 
Região Autónoma da 
Madeira RAM 458.295 1,3 2,9 1,9 
 Portugal  34.713.872 100 100 100 
 
Source: Own elaboration using data from INE (2006). 
 
     
Table 19 - Percentage % of emissions covered by the SABI database 
Sector Coverage 2005 
Coverage 
2006 
Coverage 
2007 
Thermoelectric generation 34,04% 32,18% 35,74% 
Ceramic 85,72% 85,62% 70,93% 
Cement and lime 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
Cogeneration 100,00% 98,32% 78,37% 
Other Combustion facilities 60,88% 79,55% 60,48% 
Iron and Steel 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
Pulp and paper 97,56% 97,65% 98,37% 
Refineries 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
Glass 74,23% 96,46% 70,68% 
TOTAL 59,06% 58,98% 62,60% 
Source: Own elaboration  
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7. Conclusions and Future Perspectives 
 
 
Today economies face serious environmental problems, related in part with 
the emissions of greenhouse effect gases, in particular CO2. This 
environmental conscience jointly with the assumed commitments to change 
the present route, has taken various countries to apply policies that 
modify the harmful environmental behaviour. 
 
Any policy, and mainly when it uses price driven instruments, affects in 
some way the economic activities, as well as economic aggregates as 
employment, prices, GDP, etc. Thus, it is important to evaluate the 
economic impact of these environmental policies. 
 
A particular kind of policy known as GTR has been evaluated and 
implemented in many countries. It guarantees the neutrality of state 
revenues, recycling the environmental tax revenues in the reduction of 
other taxes with dead weight loss for the economy. In such a way, a 
double dividend, or double benefit can be reached, when improving the 
environment and the efficiency of the economy. 
 
The evaluation of these policies in empirical literature, when GEM are 
used, has proved to be trustworthy and realistic, (comparing to 
evaluations with partial equilibrium models, for example). As had been 
done for other countries, we thought it would be relevant to make this 
kind of study for Portugal. 
 
We investigated what kind of models was used for these studies, how the 
diverse economic activities and economic agents were modelized, and how 
environmental variables were introduced in an economic model. 
 
Thus following some examples in the literature we constructed the 
Portuguese model. We calibrate it through a Social and Environmental 
Accounting Matrix which, for a benchmark year, included all relevant 
economic and environmental information. 
 
After the model was calibrated and correctly functioning, we did some 
simulations to evaluate and present the economic effects of a GTR 
implemented in the Portuguese economy. Two kind of reforms where studied: 
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first, a reform with introduction of an environmental tax on fossil fuel 
consumption and recycling of revenues through SSC reduction; and second, 
the same reform but with recycling of revenues through lump sum 
transfers. We also made a sensibility analysis using three different 
values for the environmental tax. 
 
We conclude that, with a GTR with reduction in the social contributions 
due by employers, there is not a “double dividend” following the 
definitions presented in chapter one. We only can say that this policy 
lead to an “employment double dividend”, since it has important 
environmental effects and simultaneously improve employment. However, 
this reform would have a cost in economic terms, decreasing the real 
value added generated by the economy by a 0,4%, leading to a 
redistribution of the economic activity between the different sectors 
with positive but moderate effects on the price index (+1,3%) and no 
significant welfare effects. With a GTR with lump sum transfers there is 
a “double dividend” following the “weak” definition of Goulder, the 
definition of the public finance approach, and the definition of the 
environmental approach (see chapter one). Through Gimenez and Rodriguez 
definition we only obtain the first dividend but not the second one. In 
this reform we obtain environmental and welfare gains, but have an 
economic cost of -1%, measured in real GDPpa, with positive but moderate 
effects on the price index (+1,4%). 
 
The environmental improvement is slightly bigger in the simulation with 
lump sum transfers, because this is more focused in the environmental 
goal. The electricity sector is the one that reduces more emissions in 
both reforms.  
 
The sectors most damaged in production and prices are, as expected, the 
more energy intensive sectors. In terms of trade balance, we have a 
reduction of the energy bill in both kinds of simulation. 
 
When we raise the environmental goal, the economic cost rises in a bigger 
proportion, indicating a convex relationship, but this is not the case 
for the welfare costs. As we reduce emissions, there are economic costs 
that negatively affect welfare, but the environmental components become 
stronger and make these costs decrease. 
 
Conclusions and Future Perspectives 
 
145 
 
It is important to notice that these simulations present very modest 
results concerning job creation, GDP variation and prices, because full 
employment is assumed as a benchmark and, in reality, Portugal has a rate 
of unemployment clearly different from zero. On the other hand, the model 
does not consider the possibility of adaptation to the carbon tax through 
technology change and through measures to improve efficiency. Therefore, 
the scenario is more pessimistic in terms of tax induced employment 
variation. Beyond this, we consider a unilateral application of the tax 
by Portugal.  
 
In parallel with the work above, we did a sectoral and regional study of 
another environmental policy (which is already in place), the ECM. Due to 
its complexity and for lack of data, we could not use the constructed GEM 
to do such evaluation. We used data on allocated and verified emissions 
for all regulated installations from 2005 through 2009. We provide also 
economic data (aggregate and firm-level), when available, to provide 
context and relevance, by pooling together data from the Community 
Transaction Log data base, regional data and individual installations 
financial data. The country as a whole has been long, i.e., it has 
received more allowances than the emissions produced by the regulated 
industries, for every year since the EU ETS started operating; however, 
the distribution between sectors and regions has been uneven. 
 
From this analysis of the EU ETS we conclude that there is a pronounced 
inequality of the size distribution of Portuguese installations. 
Allowances are extremely concentrated in a small number of large 
installations. Moreover, we show that, in Portugal, small emitters have 
generally had better positions, even if sectoral biases are taken into 
account, while at the European level installation-size allocation 
disparities are analogous but less clear-cut.  
 
At a sectoral level, the asymmetries are very pronounced. Only the 
thermoelectric generation sector has had significant negative balances 
(in 2005, 2008 and 2009), but even this sector was long for the whole 
period.  
 
Still, most installations in all sectors may have gained from EU ETS 
participation, with firms in sectors like ceramic and cogeneration 
showing considerable potential for raising revenues from permit sales.  
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At the regional level, there is a high concentration of regulated 
emissions in a limited number of regions. We find no obvious relationship 
between regional emissions and economic data (namely Industry GVA). 
Regions that house the main thermoelectric installations (in particular, 
those that have coal-based power production) show the highest asymmetries 
between emissions and Industry GVA and account for the greatest losses 
(allowance costs above 1% of Industry GVA for at least one year). We also 
find evidence for larger EU ETS surpluses in the richer Portuguese 
regions, where non-ETS sectors account for much of the produced wealth.  
 
It should be emphasized that the transport sector, agriculture, 
households and other services are responsible for a large share of 
emissions but remain unregulated by the EU ETS. We provide a discussion 
of the literature on overlapping policies, highlighting two different 
issues: the inefficiency of unlinked policies for ETS and non-ETS 
reductions (since marginal abatement costs will not be equal in all 
sectors) and the inefficiency of multiple policies within each group of 
sectors. And this fact probably reinforces our concerns with the regional 
distribution of environmental costs. As policy interactions can be very 
complex, an important recommendation is for context-specific analysis, 
which indicates a need for more applied research for individual 
countries. 
 
From the studies made in this thesis, we can make some policy 
reflections. First, we can say that it could be viable from an economic 
and political point of view to implement a GTR with perhaps a kind of 
total or partial exemption to the transport sector, which is already 
burdened with a high level of taxation, basing the main incidence of 
fossil fuel taxes in the consumption for electricity production, services 
or households. Second, a hybrid policy that concerns EU ETS plus an 
environmental tax for the non covered sectors, in a GTR context, would be 
a good bet, as in this way we make all CO2 emitters responsible and 
minimize the cost of the reform. The auctioning of licenses instead of 
grandfathering would function as a CO2 tax for the covered sectors, which 
would be coherent with some of the reflections raised by the European 
Commission for the Post Kyoto design of the EU ETS. 
 
Future research should focus on a model of interaction of diverse 
environmental policies, like EU ETS and GTR, or on the use of a General 
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Equilibrium Model for the Portuguese economy that simulates alternative 
policies, but accounting for the actual unemployment level in the 
Portuguese labour market. Another important line of work is to provide 
econometric testing of the relationship between firm-level economic data 
and emissions. It would also be interesting to develop an integrated 
model to link the Portuguese GEM with partial equilibrium models, like 
technological or microeconomic models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
